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17 APRIL 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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17 APRIL 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN OVER SDI, ABM TREATY NOTED

Reagan Meets Congressmen

LD261454 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 26 TASS -- President Reagan Wednesday met with a group of Republican congressmen on Capitol Hill and reiterated his determination to press on with his notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative" for building a partially space-based missiles defense.

He asserted that SDI was insurance policy against a first nuclear strike, an accidental nuclear missile launch and the probability of a nuclear missile falling into the hands of, and being fired by, a fanatic or a mentally unstable dictator.

Reagan voiced content with the progress achieved in the SDI effort.

But ABC television in an SDI-related story the same day accused his administration of blatantly cheating Americans when telling them of "spectacular progress" made in the "Star Wars" program which has already devoured eight billion dollars.

The TV network said administration officials had been announcing one success after another but some of the widely publicized experiments had been nothing more than P.R. tricks.

In September 1985, the Pentagon, for example, hyped as a "breakthrough in the development of chemical laser technology" and experiment in which the third stage of a rocket was destroyed on earth.

The ABC said it had transpired later that the rocket had been blown up with ordinary explosives.

A report drawn up by the staff of three American senators in March last year warned that SDI experiments could mean trickery that was only meant to ensure a steady stream of money for the "Star Wars" project.

Commenting on Reagan's description of SDI as insurance policy against a first nuclear strike, the ABC said the development of such a system would be seen by the Soviet Union precisely as the U.S. preparation of such a strike.

Nunn Criticizes 'Broad Interpretation'

LD290547 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 28 Mar 87

[Text] And now we come to "Moscow Viewpoint," contributed as usual by Dr Valentin Zorin:

The investigation into the arms to Iran scandal under way in Washington has revealed some staggering facts. It transpired that officials in high places have been violating the law for 6 years and keeping the American people in the dark about it. More importantly, the investigations confirmed the view that contempt of the law and international obligations is a rule, rather than an exception to the rule, as far as this administration is concerned.

This is born out by the maneuvering of the administration with a view to torpedoing the ABM Treaty, signed in 1972 by President of the United States and ratified by the Senate. The treaty has been in force for 10 years, giving rise to no doubts as to its interpretation, either in Washington or Moscow. At some stage the masterminds of the Star Wars program realized that the treaty stands in the way of their plans and decided to fabricate the so-called loose interpretation of the treaty in order to advance one step nearer to bringing weapons to outer space.

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, has carefully studied the problem and his report exposes a gross distortions [as heard] the fact by State Department lawyers. In Senator Nunn's opinion the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty has no legal basis whatever. It's a gross violation of the law and America's international obligations, aimed at satisfying the political whims of some members of the administration.

There's a good reason for considering the arms to Iran row and the so-called broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty in the same context. In both cases the administration showed contempt of its international obligations and ignored the decisions of the United States' legislature. The question is whether what American leaders are saying can be trusted at all. The principle whereby treaties are to be respected goes back to Roman law and is fundamental to international law. Washington's lack of respect for century-old legal traditions does serious damage to the moral prestige of the United States.

Senate Hearings

LD020940 Moscow TASS in English 0902 GMT 2 Apr 87

[Text] Washington April 2 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reporting:

Richard Godwin, U.S. undersecretary of defense for acquisitions, appeared before the Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee Wednesday.

In his prepared remarks for the senators he maintained the Pentagon was conducting work under the program for the development of a strategic defense system with space-based elements in strict compliance with the "restrictive" interpretation of the 1972 USSR-U.S. treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

At the same time he announced that it was planned "to conduct nine major experiments between now and the end of fiscal year 1989" involving SDI components.

General James Abrahamson, director of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" organization, also appeared before the subcommittee. For his part, he assured the senators there were no plans at all to test before the end of the decade kinetic kill weapons developed under the "Star Wars" program. He demanded the administration's request for increased SDI funding in fiscal year 1988 be met -- something to which a growing number of legislators is strongly opposed.

The subcommittee chairman Senator James Exon (Democrat -- Nebraska) emphasized that the administration was causing a lot of confusion on the question of whether the "star Wars" program complied with the ABM Treaty ratified by the United States Senate in its present, "narrow", interpretation.

In this context observers note the Pentagon is causing confusion on that matter with far-reaching aims. On the one hand, the administration is maneuvering in a bid to dampen the intensity of protests among the legislators, scientists and members of the public who are opposed to the administration's plans to arbitrarily interpret the important international document.

On the other hand, the White House would like to "interpret" the treaty in such a way so as to make it null and, in doing so, to untie its hands for projecting the arms race to outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1392

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS CRITIQUES REAGAN REMARKS AT 20 MARCH NEWS CONFERENCE

Grechko Citation Noted

LD201826 Moscow TASS in English 1812 GMT 20 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan was asked at a news conference in Washington to comment on the conclusions of leading American specialists that the records of the talks on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile defense systems did not bear out a "broad" interpretation of the ABM treaty, which would allow the United States "lawfully" to go ahead with its "star wars" programme.

Reagan said that he had anticipated such a question and even had taken something along to the news conference. However, to the journalists' disappointment, he evaded the question. Instead, the President offered his own interpretation of a statement by the late Andrey Grechko, marshal of the Soviet Union, who some 15 years ago commented on the admissibility of research into anti-missile defenses within the limitations of the Soviet-American 1972 treaty. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, voiced surprise about Reagan's statement and said that Marshal Grechko's views of 1972 were totally irrelevant to the "broader interpretation" of the ABM treaty now advocated by the U.S. Administration.

This manner of conducting news conference can be hardly explained away by the President's habitual forgetfulness and absent-mindedness. The world public also reacts skeptically to Reagan's explanation of his search for new "arguments" to back SDI by his desire to remain within legal stipulations.

The "Star Wars" proponents in the U.S. began their attacks on the ABM Treaty with legalistic claims that the sides had decided to limit only those ABM systems which had existed in 1972 and that ABM weapons based on new physical principles, such as laser and particle-beam technology, were not subject to any limitations. A painstaking analysis of the text of the treaty and supplements to it, which was conducted by leading specialists, including American ones, showed that the "legal arguments" of the White House in defense of "Star Wars" were built on sand.

Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger and his aides then decided to prove the "admissibility" of the militarisation of space with quotations from the records of the Soviet-American talks. But those arguments, too, were rebutted by American participants in the ABM talks.

The fuss of the "Star Wars" apologists in Washington as they try to find justification for the "Strategic Defense Initiative" and the controversy and vagueness of their half-baked "arguments" forcefully demonstrate the true worth of the claims of the White House that it is going to respect the ABM Treaty and the obligation assumed at the Soviet-American summit in Geneva to make efforts to prevent the arms race from spreading into outer space.

'Broad Interpretation'

PM231413 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Questions Without Answers: White House Press Conference"]

[Excerpt]

Washington, 20 Mar -- President R. Reagan admitted at a news conference held in the White House that the Pentagon's desire to open the way for testing and deploying components of the "Star Wars" program in space is behind the plans to switch to the so-called "broad interpretation" of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). The President said that hitherto the United States had adhered to this document's traditional interpretation since, in his words, "this changed nothing for the Strategic Defense Initiative." "But," he went on, "as work within the SDI framework and the creation [sozdaniye] of SDI means advanced, we understood that a time was coming when this narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty could only hinder us and pull back the work done by us on the creation [sozdaniye] of new systems." "You arrived at this broad interpretation quite some time ago. How soon do you intend to implement it?", he was asked. "We have not made a decision yet, since we are still acting within the narrow interpretation's framework and so far have had no grounds to go beyond it. It will be some time before we do so." Clearly preparing the ground to torpedo this document by means of, as he put it, a "more liberal" interpretation of the treaty, the President groundlessly claimed that the Soviet Union has by its own actions "gone altogether beyond the framework" of the ABM Treaty.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: U.S. PREPARING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SDI PROGRAM

Ready to 'Breach' ABM Treaty

LD231910 Moscow TASS in English 1846 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 23 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

A debate about the implementation of the "Star Wars" plans is apparently taking a new turn in the top echelons in the USA. Chief of the Pentagon Caspar Weinberger actually admitted the hopelessness of the attempts of the White House to prove juridically that the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" is in keeping with the United States obligations under the 1972 treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. The U.S. secretary of defence is of the opinion that the further debate on this question would take the U.S. Administration to a "slippery road" and would cause a considerable delay about the deployment of a large-scale ABM system.

The U.S. defence secretary said in an interview to the NBC television network: "I think what we ought to be looking at is not a lawyer's argument about who said what to whom in 1972" about the ABM Treaty. He believes the main task is to enable the President of the United States to implement the "new strategic concept" which, as is known, is based on the deployment of 1,000 units of U.S. strike weapons in space. At the same time the Pentagon's chief scorned the warning about the possibility of a confrontation between the White House and the U.S. Congress which insists on the observance of the constitution in resolving the SDI question.

The efforts of the White House to substantiate juridically the plans of "Star Wars" has been failing one after another of late. A report of legal adviser of the State Department Abraham Sofaer was used recently by the Reagan administration as one of the main arguments in favour of a large-scale ABM system. Abraham Sofaer was assigned the task to prove that SDI does not contradict the ABM Treaty. And quite recently Sofaer wrote to the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee that his report had not included important materials which contradict the main conclusion on the permissibility of SDI. The legal adviser of the State Department explained the flaws of the report by the fact that it had been compiled on the basis of conclusions drawn by "young and inexperienced" lawyers.

The Reagan administration is clearly in a hurry to make the process of the militarisation of space irreversible. Weinberger's statement to the NBC confirms the conclusion that Washington is prepared to stay within its obligations under treaties as long as they do not interfere with the implementation of the U.S. military programmes. Following this principle the Reagan administration has already abandoned the SALT-2

treaty and the 1972 agreement on strategic offensive arms. And now the United States is apparently prepared to breach the ABM Treaty, thus opening the road for uncontrolled militarisation of outer space.

'Aggressive' Space Doctrine

LD232259 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT 23 Mar 87

[Text] New York March 23 TASS -- The Pentagon has drawn up a new U.S. space doctrine which is more aggressive than the previous one. This was reported today by the NBC Television Company with reference to the sources in the Department of Defense.

According to NBC, under the new strategy the Defense Department proposes to use on a greater scale unmanned rockets along with shuttle spacecraft for putting satellites into orbit. NBC pointed out that apart from it the new strategy envisaged more military specialists working in outer space. They will be included in the crew of a U.S. orbital station, will service satellites and conduct experiments within the framework of the "Star Wars" program.

NBC emphasized that the new doctrine was adopted at the time when the U.S. space program is already oriented too much towards military goals. Since 1980 U.S. expenditures for military space projects have more than doubled to reach 18 billion dollars in 1987, while allocations for civilian space programs remained practically on the same level.

More on Doctrine

LD241410 Moscow TASS in English 1227 GMT 24 Mar 87

[Text] New York March 24 TASS -- TASS Correspondent Andrey Chytov and Arkadiy Sidoruk report:

The Pentagon has published a new U.S. space doctrine providing for wider uses for unmanned vehicles to orbit its satellites.

Besides, it plans to increase the number of military specialists to work in outer space as part of the crew of an orbiting station currently designed in the United States, NBC television reported. Their mission will be to service satellites and stage "Star Wars" experiments.

The TV network said there was a pronounced slant in the U.S. space program to the military's advantage: from 1980, spending on military projects in outer space had doubled.

Robert Bowman, president of the Institute for Space and Security Studies, has said in the space and security news bulletin that the "Star Wars" program is a U.S. attempt to establish control over outer space and make a pre-emptive strike at the arms control process.

Noel Gayler, former director of the National Security Agency, has criticized the Washington Administration's intention to adopt a new interpretation of the Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty of 1972.

Speaking in a TASS interview, he said abiding by signed agreements was exceptionally important to mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It was essentially that the disarmament talks between the two countries be conducted on a basis of respect for their mutual interests, he said.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA: FORMER U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARIES URGE ABM ADHERENCE

PM160849 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Mayskiy "Commentator's Column": "Sober Voices"]

[Text] Six former U.S. defense secretaries have sent the White House and Congress a message in which they defend the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. The appeal by these eminent U.S. figures reflects the serious concern at the attempts by the enemies of arms control to derail this highly important agreement and also the SALT II Treaty.

As has already been reported, the Pentagon and the U.S. military-industrial complex that stands behind it have launched an aggressive campaign of attacking the ABM Treaty in an attempt to win a free hand for the militarization of space. In particular, it is a question of rejecting agreed commitments sealed with the two sides' signatures and adopting some "new interpretation" of the treaty which would justify full-scale testing of "Star Wars" weapons and their subsequent launch into near-earth orbit.

Categorically opposing this course, former Defense Secretaries R. McNamara, C. Clifford, M. Laird, E. Richardson, J. Schlesinger and H. Brown stated: "The USSR and the United States must avoid actions which undermine the ABM Treaty because it helps to guarantee the effectiveness of strategic deterrence forces and makes it possible to hold talks on considerable reductions in strategic offensive arms." That is why, the message states, "We believe that the United States must adhere to its traditional interpretation of the treaty's key provision, which prohibits the development [razrabotka] and testing of antimissile systems aboard aircraft or ships or in space."

Previously a group of leading legislators had issued a serious warning against the attempts to bury the treaty. They warned the White House about the reality of "constitutional confrontation on an enormous scale." "The administration would be making a serious mistake in stepping up the arms race. If the President tries to do this, he can expect a riot from the Congress majority," J. Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives, said. S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that there are no legal grounds for a "broad interpretation" of the treaty.

As we can see, concern at the Pentagon undermining of virtually the entire arms control system has become so obvious that sober voices calling for an

end to the course of wrecking the ABM Treaty are being heard even in the upper echelons of the U.S. political system.

And although the backers of militarism in the White House and the Pentagon continue to make short shrift of the ABM Treaty and to ensure that SDI development [razrabotka] is irreversible, there is widening and mounting resistance to this adventurist scheme. Sober-minded America advocates mankind being given a chance to avoid self-destruction so as to prevent the demolition of the last obstacles in the way of transferring the arms race to space.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA: U.S. FAILS TO 'COAX' NATO SUPPORT

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 4 Mar 87 pp 1-2

[Vladislav Drobkov article: "Misfire"]

[Text] The consultations that Washington used to hold with its NATO partners until recently looked rather like successful (for the U.S.) arm-twisting exercises.

Now, to judge by the initial results of the visits by Paul Nitze and Richard Perle to Western Europe, things are somewhat different. Washington's high-ranking emissaries will come back home practically empty-handed. They have failed to coax the West European NATO partners into anything like unconditional support for the Administration's "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty.

Let me remind you that such an "interpretation," which is an attempt at distorting the very sum and substance of the Treaty, has been designed to justify full-scale tests under the SDI programme scheduled for the next few years. And that, in turn, would open up the way to a speedy implementation of the first phase of the "Star Wars" project. So Washington is trying not only to get rid of the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty but to start an irreversible process of putting weapons into space. After a series of conferences at the White House, President Reagan has signed a directive giving the green light for this reckless venture.

Washington's initiative taken in the heat of the Irangate scandal to show off the Administration's "firmness" has really disturbed the allies. They have found SDI to be capable, even at this point, of blowing up the last bridge that could stop a further arms build-up. U.S. action has come under criticism even in those NATO capitals which are normally ready and willing to back up Washington's course. And the visit by high-ranking emissaries has shown that this criticism is becoming increasingly scathing.

In Bonn, Nitze and Perle were told that the West German Government stood for the observance of the ABM Treaty in its original interpretation. A similar stance has been taken up in London, Brussels, Rome and The Hague. In some places, it has even been declared that if the U.S. ventures upon a "broad interpretation" to the ABM Treaty on its own, the partners will have to

reconsider the terms of their participation in the SDI programme. Even at the NATO ministerial session, American representatives have been told that their behaviour is inadmissible.

So, the allies have declared, with rare unanimity, their disagreement with the Administration's course of action. But the point is whether the U.S. is willing to heed those anxious voices.

In spite of the Western European misfire, leading members of the Administration, such as the Pentagon chief, Weinberger, go on doing things as if the decision to pass over to a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty has been taken finally and irreversibly. The British Guardian has called Weinberger's acts and statements a "mockery" of the consultation process in NATO. In the meantime, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adelman, has arrogantly declared that the allies have no right at all to tell the Americans what the correct interpretation of the ABM Treaty is.

The main upshot of the U.S. consultations with its NATO partners in such circumstances can only be to raise tension in relations between them.

(PRAVDA, March 4. In full.)

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR CD ENVOY ASKS INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORATE ON SPACE LAUNCHES

Addresses Anniversary Session

PM201149 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Kusnetsov dispatch: "Responsible Tasks"]

[Text] Geneva -- The disarmament conference is celebrating its 25th anniversary.

In marking this date, the representatives of Norway, the GDR, and Bulgaria stressed in their speeches at the last plenary session that international practice persistently demands that the multilateral disarmament talks be stepped up and become more fruitful, that important agreements be reached on the fundamental questions of ending the arms race and nuclear tests, and that a convention be concluded banning chemical weapons. Space problems have a special place in the conference's work. The Sri Lankan, Egyptian, Swedish, French, Hungarian, and other delegations expressed alarm over the plans to transfer the arms race to space and called for their implementation to be prevented.

"We cannot close our eyes," Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation, said in his speech, "to the fact that over the last few decades not a single international agreement has been reached at the Disarmament Conference. The conference, we believe, should be used as far as possible for overcoming the obstacles in the way of intensive and productive talks. It is a question of crucial tasks linked with mankind's survival.

"At the same time," the Soviet delegate noted, "we are satisfied about the creation of a special committee on the prevention of an arms race in space, and reaffirm our readiness to actively and constructively participate in its work. The Soviet delegation believes that opportunities already exist for reaching agreement on partial measures to prevent the launching of arms into space and, in particular, to embark on the drafting of agreements on immunity for artificial earth satellites and the banning of antisatellite weapons."

In order to get things moving, the USSR proposes examining the possibility of setting up international verification [kontrol] of the prevention of placing any weapons in space -- verification [kontrol] that envisages the establishment of an international inspectorate with the right of access to any launch sites. It could monitor any space launches.

The Soviet representative also called for the work on an agreed convention banning radiological weapons to be accelerated. For its part, the Soviet delegation, urging the conference participants to approach this problem with the utmost seriousness and to take practical steps toward solving it, is prepared to examine various plans from other countries.

Details of Proposal

AU171321 Paris AFP in English 1310 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva, March 17 (AFP)--Moscow on Tuesday fired a salvo at the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by calling for the creation of an international inspectorate to enforce a ban on the launch of all space weapons.

Speaking at the United Nations conference on disarmament here Soviet delegation chief Yuriy Nazarkin said the inspectorate should be able to carry out random checks on any proposed launch to prevent the deployment of weapons in space.

He said that by "weapons in space" Moscow meant anti-missile systems such as SDI, space weapons to hit targets on earth or in the earth's atmosphere, and weapons to hit targets in space, wherever they were based.

He said the proposed inspectorate "would be given the right of access, for the purpose of on-site inspection, to all objects designed to be launched and stationed in outer space, and to their corresponding launching vehicles. Inspectors could monitor any launches of space objects."

Mr. Nazarkin also called for a treaty to protect the nuclear power industry from attack. He said: "We believe it necessary to start elaborating an appropriate international agreement under which states would undertake not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities."

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S ARBATOV: 'ILLUSION OF IMPENETRABLE SHIELD'

WA201350 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 8, 2 Mar 87 pp 14-15

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Aleksey Arbatov: "The Illusion of an Impenetrable Shield"]

[Text] Many of the advocates of the Strategic Defence Initiative now avoid discussing concrete questions: what type of anti-missile system they are going to build and how effective it is likely to be, how much money and time such a system will take, how to make it invulnerable to countermeasures from the other side, how compatible attempts to speed up the implementation of the SDI programme are with the ABM treaty, what will happen if SDI fails to provide hardware for an anti-missile system and if the ABM treaty and the dialogue on arms limitation in general have by then been irreparably wrecked.

Instead of answering these questions, the proponents of SDI often enter into discourses of a philosophical nature, arguing that the centuries-old history of wars and the art of war has always seen a dialectic between the "shield" and the "sword," defence and attack. This rivalry has proceeded with alternating success: as more powerful weapons were invented, the doctrine of attack prevailed, to be followed inevitably by emphasis on defence, and so forth. For all their monstrous and devastating power, nuclear missiles are not exempt from this dialectical law, the champions of SDI assert.

Invoking historical experience, elementary logic and moral principles impresses public opinion, because many people are naturally unable to perceive the complex military-technical and operational-strategic aspects of the problem on their own. For this reason the defence-attack aspect of the current polemic surrounding SDI merits attention, the more so as devotees of this programme, using plausible scientific arguments, try to prove that weapons will be developed in the future as well.

Offensive or Defensive Weapon

Indeed, more often than not, offence and defence have been relative, not absolute, categories. A shield is certainly a classic means of defence. But the conclusion is different if we consider not the weapon as such but how it is used in fighting. The shield and coat of mail were attributes of offensive warfare in the Middle Ages. Artillery had an even more obvious dual purpose: it was a means of defending a fortress, and an offensive weapon to be used in sieges.

Many other instances of the kind could be cited. Cases where the role of a weapon changes depending on tactics and strategy are numerous in history. Engels wrote of the

competitive struggle between armour-plating and the guns on battleships, burghers' arquebuses and the armour of the knights. Nuclear arms are no exception to the dialectical laws governing the development of weaponry. But the incessant rivalry between defence and offence has always been manifested in concrete forms.

In the relation of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, the situation has changed periodically, just as it happened in earlier history. On the technical and tactical plane, attack and defence are competing with each other as regards the destructive power and target accuracy of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and enhancing their invulnerability to an enemy nuclear strike, on the other.

In the latter case, steps are being taken to provide better protection for the silo launchers of land-based missiles, enhance the invulnerability of missiles by deploying mobile launchers, and ensure the secrecy of patrols by missile-carrying submarines in the ocean and the quick takeoff of bombers from airfields.

The nuclear arms of one side are primarily offensive weapons against the peaceful installations of the other. As military theorists concluded long ago, the possibility of annihilating the essential values of a state -- its population, economic potential and administrative bodies -- before, or regardless of, wiping out its military potential has meant a drastic change brought about by nuclear missiles in the art and science of warfare.

In the past, the victor gained access to these values only after the enemy had been defeated. The United States hoped to realize this possibility in the 1940s and 1950s, first by relying on its monopoly of nuclear weapons and subsequently, by taking advantage of its territory being beyond the range of Soviet nuclear missiles.

The dialectical law of "negation of the negation" was also manifested with regard to nuclear strategy. As soon as the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons and intercontinental carriers, its armed forces acquired the potential to deal a retaliatory blow at vitally important enemy centres, also without engaging the enemy's armed forces.

The traditional situation between the nuclear powers has been restored, but in an entirely new form. Without crushing the armed forces and, in particular, the nuclear armaments, of the other side, its population and economy cannot be subjugated or wiped out, not because they are protected by troops, but because the other side can strike a devastating retaliatory blow at the aggressor.

Given nuclear parity, a successful attack and victory have become impossible unless the aggressor is able to avert a devastating retaliation or reduce its effect to the minimum. In other words, strategic superiority has also become unattainable.

Hence the conclusion that the effectiveness of an attack is now measured by the ability to destroy the nuclear armaments of the other side as well as its combat control and communication system, while the power of defence is measured by the ability of the strategic forces to survive even in a surprise attack and deliver a crushing retaliation. This is the chief defence factor in the relation of the nuclear forces of both sides, where defence appears primarily as the potential deterrence of the likely aggressor from attack, and not as a traditional means of repelling such an attack.

From the late 1940s to the mid-1960s, with the United States' considerable nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, strategic attack obviously prevailed over defence. The United States calculated on destroying the greater part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in a first strike. This was the reason for the instability in the correlation

of military forces and, consequently, for the political tension of those years and the serious danger of nuclear war.

In the latter half of the 1960s, the Soviet Union took measures to build up its strategic potential and, as a result, the military situation began to stabilize. In the 1970s the survivability of nuclear weapons was enhanced in the conditions of approximate parity recorded in the SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties.

This increased the ability of the two powers to deliver a retaliatory blow, and strengthened the factor of mutual deterrence.

There were negative factors as well. The increased numbers of nuclear warheads, the development of new weapon systems, and the appearance of destabilizing concepts (of a "limited nuclear war," for instance) adversely affected the nuclear balance. Remaining basically offensive in technical and operational terms, the nuclear armaments of both powers formed an overall strategic balance of forces between the late 1960s and early 1980s in which defence (that is, the reliability of the retaliatory potential) evidently predominated over attack. A substantial growth in the stability of strategic parity could be viewed as a factor for deterrence.

Trying to Upset Parity

Another tendency has become manifest in the mid-1980s. The new systems MX, Trident-2 and Midgetman, B-1B and cruise missiles of different types will enable the United States to treble by the mid-1990s, as compared with the early 1980s, its potential to destroy the other side's protected ground objectives, while the proportion of U.S. nuclear missiles that can be fired from concealed positions and reach their targets within 30 minutes will have risen 20-fold.

Given the present strategic alignment of forces, these programmes will not of course give Washington the capacity to deal an annihilating first strike. The countermeasures taken by the Soviet Union will certainly provide for the greater combat power, survivability and effectiveness of its strategic forces and the maintenance of its defence might at the proper level. However, the absolute and relative growth, in the overall military balance, of the proportion of weapons that can deliver an annihilating strike and become increasingly vulnerable to such a strike is unquestionably a destabilizing tendency. It means a relative strengthening of attack to the detriment of defence. For instance, the strategic doctrine of the Reagan administration lays emphasis on "limited and protracted nuclear war," a "preemptive" and "encounter" strike (strike on warning) and a "decapitating" strike. If this trend continues, strategic parity as a factor in military-political deterrence will gradually lose its effectiveness.

As for the defence-offence dynamics of the military balance, the mechanical application of previous manifestations of this process (which, incidentally, never assumed absolute or unambiguous forms in the past either) in the entirely new military-political situation is inadmissible. Weapons, defensive in the technical and operational sense (for instance, many types of anti-missile systems in combination with offensive nuclear weapons), could become a component of attack to a much greater extent than, for example, tanks.

The possibility of developing absolutely reliable means of protecting the population from nuclear weapons, especially from ballistic missiles, is to be ruled out even theoretically. Not a single weapon system or piece of equipment can be one hundred per cent reliable and effective. Furthermore, the destructive power of even the few nuclear warheads that could penetrate the ABM system under any circumstances makes the

impotence of defence in protecting the population more evident than ever before. With less than one hundred per cent effectiveness; a sophisticated and extremely costly ABM system with space-based elements for protecting the administrative and industrial centres would be quite useless in repulsing a first massive nuclear strike at these objectives.

At the same time, even a partially effective anti-missile system of this type can greatly destabilize the strategic balance. It may create a highly dangerous illusion that a less powerful retaliatory strike from the other side, after it has been weakened and disorganized by a surprise nuclear attack on its strategic forces, can be repulsed. The potential of attack (first strike) will gain superiority over defence (retaliatory strike). Moreover, if the potentials of both sides are symmetrical, an asymmetrical response is especially necessary to SDI. Such a response should counter the space-based ABM system with a view to enhancing retaliatory capacity, stability and deterrence.

Thus, the dialectics of the nuclear-missile balance throw new light on both offensive and defensive armaments and radically change their traditional role in the ratio of offence and defence. It is this circumstance that is being deliberately or inadvertently ignored by advocates of SDI.

The genuine dialectics of the nuclear and space age call for a new approach to the problem of defence potential and stability. Without large-scale ABM systems, the balance of offensive nuclear forces is the more stable, the less the ability to weaken retaliatory power with a first strike, and the more reliable the deterrent ability of each state to make an adequate retaliatory strike.

Since the security of the Soviet Union and the United States in the nuclear age can only be mutual, stability implies an overall balance of the forces of both powers and a symmetrical, mutual confidence in the reliability of their deterrent potentials at, incidentally, the lowest possible level of these deadly arsenals, with their reduction to the minimum reasonable sufficiency and, ultimately, the complete abolition of strategic potential and nuclear weapons.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET MILITARY PAPER ON 'DESTABILIZATION' POTENTIAL OF SDI

PM171241 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[L. Semeyko article: "SDI Is a Path to Destabilization"]

[Text] The question of the pernicious consequences of the "Star Wars" program is becoming increasingly acute in relation to the U.S. Administration's desire to accelerate its implementation. One of these consequences would be the destabilization of the strategic balance. Why? What could all these lead to?

Let us turn first to the present strategic situation, which is characterized not only by approximate Soviet-American parity. Even without space strike arms it is extremely tense because the levels of military confrontation -- and nuclear confrontation above all -- are very high.

Therefore the existing equilibrium is not a panacea against the threat of nuclear war being unleashed. The inordinately high level of the balance of nuclear potentials for the time being ensures an equal danger for the opposing sides, whereas it is vitally necessary to ensure the reverse -- a situation of reliable and equal security. The new political thinking proposed by the Soviet Union indicates the ways to create this. These include an appeal to the United States and NATO to abandon the power politics of nuclear deterrence, reliance on which is now hindering the reduction and elimination of the nuclear threat by reducing and destroying nuclear arsenals. It is necessary to acknowledge the irrefutable truth that the more nuclear weapons there are, the greater is the likelihood of a fateful malfunction. It is exceptionally important to preserve the possibility of assured forecasting of the state of the strategic situation. This can only be achieved by means of an agreed reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation and the elimination of mistrust and mutual suspicion.

Soviet military doctrine envisages the need to maintain military-strategic parity, consistently lower its level, and strengthen strategic stability. The USSR has never initiated the development [razrabotka] and creation [sozdaniye] of new kinds of arms.

However, the U.S. military-political leadership adheres to opposite principles, which are passed off as something "new." Defense Secretary C. Weinberger poses the task of "defining anew the relationship between the USSR and the United States" in order to "build our relations from a position of strength and, in the long term, from a position of still greater strength." "Still greater strength" in the strategic sphere means not only the latest nuclear weapon systems but also space strike arms. This is precisely the monstrous symbiosis that can undermine both military-strategic equilibrium and the stability of the strategic situation as a whole and make the threat of war irreversible.

More and more new leaps in the race for interconnected -- space and nuclear -- arms would sharply change the nature of the correlation of strategic forces, make its objective assessment increasingly complex, and give rise to what is reasonably called strategic chaos. For it would be impossible to judge the state of the strategic chaos. For it would be impossible to judge the state of the strategic balance by comparing just what the United States calls the "nuclear sword," that is, strategic offensive forces. It would also be necessary to take into account the so-called "ABM shield," which would include space strike arms capable of fulfilling not only defensive but also offensive functions or, in other words, capable of ensuring the infliction of a first strike. It is also important to bear in mind the nuclear attack scenarios (which would be drawn up on the other side of the ocean in the hope of weakening a counterstrike with the help of the realized SDI program), the effectiveness of countermeasures (there could be many of them), and other factors.

It is hard to analyze the supposed results of the "star clash" which would ensue in the course of a sudden attack and a counterstrike. But even if particular results seemed convincing for one side, this certainly would not mean that analogous (or close) results would be obtained by the other side. Even now that military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States has been repeatedly verified by the sides, allegations of "Soviet superiority" are constantly emerging in Washington, albeit by way of political demagoguery. How, one wonders, would it be possible to assess the balance given the SDI program's implementation? The fact that there would be total discordance in such assessments follows from the strictly theoretical calculations already carried out in the United States. Thus, in June 1983 three commissions appointed by the U.S. President to assess the technological potential of the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM system with space-based elements arrived, as American research points out, at "strikingly different assessments."

The most dangerous thing is the possible overestimation by the United States of its own military strength which, incidentally, has already happened at various times, starting with its securing of the nuclear monopoly. Now, in the future too, such an overestimation would increase the risk of nuclear buttons being pressed. Underestimation, in turn, would not only stimulate the arms race but also again give rise to the risk of war being unleashed.

A recent statement by former CIA Director S. Turner is noteworthy in this respect. Considering the hypothetical possibility of the deployment of a Soviet space ABM system, he said: "What would we do? I have no doubts about this. We would carry out an attack.... We would make a strike against components of its SDI at the time when it would be starting to build them. When the first modules have been put into space, we would destroy them with the help of our antisatellite weapon systems or simply by means of a nuclear explosion close to Soviet space stations."

Turner undoubtedly knows that the USSR has no intention of copying the American SDI. But with the aforesaid he willy-nilly confirms the extremely dangerous, provocative nature of the "Star Wars" program.

A disruption of the balance of military might would also be linked with the fact that space strike arms could also hit targets on earth. As is known, the sovereignty of a given state extends to the atmosphere above its national territory. And it has the incontestable right to defend it against invasion. But a far greater danger will stem from space, where the United States now wants to place weapons. "Such intentions," M.S. Gorbachev declared at the meeting with participants in the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity," "represent an attempt to create a new instrument of blackmail with respect to independent states. Therefore, is

it not time on an international legal plane to raise the question of a ban on 'driving' weapons into space over the heads of people of other countries?"

The Soviet Union is against the destabilization of the strategic situation and the transfer of the arms race into space. "True equal security in our age," the 27th CPSU Congress emphasized, "is guaranteed not by the highest possible but by the lowest possible level of strategic balance, from which nuclear and other kinds of mass destruction weapons must be totally eliminated." Here military potentials would be confined to the minimum limits of reasonable adequacy. The scale of military might must be precisely reasonable, that is, rule out not only the possibility of mutual destruction but also the likelihood of a sudden attack and meet the needs of defense, not of aggression. This approach is a very important component of the new political thinking, the only acceptable thinking in the nuclear and space age. For the time being, however, Washington has failed to realize this.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SDI CANNOT MAKE NUCLEAR ARMS 'IMPOTENT, OBSOLETE'

PM260941 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Political observer A. Bovin article: "SDI. Four Years On"]

[Text] On 23 March 1983 U.S. President R. Reagan called on U.S. scientists to create [sozdat] means for a strategic ABM defense which could render nuclear weapons "powerless and obsolete."

Let us examine the President's logic. Hitherto, he noted, aggression (Soviet, of course) was prevented by the threat of a retaliatory strike; it was assumed that no sensible side would deliver a strike which would inevitably lead to unacceptable losses being inflicted on it (the concept of mutual assured destruction). But, the President declared, it is better to save people than to avenge the dead: "Man's spirit must be able to rise above the maintenance of relations with other countries and other people on the basis of threatening their existence." People would be able to "live in tranquillity" if they knew that the United States were capable of intercepting and destroying the enemy's strategic ballistic missiles long before they approached U.S. territory.

The President admitted that this constitutes "a most difficult technical task and that it may not be solved before the end of the century." All this time the United States must "invariably preserve the nuclear deterrent forces and a reliable potential of flexible response." The President understood that the preservation of offensive systems in combination with the creation [sozdaniye] of defensive ones may be perceived as preparation for aggression. But, R. Reagan assured, Washington has no such intentions.

There was a stormy reaction to the President's initiative in the United States. His supporters lauded to the skies the "strategic revolution" and the promotion of defense interests to the forefront. His opponents derided the illusionism of the White House chief and his faith in the efficiency of a space-age "Maginot Line." The majority of "average Americans" applauded the man who was at last averting the death threat hanging over them and who was promising them a lasting and reliable defense. The U.S. allies, having overcome their confusion, cautiously backed the line of ABM research. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries described the "Star Wars" idea as provoking a new spiral of the arms race and leading to further destabilization of international relations. The nonaligned movement drew similar conclusions.

Four years have passed since. The "initiative" has acquired a solid organizational, scientific, and production apparatus. The first few billions have been spent. But

arguments are still going on. And it seems to me that the SDI's defenders are gradually beginning to abandon conceptual positions. In any case, the flaws and vulnerable spots in their arguments have grown larger and more noticeable in these 4 years.

First and foremost, there has been an erosion and virtual repudiation of R. Reagan's main and central idea — the possibility of creating [sozdaniye] an "absolutely" impenetrable ABM system, guaranteeing the destruction of all attacking missiles. No matter how much antimissile technology may improve, it is virtually impossible to imagine a situation whereby the totality of special countermeasures and the modernization of offensive potential would not allow a "penetration" of the potential for defense.

Not a cessation or a slowdown of the arms race, but its whipping up, its "enrichment" with a new meaning, with a competition between the space "shield" and the nuclear "sword" — this is the shape that the specific and tangible result of Reagan's initiative is assuming. This result completely rules out any opportunity of turning nuclear weapons into a heap of "powerless and obsolete" scrap metal.

Let us use the analogy suggested by R. Reagan himself. In upholding his initiative, he compared the ABM system with antiaircraft artillery. But what does such a comparison show? This is what it shows. The appearance of antiaircraft artillery and sophisticated air defense systems not only failed to render bomber aviation "powerless and obsolete," but gave a boost to efforts to build up its ability to overcome air defense systems. How can one doubt that the creation [sozdaniye] of ABM defense would have exactly the same effect with nuclear weapons.

While continuing to utter ritual words about the need for an "absolute" ABM defense, the Americans have, to judge by all accounts, opted for a bird in the hand rather than two in the bush. Emphasis has switched to the creation [sozdaniye] of a limited ABM system, covering in its first stage only the most important military installations and command centers. Why? You can't say: So that Americans could "live in tranquillity," because the umbrella is being spread not over them but over weapons and the top brass. So, why indeed? For the purpose of stability, they reply. And go on to explain: If the "Russians" knew that a certain (unspecified) number of their missiles will be "caught" by the ABM defense, it will be more difficult for them to compute a counterforce and countercontrol strike and the likelihood of such a strike will diminish.

But the "Russians" are in no way bound to think or act the way the Americans want them to. Would it not be more logical to assume that they would rather preserve the existing kill potential [potentsial porazheniya] and increase the number of missiles for this purpose? This means that the option for action by the Pentagon also provokes the arms race and the buildup of nuclear weapons, in other words leads not to stronger but to weaker stability.

The 4 years of arguments and deliberations, the 4 years of "modernization" of offensive forces by the Americans have proved that the Pentagon's actions are losing their inner contradictoriness and are becoming fully explicable in just one way: The United States, by combining the means of offense and defense, strives to gain strategic advantages over the Soviet Union. It did not work with MIRV's. It did not work with cruise missiles. But this "technological supermanship" complex continues to roll. This is where the "Russians" will be unable to keep up with us.

And what of the future? The future is one of the numerous scenarios of "limited war" with guaranteed "victory" (in this context victory means survival). If the "Russians"

were to attack, we would manage to substantially weaken their strike and take them out of the game by means of our counterstrike. And if we were to attack, our strike would weaken the "Russians'" counterstrike to such an extent that our ABM defense would cope with it in a more or less satisfactory fashion. In either case, the States suffers less damage, which means that it finds itself in a more favorable position.

The most dangerous point is the fact that the Washington leadership could take all this nonsense seriously and start....

The Soviet Union's stance is simple and has been repeatedly stated. We will never allow anyone to break the strategic parity or gain strategic superiority. This is not even a theorem. It is an axiom. We actively support the idea of rendering nuclear weapons powerless and obsolete. We have proposed to eliminate them altogether. From our point of view, however, it is not at all necessary to launch combat systems in space in order to get rid of nuclear weapons on Earth. We propose a simpler and shorter path: To embark on disarmament on Earth immediately, without wasting any time or money on the militarization of space.

So far we have been unable to convince the Americans. And there is something else. The Reagan administration is clearly trying to step up the development [razrabotka] of the "Star Wars" program in order to commit its successors more rigidly and tightly, making it more difficult for them to make an independent evaluation of the situation and an independent choice. But the "point of no return" has not yet been reached, and the Soviet Union will consistently advocate that outer space be free of weapons. Discussions in the last few years have convinced us that there is no other sensible stance.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON ANNIVERSARY OF SDI ANNOUNCEMENT

Defensive Role Denied

OW241011 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0430 GMT 24 Mar 87

[From the Novosti Newscast; Aleksandr Serikov commentary]

[Text] The fourth anniversary of Reagan's announcement of his Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] was 23 March. Our commentary:

[Serikov] Hello comrades. I have heard on many occasions from Americans who are well disposed towards us that they believe in the advisability of SDI. They believe in this because of the centuries-old belief that any defense is preferable to no defense at all, that a shield above one's head is a guarantee of survival.

The U.S. President continues to maintain that SDI is merely defensive. The following argument is used to prop up the advisability of SDI: Mankind is tired of living under the threat of Damocles' nuclear sword. SDI is specifically used to neutralize this sword.

It is certainly possible to understand those Americans who believe SDI. They are not the only ones tired of living under the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. They are not the only ones who wish to survive in the difficult contemporary world and pass on a serene and peaceful 21st century to their children and grandchildren. But can this be achieved by way of activating SDI? Reagan's SDI has been called the Star Wars program. Any war is a catastrophe. In Star Wars the use of nuclear arms in space is planned. This means that the catastrophe could become universal. Calculations by scientists and military strategists indicate that what Washington is trying to present as an antimissile shield created for the purpose of defense can also be used as a strike weapon. In other words, under the excuse of ensuring its own safety, the United States is placing life on earth under threat.

We have spoken out, and are continuing to speak out, for strict adherence to the ABM agreement, which provides effective measures for the liquidation of the very threat of which we are all so tired. A breakthrough in the world situation is impossible if the United States persists in the realization of SDI. So, let the fourth anniversary of the announcement by the U.S. President of the Star Wars program remind us once again how timely was our country's call to liquidate nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and to make every effort to ensure the survival of mankind.

'Star Nuclear Madness'

LD220053 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2122 GMT 21 Mar 87

["Washington's 'Star Nuclear' Madness"--commentary by TASS military affairs observer Valdimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Mar (TASS) -- Four years ago, on 23 March 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan made the well-known dismal speech which subsequently was labeled "Star Wars" all over the world. Thus was the official beginning of the SDI program in the United States, which became the main focus of President R. Reagan. Its proclamation was dependent on the following circumstances and considerations.

First, dreaming of world hegemony and striving to ensure for themselves positions of strategic superiority, U.S. ruling circles went the way of comprehensively accumulating arms in all conceivable directions. The logical continuation of this policy was the desire to use space for siting U.S. strike weapons and to turn near-earth space into a potential theater of war.

Second, preparatory work for the militarization of space, already carried out over many years in the United States, reached the stage, according to the calculations of official Washington, in which it was possible to expect practical results.

Third, despite the feverish tempo of creating more and more new types and weapons systems in the United States, the Soviet Union has been reestablishing military-strategic parity, depriving the United States of the opportunity to use the military might it has accumulated in order to attain its global aims. The U.S. administration decided to make the next breakthrough, this time through space.

Fourth, the idea of creating [sozdaniye] space strike weapons was the continuation of the Republican administration's military policy in a further respect as well: U.S. weapons getting geographically closer to the borders of the Soviet Union. Space strike weapons do indeed "answer to" such a goal: they can be "suspended" in space, so that they present a continuous threat to Soviet territory.

Fifth, Washington considered it to be more expedient to continue to push ahead with military programs under the cloak of declamations about the need to strengthen "defense." The idea of including outer space in the strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union, which had been under discussion for several years, itself came into play again under this rubric. The SDI program is now being implemented at full speed. The Pentagon strategists are counting on inflicting with impunity the first nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, with the help of space-based strike strategic forces, and on simultaneously making the USSR incapable of a retaliatory strike.

Illusory hopes of victory in a nuclear war and of establishing world domination -- such is the "philosophy" of the Washington strategists.

The SDI program has already become the chief obstacle on the way to a nuclear-free world. It threatens the entire international legal system in the sphere of arms limitation and reduction, and of strengthening security. If it is implemented, everything that has been created over decades could be erased forever. The SDI program cancels out the ABM treaty, deprives it of meaning, and thereby destroys the mechanism

for holding back the nuclear arms race. It is becoming a powerful catalyst in this race in all aspects, undermining general security.

Today, 4 years later, the evaluation of the SDI given by the Soviet leadership on 27 March 1983 is wholly justified: the present U.S. administration is continuing to proceed along an extremely dangerous path, and is devising more and more new variants of how best to unleash nuclear war in the hope of winning it. This enterprise is not only irresponsible; it is also mad.

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CSO: 5200/1392

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: FOREIGN PRESS CITED ON U.S. LASER ARMS RESEARCH

PM201229 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[Military-technical review by Candidate of Technical Sciences Major General V. Belous; "Laser Weapons"]

[Text] The "big stick" policy proclaimed by the U.S. Administration back at the beginning of this century was revitalized after World War II. Based on nuclear weapons, whose strike power has constantly increased, this policy has assumed a large scale these days although it has not yielded Washington the desired dividends. Sensible voices have begun to speak out across the ocean, recognizing that even in the event of delivering a nuclear first strike against the USSR the United States will not be able to escape retribution. He who shoots first dies second -- that is the reality of our time.

It has always been the Pentagon's secret desire to be first to press the button. It was only the prospect of death that deterred it, even the prospect of being second to die. Washington has begun thinking about strike space weapons and "impenetrable defense" in the hope of "overtaking" the Soviet Union and securing decisive military strategic superiority for itself. It is gambling on creating an ABM defense in depth [sozdaniye glubokoeshelonirovannoy protivoraketnoy oborony] with space-based elements. The key role here is assigned to the ABM forward echelon. The weaponry in this echelon is to ensure the guaranteed destruction of Soviet missiles in the boost [aktivnaya] phase of their trajectory.

Stressing the decisive role of the "first stage of defense," G. Keyworth, former adviser to President Reagan, put it in these terms: "If you assess the project's importance on a scale of 10, this work (the creation [sozdaniye] of the first echelon weapons -- V.B. note) should be awarded 10 points with the next most important work worth 5." The attention paid to the initial stage of flight, foreign specialists note, is primarily due to the fact that at that moment before the release of the reentry vehicle, it is possible with a single shot to destroy the missile with all its nuclear warheads and anti-ABM devices.

However, foreign commentators complain, there are serious difficulties impeding the solution of this task which may significantly reduce the reliability of the space defense system. The point is that the boost phase is short. For an MX missile, for instance, the boost phase is completed just 3 minutes after launch at an altitude of around 200 km.

U.S. specialists are setting aside approximately 2 minutes to detect the launch of the Soviet missiles and to take the decision to destroy them. In other words, the Pentagon's strategists regard time as the critical factor in resolving the set task. Hence the conclusion that weapons which strike "with the speed of light," primarily laser weapons, should play the main role in destroying missiles in the boost phase.

The foreign press notes that the work on laser weapons has been conducted for a long time now but that particularly intensive research began in the seventies. However, despite the optimism of General Abrahamson's department (he is director of the SDI program) the creation [sozdaniye] of laser weapons for deployment in space remains highly problematical. The main difficulties that the proponents of SDI have had to face are the great size and weight of the orbiting delivery platforms [platforma-nositel], the difficulty of supplying them with power, the high accuracy and speed required for directing the beam to the target, and so forth. Furthermore, such bulky facilities in space are themselves vulnerable targets.

An earth-and-space-based system is considered to be the alternative to this. The bulky installations and their fuel sources are deployed on earth and the "relay" and "battle" mirrors would be launched into space.

It is proposed to place the 10 meter diameter "relay" mirrors in geostationary orbit and to place the 5-meter diameter "battle" mirrors in orbit at an altitude of around 1,000 km.

Working on the assumption that it will take 100 seconds to destroy missiles in their boost phase and that it will take 5 seconds to transfer the power necessary to hit a single missile, the Pentagon has calculated that a single "battle" mirror will be able to ensure the destruction of 20 missiles in succession. Foreign observers note that it will take at least 70 battle mirrors to prevent a retaliatory attack by Soviet ICBMS. And that is on condition that they are all stationed simultaneously above the USSR's territory. Each "battle" mirror must have a corresponding "relay" mirror. The total number of "battle" mirrors will be between 400 and 420.

The outline of the scheme is as follows. The laser beam from the earth-based installations is directed to the "relay" mirror which redirects the energy beam to the "battle" mirror located above the regions where the enemy's ICBMS are deployed. The "battle" mirror directs the laser beam energy straight onto the missile and destroys it.

A group of U.S. scientists has evaluated the cost of the energy needed for the operation of the earth and space-based system. It transpired that in view of the loss of radiation energy as it passes through the atmosphere the efficiency of the laser installation requires the output of 300 1,000-megawatt power stations. This represents over 60 percent of the U.S. energy system's total capacity.

When the laser beam passes through the atmosphere the loss of energy is extremely high as a result of the scattering and absorption of radiation. In an attempt to reduce that loss U.S. specialists are exploring every conceivable solution. One plan envisages the deployment of lasers on mountain tops at an altitude of 4-5 km above sea level. As the main mass of atmospheric particles is concentrated in a 10-km thick layer around the earth, placing the laser devices at such an altitude will make it possible to reduce the energy loss by 300-400 percent.

However, the effect of atmospheric turbulence still has to be considered (the velocity of the processes of atmospheric turbulence is considerably less than the speed of the dispersion of radiation).

The foreign press is also discussing the following design solution. It is proposed to equip the mirror-bearing satellite, which is placed in geostationary orbit, with a small laser firmly fixed to a 900-meter boom. The laser's pulse beam will be received by the earth laser. The beam, which carries information on the effect of atmospheric turbulence, strikes the earth-based device and alters the phase angle by 180 degrees and, after passing through a series [kaskad] of laser boosters, is highly intensified. Travelling in the opposite direction, the modulated beam compensates for the effect of atmospheric turbulence.

The "relay" and "battle" mirrors are very complex devices. The accuracy of the manufacturer of the mirrors' surface must be commensurate with a certain wave length which presents considerable difficulties, particularly when creating large-diameter mirrors.

There is a further difficulty in that part of the power beam striking the mirror will be absorbed by the structure which will heat up and change its form. This will cause the beam to go out of focus and lose some of its destructive capability. Thus, high-capacity cooling facilities are needed. Let us also mention here the orientation, stabilization, targeting systems and the high-speed computers. The complexity of the plan is obvious and the cost runs into billions of dollars. But is it reliable?

The foreign press leaves these questions unanswered. The main thing is to create an atmosphere of war hysteria, to convince the U.S. taxpayer of the need to contribute more, and to indulge the military-industrial complex. The SDI apologists are in a hurry. They need effective demonstrations. An experiment is planned for June 1987 in which a laser beam will be directed on to a moving target with the help of a mirror deployed in space. Behind all this adventurism there is the Pentagon's irresistible urge to prolong the arms race into the 21st century and make this process irreversible.

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CSO: 5200/1392

SOVIET COMMENTATOR PRAISES AUSTRALIAN STANCE ON SDI

Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 26 Feb 87 p 6

[APN-attributed item by APN political analyst Vladimir Sazonov: "Dangerous Course in Pacific"]

[Text]

THE Soviet Union notes Australia's consistent stance on SDI, which the Pentagon is about to implement.

After Australia revised its obligation to let the United States observe MX test flights from its territory after it officially refused to take part in developing Star Wars programs, Mr Rawdon Dalrymple, Australian ambassador to the US, said to Mr Paul Nitze (presidential adviser on arms control) on February 9 that Australia resolutely opposed America's intentions to revise the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty and its SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) research, let alone practical implementation — a logical step, says Moscow.

The Soviet Union sees the Australian stance as realistic — not only because space-deployed nuclear weaponry will start a new and unprecedented spiral in the arms race, fatally dangerous for the world not even because the Star Wars program is a stumbling block in the way of Soviet-American disarmament talks, as was the case in Reykjavik.

The Soviet Union well understands that Australians and the nations of island and coastal States in the Indian and Pacific Oceans have

every reason for concern, all the more so since the Pentagon sees the sea as potential for already existent key SDI bases.

The Diego Garcia Atoll in the Indian Ocean has an American nuclear missile base being updated and extended, and a space surveillance station presently under construction.

The Pentagon has similar prospects for the Air Force satellite observation station in Mahe, Seychelles.

Australia alone has several dozen major US projects, the largest, Northwest Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar, intended to supply information necessary for homing nuclear missiles, to guide strategic nuclear operations, and ensure liaison between those projects and control centres in the US.

Incidentally, the Nurrungar base, called for some reason a navigation base, is used to communicate military-strategic satellites and thus has a direct bearing on the Star Wars program.

Filipinos have every reason to display mounting discontent with the US military bases in Subic Bay and Clark Field. It is long known that the US sees them among the pivots of the Pentagon base network, as the President said in February 1986.

Australia's stance on SDI is realistic

Micronesia, particularly Kwajalein, deserves special attention. The atoll has long turned into US ballistic missile testing grounds. The Pentagon attaches primary importance to it: its construction has cost America more than a billion dollars.

According to last year's congressional information, a new complex is to be built in Kwajalein to test parts of a major ABM system with space-based components: part and parcel of the SDI. The construction is to start this year.

In July 1985 the Chilean junta resolved to pass Easter Island to the United States to house the Pentagon's Air Force base among monuments of ages past.

The Pentagon licks its chops, looking at the Yokota, Kadena, Kami Seya and Kamp Zama satellite communications centres in Japan possibly to be used for SDI purposes. The Japanese situation is more pregnant than elsewhere since Japan is the only Pacific State to have directly supported President Reagan's Star Wars plan.

The SDI-oriented Pacific activities by the Pentagon are easy to understand, as it views that part of the world as the most likely theatre of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ample facts bear that supposition out, and there is no need to cite them as the US administration is outspoken on that score. A dangerous course. Where may it lead humanity?

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CSO: 5200/1398

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW TO JAPAN: U.S. DECEIVES JAPAN ON SDI

OW250642 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 24 Feb 87

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] Approximately 1 and 1/2 years have elapsed since the Japanese Government decided to participate in SDI. However, it has recently become the cause for the Japanese Government's headaches. Now it is worried because the U.S. Government is trying to start the early deployment of the SDI system and because the United States is attempting to abolish the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty, which THE NEW YORK TIMES says is instrumental to preventing nuclear war as it serves as an important measure for checking the dangerous combination of offensive force with defensive strength.

The world's public opinion has a clear appraisal of such a move. For example, the MAINICHI SHIMBUN recently stated: President Reagan will be in his office for two more years and within that time the U.S. Government will attempt to deploy the SDI system in orbit, and no other American president could ever remove it.

Incidentally, what has made the Japanese Government worried can be stated as follows: in deciding on SDI participation, the Japanese Government attached some conditions. Among the most important conditions are that prior consultations with allies should be held before actual SDI deployment and that SDI will not conflict with the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty. Prior to its decision in SDI participation, the Japanese Government particularly emphasized these conditions to appease public opinion and the opposition parties. However, using the Japanese Government's trust as a good excuse, the U.S. Government has now refused to pay attention to these conditions.

While starting on first-stage deployment of its SDI system, the U.S. Government has made and is making preparations for abolishing the ABM Treaty. However, there is no sign of holding prior consultations with its allies. Then what will be the results of this deployment? The U.S. allies that have decided to participate in SDI research projects, including Japan, Great Britain, and West Germany, will be involved in the actual militarization of space without any notice. In other words, they will be drawn into space militarization almost before they realize it.

According to the Pentagon's plans, when first-stage deployment of the SDI system is completed, thousands of kinetic-energy offensive devices deployed in space will be hanging over Soviet territories. Just imagine what will be the position of the country whose territories have been put into such a situation. Naturally, the USSR will take effective measures against it, and hardly anyone in the United States itself will ever have any doubts about this point. As a result, however, the peoples of various countries in the world will face a new round of the nuclear arms race and the intensified threat of nuclear war. And the United States' SDI will be the major cause for this situation.

In case of an emergency, the SDI system will fail to defend the White House, not to mention Japan. Well then, what is the Japanese Government's reaction to such a situation? Quoting a Japanese Foreign Ministry leading official, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR reported the other day that Japan was taken as a fastidious ally of the United States. It seems that the Japanese Foreign Ministry regards the expression of apprehensions about the "Star Wars" program of the U.S. Government as an act of audacity. In fact, however, what Japan has done in dealing with the current situation, in which Japan has been deceived in handling an issue of great importance to the future of the world, is to merely state its apprehensions.

According to Japanese press reports, the Japanese Foreign Ministry has taken the position that the Japanese Government will eventually follow the U.S. interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In other words, this indicates that the Japanese Government, as it is restrained by its obligations to the United States, now intends to withdraw its previous conditions. And naturally, Washington would take this as a sign that the United States could neglect the views of its allies on various important issues. That is to say, after making some pledges in return for allies' support for its dubious plans, the United States will go back on these pledges once it has obtained the support.

The current story concerning the SDI program indicates that there still exist in this world some politicians who are willing to be stooges.

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CSO: 5200/1392

BRIEFS

TASS: UN SPACE LAW COMMITTEE--New York, 17 Mar (TASS)--A general debate started today at a session of the legal subcommittee of the U.S. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Centres round the issue of the further development of space law in the interests of peaceful cooperation in outer space and the consolidation of peace and social and economic progress of all nations. The Soviet Union attached great importance to putting an obstacle in the way of space militarization before that process became irreversible, before weapons were deployed in outer space and an unpredictable breakthrough was made in the space arms race, said the Soviet Representative, A. S. Piradov. He came out in favour of the further consolidation of law and order in outer space with the progressive development of international space law with a view to upholding peace, stability and security. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT 17 Mar 87 LD] /9274

TASS: U.S. GENERAL URGES ASAT TESTS--The Pentagon is demanding that the militarization of space be accelerated. This conclusion follows from a UPI report from Washington. A high-ranking figure of the U.S. war department, General Piotrowski, commander in chief of the unified North American Air and Space Defense Command, speaking in the Senate tried to prove the need for the United States to conduct more aggressive activities in the use of near-earth space for military purposes. The general said that the United States should safeguard its legitimate interests in space in exactly the same way that they do on land, at sea or in the atmosphere. The Pentagon spokesman urged the lifting of the temporary restrictions on the testing of the ASAT anti-satellite system that have been imposed by Congress. Incidentally, a directive of Secretary of Defense Weinberger dated the beginning of February this year, the existence of which emerged a few days ago, provides for the speedy deployment of the ASAT system and preparations for the creation of combat space stations in orbit. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0230 GMT 29 Mar 87 LD] /9274

TASS CITES WEINBERGER INTERVIEW--Washington, 22 Mar (TASS)--Caspar Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, gave an interview today at the "Meeting the Press" [as received] program of the NBC Television Company. He made it clear that Washington was not going to give up its attempts to pass over the so-called "broad interpretation" of the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty. Moreover, it followed from his statement that the administration and personally President Reagan were in a position to change contractual commitments of the United States if they hampered the implementation of militaristic plans of the Pentagon, ignoring the role of the American Senate which ratifies the treaties signed by the U.S. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2107 GMT 22 Mar 87 LD] /9274

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: CONGRESS SEEKS REAGAN COMPLIANCE WITH SALT II, TEST BAN

Wright, Byrd Cited

LD182232 Moscow TASS in English 1916 GMT 18 Mar 87

[Text] Washington, 18 Mar (TASS)--Correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

At their meeting Tuesday James Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives, and Robert Byrd, Democratic majority leader in the Senate, made a decision to put to vote in the House of Representatives and in the Senate shortly two important legislative amendments concerning disarmament problems, the newspaper "WASHINGTON POST" reported today.

One of them demands that the Pentagon adhere to the limitations on strategic armaments put by the Salt-2 treaty. The other bans the holding of nuclear tests with yields exceeding one kiloton. The voting on the amendments is scheduled for April 2, 1987.

The "WASHINGTON POST" points out referring to sources in Congress and the State Department that this decision was adopted contrary to the demand by State Secretary George Shultz that the implementation of these plans be put off. He said they could worsen his stand at the talks during his visit to Moscow next month.

The newspaper recalls in this connection that in the run-up to the meeting in Reykjavik the Reagan administration succeeded last October in blocking the adoption of similar amendments. The administration stated at that time that they would tie its hands at the negotiations with the USSR. In bowing, Congress hoped that the White House would act in Iceland from constructive positions. The administration, however, fell short of these expectations.

The "WASHINGTON POST" quotes an arms control expert of the U.S. Congress as saying that congressmen gave President Reagan freedom of action but received nothing in exchange. In his turn, an assistant of Congress' Democratic leadership told the newspaper that they had burnt their fingers once and this would not happen any more.

House Appropriations Committee Vote

PM310931 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 1

[A. Blinov dispatch: "Congress Versus the White House" under the rubric "Reports From Abroad"]

[Text] Washington -- The U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee has introduced an amendment to the bill on additional budget expenditure for the current fiscal year, which prohibits the allocation of resources for arms exceeding the limits of the USSR-U.S. SALT-II treaty.

Another amendment made by the committee demands that nuclear weapon tests be restricted to explosions with a yield of no more than 1 kiloton. The bill cuts back on administration requests for the additional allocation of resources for the "Star Wars" project and a chemical weapons production program. The bill will be sent to the House of Representatives.

Similar amendments were introduced by the House of Representatives last year, although, with the help of pressure and political maneuvering, the White House was able to have them reversed. It is expected here that, if they are approved by the House of Representatives again, President Reagan will not hesitate to use his right of veto. At the same time, the fact that Congress has repeated these demands, coupled with the vote by the Appropriations Committee, shows that the White House is unable to gain congressional support for its actions aimed at undermining arms control agreements.

A whole series of congressmen have sharply criticized the attitude taken by the White House. Congressman N. Dicks described the administration's departure from the SALT-II treaty as totally unwarranted. L. Aucoin, another member of the House of Representatives, has spoken in favor of a joint USSR-U.S. nuclear test moratorium and the conclusion of a treaty on a total nuclear test ban.

'Warnings' to White House

PM021112 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 87 First Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Aleksandr Lyutyy: "Warnings From Congress"]

[Text] In recent days a number of unequivocal warnings have been issued to the White House by the U.S. Congress. The crux of them is: Unless the administration moderates its obstructionist fervor with regard to arms control problems, it risks meeting with serious difficulties in the discussion of requests for military appropriations.

The latest such warning was the adoption of two legislative amendments by the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee. The first provides for an end to the financing of tests of nuclear charges with a yield of more than 1 kiloton, if the USSR agrees to such a limit and also consents to the carrying out of a corresponding inspection on its territory. The second blocks the allocation of funds for the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of arms systems which go beyond the bounds of the SALT II treaty.

These amendments are nothing new in themselves. Similar proposals were discussed in the House of Representatives last year, but were eventually taken off the agenda after

a cunning maneuver by the administration -- President Reagan stated that such acts by congress would be detrimental to the U.S. positions at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik.

The administration has also received a very noticeable, painful blow from the quarter from where it least expected it. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who is well known for his tough, conservative views on defense questions, after a careful study of the content of the ABM Treaty, drew a truly sensational conclusion. He accused the administration of forgery. State Department legal adviser A. Sofaer, who was charged with preparing a justification for the "broad" interpretation of this document, together with his colleagues, as Nunn put it, "absolutely and entirely distorted" a whole series of aspects of the treaty.

There are clear instances of growing opposition on Capitol Hill to the government's irresponsible approach to the most important problem of today. I think the following is already clear: First, after "Irangate," which showed the whole world what deception and hypocrisy Washington can sink to, fewer and fewer people in the Congress are prepared to take all the administration's statements at face value. Second, after Reykjavik, which showed there is a real prospect of achieving accords between the USSR and the United States, congressmen have a growing fear that SDI could bury any chance of arms control. Finally, the USSR's latest bold initiative on medium-range missiles showed the vast majority of members of Congress the real possibility of a breakthrough in the cause of arms reduction.

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CSO, 5200/1386

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET COMMENTS ON U.S. 'SOVIET MILITARY POWER' 6TH EDITION

'Exaggerated' USSR Military Power

PM301028 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Gan report: "Lies, With a Hidden Purpose: The Pentagon Brochure on the 'Soviet Threat'"]

[Text] Washington, 26 Mar -- In the opinion of high-ranking Pentagon officials, Americans should constantly "sense a threat to their security," since there is no other way of making them shell out for military programs. "Every time we create the impression that we and the Soviet Union are beginning to cooperate and to moderate our rivalry," U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle explained, "we undermine that sense of threat."

This is a cynical "philosophy." That does not worry its "founders" -- the propaganda falsification production line is working at a crazy speed, bringing to the surface more and more heaps of terrifying anti-Soviet fabrications.

"Soviet Military Power" -- that is the title of a brochure just published by the Pentagon for the sixth time during the Reagan administration's rule. Like all its five predecessors, it is not simply an apology for unrestrained militarism. It is probably the quintessence of hatred of the Soviet Union.

The authors themselves cannot be called paranoid. They would like to make their fellow citizens paranoid, instilling fear into them with every line. "As free people, we should understand that the Soviet political system -- a system which, the Soviet proclaim, will triumph over ours -- is nurturing the growth of military might... The Soviet Union continues to seek world domination... In domestic policy the CPSU's main goal is to restore the weakened Soviet economy and lay the foundations for future military expansion... The main goal of Soviet strategy in the arms control sphere is to establish control over the rate of military modernization in the West, and also to block specific programs, such as the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' (SDI) and other American military modernization plans..."

Basically the entire brochure consists of such sentences, alternating with "indicators" which are exaggerated to an inconceivable size relating to Soviet defense spending and the numerical strength and equipment of Soviet armed forces.

These "indicators," which are plucked out of the air and are constantly being exposed, stubbornly migrate from one Pentagon work to another. That is understandable: Without

them the falsifiers and slanderers would soon overtax themselves in their attempt to prove the "mortal threat from the Soviets."

The Pentagonites have concocted a whole 147 pages of anti-Soviet horror stories -- without begrudging the costly, glossy paper -- while assigning only 14 to the "American response" to Moscow's "global machinations." In this section the United States is, naturally, represented as a lamb to the slaughter. All its thoughts and concerns are only of peace and security, of "rebuffing the USSR's aggressive plans." The emphasis is above all on the "Star Wars" program, which, without a trace of embarrassment, is called "the hope for a significantly more stable and secure strategic order." The conclusion -- "maintaining a strong military potential in the long term requires us to finance an adequate defense program every year."

The publication of the Pentagon brochure is no accident. The "budget battle" between the administration and Congress is becoming fiercer, and is waged mainly over the request for huge appropriations for the war department. The White House and Pentagon are seriously alarmed by the broad opposition on Capitol Hill to the plans to step up work on SDI. Incidentally, Reagan marked the fourth anniversary of that adventurist program with a special statement in which he entreats the Congress not to lessen its support for "Star Wars."

There is also another very important feature clearly present in the calculations of those who are now orchestrating the violent upsurge of anti-Sovietism. This is the real opportunity which has emerged for achieving a USSR-U.S. agreement on Euromissiles. In the face of the very broad public support for such an agreement, the opponents of any accords with the USSR are afraid to block it straight out, preferring to operate by stealth.

'Deliberate Lie'

LD301936 Moscow TASS in English 1913 GMT 30 Mar 87

["Incorrigible Weinberger" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow March 30 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

If we are to believe U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger, in the past six years rough military parity between the USSR and the U.S., which had existed before Reagan came to the White House, has turned into the Soviet Union's huge superiority in virtually every component of the military potential with the exception of the number of large surface ships.

It follows from the recent statements of the Pentagon chief at the press conference in Washington, devoted to the publication of the latest propaganda booklet "Soviet Military Power," that the United States, having spent more than one trillion dollars for military purposes between 1981 and 1986, has lost parity with the Soviet Union in the strategic forces and is now inferior to it in intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the ratio of 1 to 4!

When the SALT-2 Soviet-American treaty was being readied for signature in 1979, the balance of strategic forces between the sides was carefully checked by leading experts. A supplement to the treaty, signed by the leaders of the two countries, noted

that the Soviet Union had roughly 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) and the United States about 2,300.

But what has happened to the American strategic forces? Even the Pentagon admits that the total numerical strength of the Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers has not increased since 1979. Has the Reagan administration spent one trillion dollars just to destroy the American strategic forces, cutting them back by three-fourths?

Nothing of the sort. Late last year the Reagan administration exceeded the limits set by the SALT-2 treaty on bombers with cruise missiles, thus derailing that treaty. Old submarines with Polaris and Poseidon missiles were replaced with missile-carrying submarines of the Ohio type. A few outdated Titan ICBMs were dismantled and replaced with 10 MX ICBMs carrying 10 warheads each. About 70 B-52 bombers were modified into refuelling planes.

The modernization of the U.S. strategic force, naturally, has not detracted from its potential. At present the U.S. has in its strategic arms arsenal 2,208 delivery vehicles against the Soviet Union's 2,408. However, the United States has 50 per cent more nuclear warheads on its strategic delivery vehicles than the USSR has.

The statement of the Pentagon chief about the Soviet Union's quadruple superiority over the U.S. in strategic missiles is neither a slip nor an inaccuracy but a deliberate lie.

The Pentagon's allegations of a U.S. "lag" in the military filed are intended to justify the unprecedented programmes of the U.S. buildup of weapons of mass annihilation and disguise the true scope of the arms race whipped up by the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1386

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ABILITY TO PREVENT U.S. SUPERIORITY STRESSED

PM300921 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 87 Second Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer Manki Ponomarev article under the rubric "International Observer Answers Reader": "We Will Not Permit Superiority" -- first three paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction and reader's letter]

[Text] Here is what N. Pastushenko, a worker at the "Zhdanovtyazhmash" Production Association, wrote to the editorial office:

"Almost every day I read in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that the United States and its NATO bloc allies are preparing for war. They would clearly like to obtain military superiority over us, particularly by transferring the arms race to space and expanding work on SDI. One cannot help wondering whether we will be left behind militarily or be able to provide a worthy response to their challenge. After all, the security of our country and the maintenance of world peace depend on it."

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Manki Ponomarev answers Comrade N. Pastushenko.

You are not the only one, Comrade Pastushenko, to be alarmed by the question you asked in your letter. It is being asked in one way or another by many other readers who are also alarmed by the growing threat of war. What can be said on that subject?

Indeed, the arms race is continuing at an unremitting rate in the United States. The unprecedented program for building up strategic nuclear forces adopted back in 1981 is being implemented. The table below shows that the Pentagon already has more than 2,200 ICBM launchers, SLBM's, and heavy bombers (including cruise missile platforms) equipped with approximately 15,000 nuclear charges. Nonetheless, the growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces is continuing. It was no accident that last year the United States refused to observe the SALT II treaty and had already exceeded the limitations imposed by that document on numbers of nuclear arms.

The same picture emerges when one looks at other programs for enhancing the might and combat capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The increasingly extensive work to implement the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" is extremely dangerous. You rightly noted, Comrade Pastushenko, that SDI is allotted a special role in the attempts by militarist U.S. circles to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. This program is called "defensive" merely for diversionary reasons. In fact it is based on space strike weapons systems and its essence lies in the desire to acquire a "space shield" -- in addition to the "strategic

sword" that has already been forged -- in order to be able to use it as protection when inflicting a first "disabling" strike against the enemy without fearing a retaliatory strike, and thereby win a nuclear war.

These plans are very dangerous. Dangerous because they make all the more tangible the threat of a nuclear catastrophe which could have only one outcome -- the death of human civilization. This must not be permitted. That is why the Communist Party and the Soviet state devote unremitting attention to maintaining the country's defense capability at the proper level and strengthening its security.

The creation of military-strategic equality and parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact Organization and the NATO bloc was a major historic gain not only for the Soviet people but for all world socialism. This parity was achieved at the start of the seventies. It continues to exist today. This does not mean, of course, that there is a Soviet missile for each U.S. missile, a Soviet aircraft for each U.S. aircraft, or a Soviet tank for each U.S. tank. It is not a question of an arithmetical correspondence between the two sides' armed forces and arms, but of the equality of their combat potentials and capabilities.

You can see for yourself that this is actually the case by looking once again at the table of figures on Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear forces. It shows that the Soviet Union, for instance, has more ICBM's than the United States, and that, for instance, the United States has more heavy bombers, including cruise missiles platforms. On the whole the USSR has a certain advantage in terms of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, while the United States has a certain advantage in the nuclear charges carried by strategic delivery vehicles. But on the whole, we can quite definitely talk about parity

In short, the USSR has done and will continue to do everything necessary to reliably safeguard its security and that of its friends and allies in order to ensure that nobody, as the saying goes, is tempted to test the strength of our borders.

But the Soviet Union has never taken and will never take a single step over and above the demands and requirements of reasonable, adequate defense. It will not idly and automatically ape what imperialism strives to impose on us in the arms race. That can easily be seen from the Soviet Union's reaction to the U.S. "strategic defense initiative."

Here it would be apposite to recall M.S. Gorbachev's words. Speaking at the Reykjavik press conference, he said: "...the SDI does not scare us. I can say this with confidence because on such questions bluffing is irresponsible. There will be a response to the SDI. It will be asymmetric, but there will be one. And we will not have to make many sacrifices."

The Soviet press has already discussed the shape our response to the U.S. "Star Wars" program could take. It includes the further development of Soviet nuclear arms with a view to preserving their capability to inflict a retaliatory strike, which will create additional difficulties for U.S. space-based ABM early-warning systems and cause a sharp drop in the efficiency of its interception systems and systems for guiding space strike means to their specific targets. It also includes increases in the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles and the deployment of "dummy missiles" without warheads. The necessary result may also be produced by changing the tactics for launching missiles and building up the number of submarine-launched missiles launched on flat trajectories, and of cruise missiles, which are extremely difficult to detect and destroy reliably from space.

These, so to speak, are the active retaliatory measures. There could also be various passive countermeasures. These could include defending missiles and warheads from laser radiation with a special screen, releasing of chaff clouds in space, and so forth.

The fact that, in the opinion of specialists, the cost of a comprehensive system of measures and countermeasures will, relatively speaking, not be all that great and may amount to just a few percent of the cost of implementing the U.S. SDI program is very important too.

All this, Comrade Pastushenko, makes it possible to conclude that the USSR's persistent desire to prevent military superiority over us from being achieved is not a problem to do with fear of lagging behind, but a problem of responsibility. There is nothing the United States could do that we could not. But we resolutely oppose the U.S. arms race logic.

However, as long as international reaction whips up this race and until it abandons the policy of social revenge and "crusades" against socialism, the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the CPSU Central Committee appeal "To the Soviet People" stresses, "[we] will do everything necessary to maintain the defense might of our country and the socialist community at the proper level. Soviet people can be confident that we will never allow imperialism to obtain military superiority under any circumstances."

Ultimately this all depends on us, Comrade Pastushenko, and on how we work and fulfill our military duty. Peace, which we all want so much, must be achieved first and foremost through daily work -- at plants, in the fields, and at scientific institutes. The better we cope with our own tasks at home the louder and weightier the Soviet Union's voice in the international arena will be.

Figures for Soviet and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (as of 1 January 1987) [subhead]

	USSR	United States
ICBM Launchers	1398	1016
including ICBM launchers with MIRVed warheads	820	550
SLBM Launchers	922	672
including SLBM launchers with MIRVed warheads	352	640
Total ICBM and SLBM Launchers	2320	1688
including ICBM AND SLBM launchers with MIRVed warheads	1172	1190
Heavy Bombers	164	522
including heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles	56	132
Total ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber launchers	2484	2210
including those equipped with MIRVed warheads and cruise missiles	1228	1322
Total charges on strategic delivery vehicles (approximately)	10,000	15,000

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CSO: 5200/1386

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S ARBATOV ON WESTERN FEAR OF NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD

PN240927 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 19 Mar 87 p 4

[Georgiy Arbatov "Searchlight" article: "Misconceptions Which Block The Way"]

[Text] In Reykjavik the door to a nuclear-free future was opened a little. But after taking a look through this door, many Western politicians -- not only Americans, but Europeans too -- have turned back terrified.

Where do we find the real motives behind such behavior? In the case of some it is simply a matter of common hypocrisy. With others, there are endeavors to undermine any possible progress along the road to arms limitation and real disarmament. It is important to note that in many cases the reason lies more in erroneous ideas, often honestly held, which in the West are shared not only by politicians but also by a large section of the general public.

Here is one such erroneous idea: The monstrous destructive power of nuclear arms is such that it follows almost automatically that they cannot possibly be used. And what is more, nuclear arms, which make the superpowers more cautious, also help to avert local conflicts in which conventional weapons would be used. If this is the case, nuclear arms do not work for ill, but for the good of mankind. It is supposedly thanks to them that people have lived for 40 years without world wars...

It is impossible to prove this assertion in practice. But it is possible to imagine that the fear of terrible annihilation has played a certain role. However, this gives us no reason to have faith in such anxiety as a reliable and eternal guarantee of peace. That would be the same as ascribing to all governments, statesmen, and politicians the ability to behave extremely rationally, even the possession of clairvoyance powers. That is something that has been characteristic of very few of them -- in the nuclear age too. It is difficult to explain in any other way the many wars, international crises, and other social upheavals which have abounded in the 20th century.

As a historian, I ought rather to take this opportunity to say that the fact that a nuclear war has been avoided for 40 years is due not so much to the wisdom of governments as to public opposition to their actions, and, from time to time, simply to accidents.

Let us for a moment imagine that during the Caribbean crisis in 1962 there had been a serious breakdown in communications, a fatal mistake on the part of one of the leaders, or some serious internal upset or other (something, for example, like the assassination of President Kennedy which took place a year later). Would there then have been a

guarantee that the catastrophe would have been avoided? Can we count at all on luck as a guarantee?

In the final analysis, the problem does not lie in finding the reason why it has been possible to live without a major war for the last 40 years. The main thing -- and what worries us today -- is this: How can we live without a nuclear war for the next 40 years, and the 40-year periods after that? Taking as one's point of departure the fact that such a catastrophe has not happened in the past is absurd. We must assume that the threat of an "accidental" nuclear war will increase if nothing changes in the world because of the large quantities of nuclear arms, and because of their new capabilities, which reduce the time for making the most crucial decisions in mankind's history. For this reason a growing burden of responsibility is being transferred to machines and mechanisms. But these are imperfect, no matter how thoroughly they are checked.

Such is the tragic dilemma of our time. Mankind is living under conditions in which the mechanism for starting a nuclear war is fully developed. A malfunctioning computer, a military person who makes a mistake, or a politician who loses control of himself could set the whole thing in motion. For this reason -- even if you think that nuclear arms and the fear of them could have played a decisive role in the avoidance of a catastrophic war so far -- it is impossible to count on the situation remaining the same in the future. We need other, more reliable guarantees.

The Soviet Union has put forward proposals for the total elimination of nuclear arms and views such a step as the first part of an overall plan to secure world peace and security. In Mikhail Gorbachev's 15 January 1986 statement, which contained a proposed program for the abolition of nuclear arms by the year 2000, it was assumed that disarmament would also spread to other areas. This is natural. The Soviet Union has proposed putting an end to nuclear arms not simply to "move" the arms race into other fields -- chemical or conventional weapons, for example.

In the Soviet Union, which survived the horrors of World War II, which was a "conventional" war according to all modern norms, people are able to imagine better than in any other state what threat is also true of the rest of Europe, which has also true of the rest of Europe, which has also lived through two world wars. And outside the European continent a major "conventional" war is hardly likely. In Europe, people are coming to an ever clearer realization that "conventional" war is just as appalling as a nuclear war. Especially as there are in Europe over 150 Chernobyl-sized nuclear reactors, large numbers of chemical companies, stockpiles of oil products, and buried toxic waste -- things that mean that even an "ordinary" war would amount to the total destruction of modern society.

The Soviet Union sees an agreement for the abolition of nuclear arms as a major and -- without wishing to exaggerate -- an excellent step toward disarmament and demilitarization at all levels. Without waiting for such an agreement, the Soviet Union, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, has put forward more far-reaching proposals for conventional arms limitation.

Nuclear arms are not only a new type of weapon. They have brought the most important internal contradictions of militarism to the final limit by demonstrating clearly that war has lost all political meaning and justification. Because these weapons can lead to -- or more correctly, cannot avoid leading to -- the destruction of mankind. These weapons have brought us, as have many hundreds of years of militarism, of armies, and of military equipment, to an outer limit. Mankind will not be able to stay there for long. It could either throw mankind into the nuclear abyss or open up the road to real disarmament.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: CHERVOV PRESENTS 'WHENCE THREAT TO PEACE' 4TH EDITION

LD311249 Moscow TASS in English 1230 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 31 TASS — The threat to peace, not a mythical, but a real one, stems from the U.S. military machinery, from Washington's belligerent policy, its attempts to decide international affairs from the positions of strength, including with the use of the armed forces, Nikolay Chervov, chief of the Administration of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, told a briefing for Soviet and foreign newsmen today. He presented the fourth edition of the book "Whence the Threat to Peace", which proves by specific examples that it is precisely the United States which has appeared and continues appearing today as the instigator of the arms race.

The USA, Nikolay Chervov pointed out, was the first to create and practically use the atomic weapons, was the first to build nearly 2,000 heavy bombers in the 1950's, was the first to deploy in the 1960's nearly 1,000 ICBMS, the first to start fitting out ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, was the first to start building air, sea and land based cruise missiles. Beginning from 1970, the strategic potential of the USA grew three times over (from 5,000 to 15,000 warheads). Now the Pentagon is speedily implementing a programme worth billions of dollars for the chemical rearmament of America, is developing biological weapons, is out to put weapons into outer space as soon as possible and threaten the whole mankind from outer space.

Speaking on the pamphlet "Soviet Military Power", which was put out in Washington, Nikolay Chervov stressed that it gives an extremely distorted picture of the state of the weapons and Armed Forces of the USSR and the USA. Most of the figures cited in the pamphlet are garbled in such a way that no trace of objectivity is left.

A "sensational discovery", for example, is the attempt to prove that there is a "threat" from the Soviet Navy. In so doing they deliberately do not cite any figures of the U.S. Navy. Albeit it is known that the programme for increasing the number of U.S. warships to 600 units is being intensively implemented. In 1980, they had 479 ships. Now they have 580 ships, meanwhile the number of attack submarines has increased from 73 to 105. At hand is not a "disbalance", but a "tilt" in favour of the USA.

Any attempts of the USA at upsetting in its favour the military balance hold no promise, Nikolay Chervov said. They will lead only to a new spiral of the arms race. A source of special danger is the SDI programme. Its implementation will destroy the ABM Treaty, the arms race will get out of control and humanity may find itself trapped. Those who decide the policy of the USA should look at the situation, which has shaped, in an unbiased manner, take, at least, a realistic stand which would make it possible to divert from humanity the danger of nuclear destruction. [sentence as received]

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOZAMBICAN JOURNALIST INTERVIEWS SOVIET PREMIER

PM301038 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Answers Given by N. I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to Questions from L. de Vas Conselos, general director of Radio Mozambique"--date, place of interview not given]

[Excerpt]

[L. de Vas Conselos] IV. A last question: What is your assessment of the international situation?

[N.I. Ryzhkov] The world situation remains complex and dangerous. Dangerous above all because the militarist, aggressive forces of imperialism continue to spur on the arms race, are preparing to extend it to space, and interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In present-day conditions strong-arm politics and wars cannot be the means of resolving international problems, and the desire for military superiority cannot produce political gains for anyone, because you cannot win a nuclear war, or even the arms race. At the same time irresponsible attempts to achieve this create a real threat of world nuclear missile conflict.

The Soviet Union is opposed in principle to nuclear war and has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Our foreign policy knows no higher goal than the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. This is the aim of the Soviet Union's major foreign policy initiatives, among which a special place is assigned to the program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century and the comprehensive system of international security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress.

On this fundamental basis a package of concrete, far-reaching proposals has been elaborated, proposals capable of leading the nuclear disarmament problem out of the impasse and opening up the path to a nuclear-free world. These proposals were put on the conference table in Reykjavik by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and took the disarmament problem to a fundamentally new level. Reykjavik showed the possibility exists for reaching agreement on the major problems associated with mankind's survival, and that a nuclear-free, nonviolent world is not a utopia.

Broad understanding and approval in the world, and especially Europe, greeted the Soviet Union's new constructive step recently. It is a question of singling out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of questions and concluding a separate agreement on this problem with delay. This initiative opens up the

possibility of substantially strengthening European security and lessening tension and the threat of confrontation where the two most powerful military groupings meet.

The active position of our party and the Soviet Union in international affairs is an expression of the new political thinking, without which there can be no mutually acceptable solutions or accords in the interests of mankind's survival.

In the struggle to preserve peace and establish just principles of international security we attach great significance to collaboration and solidarity with the liberated countries. We highly value cooperation with Mozambique and we pay due tribute to its contribution to the peoples' struggle against imperialism's aggressive policy and for the final elimination of colonialism and racism.

It is our profound conviction that for all the danger hanging over mankind, never before has the potential for preserving and strengthening peace been so real. War can be prevented and mankind can be saved from catastrophe by the peoples' united efforts. That is the historic mission of socialism and all our planet's progressive and peace-loving forces.

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CSO: 5200/1386

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET DELEGATION VISITS COLOMBIA

PN311452 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

["Joint Soviet-Colombian Statement on the Visit to Colombia by a USSR Supreme Soviet Delegation"]

[Excerpts] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by G. M. Voskanyan, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, was in Colombia on an official visit 24 through 29 March 1987 at the invitation of the National Congress of the Republic of Colombia.

The delegation was received by Colombian President V. Barco, to whom a message from the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium was conveyed. Meetings and talks took place with Foreign Minister J. Londono; H. Gutierrez, president of the National Congress; G. Ovalle, president of the Chamber of Representatives; and Julio Cesar Sanchez, mayor of Bogota; and in the National Congress foreign affairs commission, with the participation of representatives of the main political parties.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation gave the Colombian side a detailed briefing on the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and spoke of the profound restructuring of all spheres of Soviet society's life which is under way in the Soviet Union and of the work aimed at accelerating the country's socioeconomic development. The delegation stressed that on the basis of the tasks of the country's internal development, the main aim of the USSR's foreign policy strategy is to secure for the Soviet people the opportunity to live and work in the conditions of a lasting nuclear-free and nonviolent world. This goal is not contrary to other people's interests.

During the examination of questions of the international situation the sides expressed concern at its continuing deterioration, the buildup of the nuclear arms race, the danger of the spread of the arms race into space, the undermining of the SALT II treaty, and the threat to undermine the ABM Treaty. The firm conviction was expressed of the need for a total ban on nuclear tests. In this regard the Colombian side's attention was drawn to the large-scale Soviet foreign policy initiatives, whose implementation would lead to a true breakthrough in the development of the international situation, mankind's liberation from nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The USSR's proposal to isolate the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of issues and to conclude an agreement on it without delay on

the understanding that the question of a substantial reduction and then the elimination of strategic arms is not removed from the agenda, was a major new step along the path to mutually acceptable accords in the nuclear disarmament sphere. The sides noted the special role of parliaments in the struggle to save mankind from nuclear catastrophe, eliminate seats of enmity and military conflicts, and build a nuclear-free, nonviolent world.

There was a shared understanding of the need to stop the arms race, above all the nuclear arms race, and seek mutually acceptable solutions to other problems common to all mankind in the modern world. The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and ministers of the Colombian National Congress came out in favor of transferring the resources now being spent on military purposes to peaceful utilization, including the socioeconomic development of the world's peoples. They supported the UN General Assembly resolution on convening a UN conference on the relationship between disarmament and development.

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CSO: 5200/1386

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

PETROVSKIY ACCUSES U.S.--Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has accused the United States of impeding accords on nuclear arms limitation and on the prevention of militarizing outer space. He was speaking in Beijing, at a United Nations-sponsored conference on disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. Vladimir Petrovskiy said the United States was advancing ever new conditions at negotiations which hamper agreements. Delegates of 16 nations are attending the conference. [Text] [Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2022 GMT 23 Mar 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/1386

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS COMMENTATOR VIEWS PAISLEY ASW CRISIS REMARKS

LD201039 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0345 GMT 20 Mar 87

[Text] Washington, 20 Mar (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy reports:

The Pentagon has discovered a new threat to the U.S. from the USSR. This time it comes from Soviet submarines. "We are on the threshold of a crisis in our capability to wage anti-submarine warfare (ASW)," Melvyn Paisley, assistant secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems) told legislators in a report, whose contents became known on Thursday.

This is not the first time that the Pentagon has discovered "windows of vulnerability" in America to a nuclear strike from the USSR. Always following on such "discoveries" are demands for immediate allocation of (or increases in) funding for this or that military program, before the USSR uses the "window of vulnerability" and starts a nuclear war. Nor has there yet been a time when the Congress has failed to heed these prayers without delving particularly into the question as to how a worldwide nuclear catastrophe could meet Soviet interests. Neither has there yet been a time when these "windows of vulnerability" have not turned out to be myth. However, the money wrung out of the legislators for them has remained quite real.

"The time for change has come," said M. Paisley in his report, but hardly meaning that it is time to alter this vicious practice. No. He sees the urgency for changes in that up till now Congress is supposed to have paid little heed to naval demands for a sharp increase in funding for submarine warfare.

It's a familiar chain of events: the discovery of a "window of vulnerability," a demand for allocation of new resources, and then their allocation. Now only the last link in the chain is missing: Congress has not yet allocated the money. But on the other hand, the Pentagon has not yet sent Congress a concrete demand, continuing its elaborations on the plan for a new military program which it promises to submit to the legislators in the coming weeks. Going by the experience of past years, that is when another link will fall into place in the vicious chain of escalation in the arms race urged on by Washington.

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CSO: 5200/1390

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

TASS REPORTS MX TEST--Washington, 22 Mar--The United States conducted its latest test of the MX ICBM on Saturday. Fitted with six dummy warheads, the missile was launched early in the morning from a test site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in the direction of Kwajalein Atoll. According to an Air Force spokesman, the test was successful. This is already the 17th out of a total of 20 planned missile launches. The MX is capable of carrying up to 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads. As spokesmen for the administration have repeatedly said, the development and commissioning of this type of missile is one of the most important components of the Pentagon program which aims to enhance the U.S. nuclear potential. Many specialists believe that, by virtue of its characteristics, the MX is intended for carrying out a first nuclear strike. [Text] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 87 First Edition p 6 PM] /9274

MOSCOW REPORTS SCC SESSION--A routine session of the Soviet-U.S. Permanent Consultative Commission has opened in Geneva. It was set up in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the USSR and U.S. Governments of 21 December 1972 to facilitate the implementation of the goals and provisions of the strategic arms limitations agreements and on measures to lessen the danger of nuclear war breaking out, concluded between the USSR and the United States. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 19 Mar 87 LD] /9274

CSO: 5200/1390

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CRITICIZES REAGAN STATEMENT ON END OF MARCH INF ROUND

LD280955 Moscow TASS in English 0824 GMT 28 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 28 TASS — The White House released President Reagan's statement in connection with the close of the latest round of talks in the group on the intermediate-range nuclear forces at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva on March 26.

The statement lauds in every way the stand of the American side and its "commitment" to the efforts to reach an accord on medium-range nuclear missiles. Simultaneously, it attempts to misrepresent the Soviet approach to the talks and imputes to the Soviet side a "new position," which is "not acceptable" to the United States or its allies.

The President insists in his statement on linking an "initial INF agreement" to "constraints" on shorter-range INF missiles.

The Soviet initiative, formulated in the statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on February 28 pursues the clear goal of an immediate separate agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe so that, in keeping with the Reykjavik accords, the USSR and the United States should eliminate them within the next five years. The number of Soviet missiles of that class will be reduced in the Asian part of the Soviet territory to 100 warheads within the same period with the understanding that the United States will retain as many warheads on medium-range missiles in U.S. national territory.

The Soviet Union stresses that as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles is achieved, the USSR will withdraw from the GDR and Czechoslovakia, by agreement with the governments of those countries, longer-range INF missiles deployed there as a countermeasure to the stationing of Pershing-2's and cruises in Western Europe. As for the other INF missiles, the Soviet Union has stated its readiness immediately to enter talks with a view to their reduction and total elimination.

The United States has said on more than one occasion that if the USSR detaches medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, it will be easy to reach accord on their elimination in Europe. Now that the Soviet Union has done so, Washington is trying to devise new pretexts for complicating the talks. This only indicates that the U.S. is unwilling to abolish medium-range missiles in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COMMENT ON U.S., WEST EUROPEAN RESPONSE

'Complex Problems'

LD132113 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 13 Mar 87

[Report on interview with IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin, by Moscow correspondent Stefan Simak; Bovin replies in Russian fading into Slovak report; date and place not given -- recorded]

[Text] Without a doubt, one of the most important foreign political events this year has been the Soviet proposal for scrapping medium-range missiles in Europe. As we know, the U.S. effectively approved of this step in proposal form and yesterday submitted its proposal for verification for possible agreement at the Soviet-U.S. disarmament dialogue in Geneva. The Soviet Union agrees to on-site verification; in other words, to U.S. experts being present at the destruction of Soviet missiles, and Soviet experts, in turn, at the destruction of U.S. ones. However, it insists unequivocally on reciprocity. Western political commentators are trying to assess this approach optimistically. What, though, is the view of Aleksandr Bovin, political observer of the Soviet daily IZVESTIYA? Stefan Simak invited him to reply in this interview:

[Bovin] (?On that occasion) I stressed that in this case I would be happy to be proved wrong, and that is still the case, but I suggest that we do not run ahead of ourselves, that we wait a while. Some time could elapse before an agreement is signed because a large number of rather complex problems will have to be resolved, primarily in respect of verification.

So far we still cannot rule out the possibility that just at the decisive moment when a decision has to be made on whether or not to sign the agreement, the Americans will not spring yet another surprise on us in connection with their favorite subject of verification, and not block that process, Aleksandr Bovin stressed.

[Simak] Some elements of bourgeois propaganda these days are saying that the Soviet Union has made a carefully calculated move: the United States is suffering from the Irangate syndrome, President Reagan is nearing the end of his tenure, and an agreement with the Soviet Union would help him heal many of his wounds. I asked comrade Bovin what he thought.

[Bovin] I think that like any government, our government always makes a comprehensive assessment of the situation. Of course, we are taking into account the situation in which the United States finds itself today, and the one in which President Reagan finds

himself. The important thing for us, however, is not what is actually happening in the United States, but how it affects the development of Soviet-U.S. relations. Of course we are trying to make use of anything that could have a positive effect on those relations. Reagan's domestic problems can be seen as a certain stimulus for seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union -- that is logical and of course we will try to make use of that logic, Aleksandr Bovin stated.

[Simak] If an agreement was, indeed, signed on medium-range missiles, an avalanche of new agreements could follow too, for example on operational-tactical missiles, conventional weapons and so forth. But is the world ready for such a jump?

[Bovin] I am not really sure that it is a matter of taking jumps. Instead we need to take gradual and consistent steps toward a definite goal. After all, if someone wants to learn to swim, he first has to get into the water. If we can take the first step, more steps will follow. But you have to start somewhere, so why not start with medium-range missiles and while we are moving toward an agreement on that, the world will prepare itself for further disarmament, Aleksandr Bovin concluded.

'Propaganda Backup' Assailed

PN231358 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 21 Mar 87 p 3

[Political observer Yuriy Kornilov "View of Events": "Door to a World of Hope"]

[Text] Europe without nuclear weapons? Until recently such a question would have been seen by many in the West -- and not only in the West -- as a political utopia. But today the outlines of such a Europe can already be seen, and quite clearly too. The way toward this was opened up by the USSR's large-scale foreign policy initiative of fundamental importance, which proposed separating the problem of medium-range missiles on the continent from other questions linked with curbing the arms race and concluding a separate Soviet-U.S. agreement on this problem. The signing of such an agreement would make it possible to rid the European continent of many hundreds of Soviet and U.S. missiles and their nuclear charges. We recall that the United States currently has 380 missiles in Western Europe (108 Pershing's and 272 cruise missiles), while the Soviet Union has 355 medium-range missiles in the European part of the country (243 SS-20's and 112 SS-4's).

The Soviet initiative was made 28 February, but now, almost a month later, it is still at the center of world public attention. Eminent statesmen and public figures in various countries and mass media organs are stressing again and again that the Soviet proposal is yet another vivid manifestation of new political thinking and convincing testimony to the Soviet state's profound love of peace. The implementation of this proposal would be of enormous political significance, since it would mark the start of genuine disarmament and, consequently, and abrupt easing of tension and the creation of an atmosphere of greater trust. The Soviet initiative, the foreign press quite rightly noting, is extremely substantive from the purely military standpoint as well, since it is aimed at eliminating a considerable proportion of an entire class of nuclear weapons and ridding the entire continent of them.

This is the state of play today: Washington has agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal. This proposal -- like the U.S. draft agreement submitted somewhat later -- is on the negotiating table at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. Although the seventh round of these talks is over, by mutual consent a group

that specially deals with the medium-range missile problem is continuing to work. The instructions on the basis of which the Soviet delegation operates are distinguished by their extreme clarity. Move vigorously toward the drawing up of a concrete and reliable agreement in as short a time as possible. The Soviet side proceeds on the basis that the agreement being worked out must be a sound, well-conceived, and thoroughly balanced document taking the interests of both sides and European security into account. We expect the same serious and constructive approach from the United States.

Needless to say, the Geneva talks are not conducted in a vacuum. Their success and fruitfulness largely depend on the "political background" against which they are held. This "background" is created not only by the enormous mass of positive responses to the Soviet initiative; it is also largely shaped by those U.S. and NATO circles which still think in terms of confrontation and are uninterested in detente. There are no tricks or ignoble maneuvers to which the representatives of those circles will not stoop in their attempts to hamper progress in ridding Europe of its deadly nuclear missile burden! The well-known Pentagon "hawk" R. Perle, who has been in the influential post of U.S. assistant secretary of defense for the last 6 years, proclaims that although Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range missiles are no bad thing in themselves, the Pentagon is "demanding" that in 1988-1989 the number of U.S. military personnel in Western Europe -- and primarily that part of Western Europe served by precisely these missiles -- be increased. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, issued a statement couched in the same tone, to the effect that whatever the state of the Moscow-Washington talks, the United States must retain no less than 50 medium-range missiles in Western Europe in order to be able to counter the "Soviet threat." Then it was the turn of K. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who, speaking at a Washington conference, put forward yet another more than strange "demand," according to which neither Moscow nor Washington should determine the specific areas in which the 100 warheads -- which would be retained in the Asian part of the USSR under a proposal in line with the Reykjavik accord -- will be sited. The maneuvers may differ but they have one aim: To cast doubt on the very idea of ridding Europe of medium-range missiles, to complicate the talks, and to erect artificial barriers in the way of resolving the problem.

It is well known that the Soviet proposal to rid Europe of medium-range missiles not only does not push other key disarmament problems into the background but, on the contrary, is designed to sharply step up the quest for a solution to these problems. That is the USSR's principled and consistent political line. But how does the United States respond? Its stance is eloquently attested to by Washington's continuing attempts to torpedo the ABM Treaty by way of a so-called "broad interpretation" of it and to transfer the arms race to space. The recently publicized secret Pentagon directive envisaging an entire range of measures -- including preparations for the creation of military space stations -- within the framework of the "Star Wars" program attests no less eloquently to this stance. The U.S. position on the problem of strategic offensive arms is also in line with the same old militarist policy: Washington is clearly trying to move merely toward a 50-percent reduction in these arms. Nor is any real progress visible in the U.S. side's approach to questions such as the elimination of chemical weapons or conventional arms reduction. "Since R. Reagan became U.S. President, U.S. military strategy has boiled down to ensuring that the United States is able to fight and win a nuclear war," THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER noted.

The corresponding "propaganda backup" has been provided for this extremely dangerous militarist line. It is typical that at a time when, as a result of the new Soviet

initiative, an opportunity is emerging for real progress in solving such an important problem as the "Euromissile" problem, certain circles in Washington are attempting with particular zeal to revive the myth -- long since refuted by the facts -- of the "Soviet military threat" and give people the idea that the USSR allegedly "cannot be trusted." It is this aim -- shamelessly lying about our country and its peace-loving foreign policy -- that is pursued by the recent presidential report entitled "On the Soviet Failure To Observe Arms Control Agreements" which has been presented to Congress. The authors of the report, in an attempt to off-load their own sins onto others, strive -- albeit in vain -- to conceal their own militarist ambitions and their gamble not on talks and agreements but on the military and space stick, with which it would be possible to impose their own will on sovereign countries and peoples.

It is said that all parallels in international affairs are relative to a certain extent. Nonetheless, in observing the current feverish activity of the Washington apologists for the arms race, one cannot fail to recall November 1985, when the Soviet-U.S. summit was held in Geneva. How many hopes it engendered and what a warm welcome was given to the statement by the two countries' leaders emphasizing that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that the sides would not strive for military supremacy! But only a few months passed before the world saw that the unprecedented U.S. military preparations were not only not ending but, on the contrary, increasing. "The summit half-opened the door to a world of hope," M.S. Gorbachev said in April 1986 when answering questions from the Algerian magazine REVOLUTION AFRICAINE. "But how the people linked with the U.S. military-industrial complex were scared of that ray of hope! With what force they brought their weight to bear on that 'door' in order to slam it shut!" Is not something of the kind happening today as well?

We have been repeatedly assured by Washington and the capitals of the other NATO states that if the USSR separated the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package there would be no difficulty in reaching an agreement on eliminating them in Europe.

Well, those people in the West who made such statements now have every opportunity to show that they were sincere in their intention to reach an agreement. As for the Soviet Union, it is fully resolved, despite all the difficulties and artificial obstacles, to continue to do everything to make a real and major contribution to the cause of ridding our continent of nuclear arms. This historic chance must not be wasted! That is what the Europeans and the peoples of other continents expect, and that is what the interests of the present and the future demand.

'Lifebelt for Reagan'

LD222105 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Mar 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Boris Kalyagin]

[Text] We have already reported the accident which occurred on the dry cargo ship Komsomolets Kirgizii, which went out of control and sank in the stormy waters of the Atlantic. It would have been a much more serious disaster if it were not for the airmen of the U.S. Coast Guard. They managed to deliver safe and sound from the shipwrecked vessel to the shore all the members of the Soviet crew. [video shows still of a shipwreck; group of men getting out of helicopter]

Our sailors have now returned home, but on the way they were invited to the White House by U.S. President Reagan. The successful evacuation of the crew, said the President, is yet another example of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in search and rescue operations. [video shows reception ceremony; Reagan greeting Coast Guard members]

We too have, on many occasions, rescued American sailors in distress. These instances clearly show just what good deeds could be performed by American and Soviet people if they were to act jointly, to cooperate. It's not just a question of rescuing individual ships. Our entire world ship has gotten into troubled waters and its holds are literally packed with nuclear cargo. Today, thanks to our country's initiative, there has appeared a genuine hope that we might soon get rid of a part of these deadly stocks -- or to be more specific, of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The U.S. newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR has called the Soviet medium-range missile proposal a life-belt for Reagan. What they mean is that the President's prestige is so dampened by Irangate that he can only be kept afloat by a major and historic decision, for which millions of Americans are waiting -- for example, an arms reduction.

Incidentally, about Irangate, at his latest news conference Reagan was literally ambushed by questions from journalists. Still the President did not manage to provide any kind of intelligible explanation of his behavior regarding the secret arms sale to Iran and the illegal transfer of funds to the Nicaraguan contras. The political scandal over Irangate is not dying down, but we, naturally, are far from exploiting the short-term zig-zags of Washington politics. Our position has been expressed sufficiently clearly. Valuable time must not be lost -- by waiting, for example, for the present administration to be replaced. It is essential to put an immediate stop to the arms race before it gets out of control.

For his part, the U.S. President has stated that he sees the possibility of substantial progress at the arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union. At the same time, it would seem that the U.S. administration is venturing into another political game in order to carve out maximum advantage for itself at the expense of the other side. For example, it is being stressed in every possible way that the new Soviet proposal, which takes into account Reagan's zero option, is, allegedly, the result of the U.S. President's firmness; that his tough line is bearing fruit. We shall not get into polemics with such statements for the moment. If it was just a matter of rhetoric then it wouldn't be so bad, but the U.S. Administration is undertaking specific actions which are destroying the basis for accords. Once again a complex dance has been started around the question of verification, but most importantly, the Soviet-American ABM Treaty is being undermined.

The White House has again spoken in favor of the so-called broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty. At his news conference, Ronald Reagan frankly admitted that the traditional -- i.e. commonly accepted -- interpretation of the treaty is hampering work in the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative. For that reason, the United States intends to jettison the traditional interpretation and take up the broad interpretation of the agreement. This would allow them, on a legal basis, so to speak, to implement the Star Wars program.

This barely-disguised attempt at renouncing adherence to the treaty has aroused criticism in the U.S. Congress itself. Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has stated that there is no legal basis for the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. Western European partners have also advocated adherence to the treaty.

After some hesitation, they have also supported the idea of an agreement on Euromissiles. At the same time, there has been an increasing number of calls for the need of the countries of Western Europe to work out an independent approach to disarmament problems. In this connection, particular attention is being devoted to the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Tomorrow, the British Prime Minister is to meet FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Francois Mitterrand, and certain observers are making the assumption that Thatcher plans to speak in Moscow on behalf of the Western European NATO partners.

NATO Wants 'Link' With SRINF

LD260102 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 25 Mar 87

[Text] State Department spokesman Charles Redman said that in concluding an agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the United States must secure the right to install in Western Europe more short-range missiles or remodel the Pershing-2 missiles already there. Our commentary is by Vladislav Kozyakov:

The State Department spokesman chose to resort to the so-called lag of the United States in the military sphere, something that Washington always does in similar circumstances. Under the draft agreement, however, the United States and NATO would retain a considerable nuclear potential in Western Europe after the elimination of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles there. The United States keeps over 5,000 nuclear charges on its missiles, artillery shells and mines in the region. America's allies, Britain and France, hold hundreds of nuclear missiles and their nuclear weapons are constantly upgraded. The London OBSERVER magazine says that Britain is planning to produce 2,000 more nuclear weapons and among them tactical missiles.

Why are Washington and NATO trying to link the talks on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles with other nuclear weapons in Europe? Having proposed that a separate agreement be reached on medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union said it would be prepared to immediately enter into talks on reducing and eliminating tactical missiles in Europe.

The Soviet Union is prepared to contribute to resolving that problem by withdrawing its tactical missiles with extended range from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia as soon as an agreement on medium-range missiles is reached. Given good will on the part of the West there is every possibility for reaching an agreement on the problem of shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union has done a great deal to clear the way to an agreement. The problem of eliminating Soviet and American missiles in Europe is not linked now to the nuclear weapons of Britain and France or other disarmament problems. Nor is it linked to the SDI. What is the aim of the United States in trying to establish a link between that problem and other problems of nuclear weapons in Europe? One has the impression that NATO is unwilling to part with nuclear weapons, medium-range or tactical, and that is why it is trying to tie the two problems in with each other.

West Europe Critics Answered

PM261124 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Vikentiy Matveyev article under the rubric "Political Observer's Opinion": "Europe's Say"]

[Text] Diplomatic departments in the major West European capitals have recently been working overtime. Consultations are taking place between London, Paris, and Bonn. A meeting of heads of state and government of the EEC countries is in preparation. Animated debates on foreign policy issues have taken place in the FRG Bundestag and the British Parliament.

In the past, such outbreaks of activity have often been due to acute international crises. Now the reverse is true. A glimmer of light, of special significance to Europe, has appeared on the horizon, which only recently was entirely dark.

The West German newspaper GENERAL ANZEIGER wrote on 21 March, after the 3-day Bundestag debate, that the appeals from Moscow for a "new way of thinking" had a strong influence on the government statement made in the Bundestag by H. Kohl and on a considerable part of the debate.

This debate, like the present diplomatic activity in the West European capitals in general, is focused on the question of the medium-range missiles sited in Europe. The Soviet Union has once again displayed good will by proposing to conclude a separate agreement on this question, separating it from the package of other problems. A USSR-U.S. accord on this question would pave the way for progress also with regard to the shorter-range missiles which exist in Europe.

But how are we to regard those figures in the West who complain that the talks on the elimination of medium-range missiles are supposedly taking place "behind Europe's back" -- as if the Soviet Union was located at the other end of the world and was entering into some kind of conspiracy, rather than being guided by interests of vital importance to all the continent's countries and peoples!

This arbitrary dealing with geography has a political basis. Those same figures try to sow all kinds of doubts about the motives behind the USSR's readiness to achieve accords on the problem of medium-range missiles, just as in general they try to set the public against the idea of such an accord.

It is claimed that such an agreement would place Western Europe in a "vulnerable position." While our country, to meet the wishes expressed at public and state levels, is prepared not to link an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe to other problems, the opponents of such an accord insist on not one, but several "linkages," that is, in effect they would like to work toward the blocking of such an accord.

So far, it is a question of individual statements by particular figures. In the first reaction to M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement on this question, official circles in Western capitals welcomed the prospect of ridding Europe of an entire class of nuclear missile weapons. But then all kinds of reservations began to be put forward by certain prominent government figures.

It is pointed out that the problem of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe will remain outside the framework of the agreement being discussed between the USSR and the

United States. But surely the Soviet side is not saying that this problem should be relegated to the archives? The Warsaw Pact states have made far-reaching proposals directed toward progress in this sphere too. In Vienna, within the framework of the meeting of representatives of states participating in the all-European conference, preliminary consultations have begun on this problem. It is not the socialist countries, but the United States and its NATO partners that display extreme sluggishness, if nothing worse, in this respect.

Following the "tradition" started some years ago, the Pentagon has just published the latest collection of fabrications designed to convince the outside world that the Soviet Union constitutes a "threat." In presenting to journalists this "compilation," which contains 159 pages and is the biggest of all those so far prepared by the Pentagon's propaganda services, Weinberger, the department's chief, claimed that the USSR is preparing a new generation of mobile ICBM's for the mid-nineties. He has "forgotten" one thing: the USSR's repeatedly expressed readiness to move forward, together with the United States, along the path of total elimination of the arsenal of strategic missiles, which, as is well known, was opposed by the Pentagon with all the force that could be mustered by militarist circles across the ocean, who cannot conceive of a future without the arms race.

The Pentagon's latest anti-Soviet fabrication shows that on the question of the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, influential circles in Washington do not want to move forward, but to mark time. How else can one assess their "proposals" on reequipping the Pershing-2's as shorter-range missiles, so as to leave them inviolate? These so-called "recommendations" from across the ocean should show Western Europe more clearly than anything who wants to perpetuate the continent's transformation into a nuclear powder keg.

The desire of the governments of West European countries to have a say on the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles is natural. It does not matter which countries are concerned: those where there are American missiles, or those where there are not. The problem affects our continent as a whole. The Soviet Union bears this in mind. And of course, we do not think that as a result of the attainment of an accord on this problem a situation will arise where constructive diplomacy will be able to rest on its laurels. Such an accord will create a favorable atmosphere for talks on other topical questions, to whose resolution the European countries can and should make a fitting contribution.

Overall Balance Viewed

PM261425 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[V. Katin article: "Obstacles to the Elimination of Medium-range Missiles"]

[Text] During the FRG Bundestag debate on Chancellor H. Kohl's government statement, Economics Minister Martin Bangemann urged that the disarmament proposals advanced by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, be treated very seriously. M. Bangemann warned against burdening the solution of the question of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe by advancing new parliamentary conditions.

At the same time, alarming information is coming from Britain. According to the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, there are grounds for believing that the deployment of American cruise missiles has begun at the Molesworth Air Base -- a year ahead of schedule.

The problem of medium-range missiles was also the focus of attention at British Prime Minister M. Thatcher's talks with F. Mitterrand and H. Kohl on the eve of her upcoming visit to the Soviet Union.

Our country is attentively following the reaction abroad to the proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, analyzing that reaction, and drawing conclusions. To sum up the responses to that initiative, it is possible to state that, on the whole, a positive mood can be sensed among many American and West European leaders and politicians and the broad public.

Speaking on national television, U.S. President Ronald Reagan welcomed M.S. Gorbachev's statement.

French President Francois Mitterrand, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher regard the new Soviet proposal as opening up opportunities to make progress.

However, discordant statements are also to be heard, now here, now there. Claims that the Warsaw Pact Organization "has an advantage" in conventional arms and therefore the elimination of American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles will give it military superiority are appearing in the press of NATO countries, particularly the FRG. At what are such statements aimed? At dragging out and complicating the solution of the problem of medium-class missiles.

Let us take specific data. For example, those cited by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. They attest that there is an overall balance of forces in terms of conventional arms between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. And the Brookings Institute (United States) believes that the correlation of the two alliances' conventional forces is now even shaping up in the West's favor.

One more important circumstance: For all their equality, the two blocs' armed forces will never be able to be a mirror image of each other. One of them might have more of certain individual kinds of arms, and the other more of different ones, constituting a counterbalance. On the whole, however, on a global scale, approximate equilibrium exists here. And that is the chief thing.

At the same time, the opinions of NATO experts are not brushed aside in the Warsaw Pact countries. For it is clear that different estimates of the strength in conventional arms and manpower could slow down the process of reducing armed forces in Europe and create misunderstanding and difficulties. Is that really such an insuperable barrier in our age? We have only to unite the two sides' political will, and the Rubicon will be crossed. There are specific proposals for this.

A program for reducing armed forces and conventional arms was advanced at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest last July. It is proposed to carry out their reduction in Europe at agreed times, while constantly preserving military equilibrium at lower levels without detriment to anyone's security. As an initial step it is possible to make a one-time mutual reduction in the number of the military alliances' troops by 100,000-150,000 men on each side over 1-2 years. The number of tactical strike aircraft would be reduced within the framework of this measure. Immediately after this, the Warsaw Pact states are ready to make further significant reductions, as a result of which, given the NATO countries' reciprocal readiness, in the early nineties ground forces and tactical strike aircraft in Europe would be reduced by 25 percent compared with today's level. This reduction would total more than half a million men on each side.

This is a specific, perfectly realistic plan -- not difficult to fulfill -- for solving the problem of the "threat" from the Warsaw Pact's conventional armed forces. If this problem is really of concern to someone in NATO and if it is advanced sincerely and not in order to sideline the USSR's new proposal for the elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles on the continent, then it must be tackled immediately and solved quickly in a businesslike way. This will be a good test of the true intentions of Western leaders in respect to whether they want reliable security in Europe.

The linkage of the elimination of these missiles with the problem of short-range missiles is also advanced as an obstacle. Artificial obstacles are being created here! For M.S. Gorbachev's statement clearly says: As soon as an agreement to eliminate Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR will withdraw increased range operational and tactical missiles from the GDR and the CSSR by agreement with those countries' governments. As regards other missiles of this class, the USSR is prepared to begin talks at once with a view to reducing and totally eliminating them. So everything here has been provided for and thought out.

Fears that Western Europe will, you see, remain "defenseless" against Soviet shorter-range missiles are also completely farfetched. For there are thousands of American forward-based nuclear means close to the Soviet Union's borders. Let us add to this the U.S. allies' -- Britain and France -- own nuclear weapons. The result is a strange distortion in bookkeeping: Literally everything is taken into account for the USSR, starting with the number of bayonets, while quite a different approach is employed for the NATO armed forces.

In solving the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe the Soviet Union agrees not to touch either the American forward-based means or the Anglo-French nuclear potential. There is undoubtedly a certain risk here. This is being done exclusively in order to finally overcome the deadlock in the problem of clearing Europe of nuclear explosives. For you have to start somewhere, and erect an obstacle to the avalanche of nuclear arms at some time.

Adelman WASHINGTON POST Article Hit

PM301505 [Editorial Report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 March 1987 First Edition carries on page 3 a "Political Debate" feature under the general heading "Europe Without Missiles: How Far Off?" It comprises a 900-word abbreviated reprint of a WASHINGTON POST article by Kenneth Adelman and an article by Lev Semeyko in response to it. The introduction to the feature reads as follows:

"Since the proposal in M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement on singling out the problem of medium-range missiles and solving it as soon as possible at talks, the issue has been at the center of world public attention. There have been a number of articles in the Western press in which one detects a desire by politicians to exaggerate the difficulties in the way of achieving an agreement and to prepare public opinion for delays at the Geneva talks.

"Today we are publishing a slightly abbreviated reprint of an article in THE WASHINGTON POST by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director K. Adelman and a commentary on it by the well known Soviet expert L. Semeyko, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace Disarmament Commission."

The Adelman article is an overview of the INF situation, answering critics of the Reagan administration's approach to the issue over the years and stressing its

"serious" approach to arms control. He talks about the "very important" problems that are still to be settled and says that "we still have far to go."

Lev Semeyko's commentary reads as follows:

"It is just as difficult to find a coherent theme in K. Adelman's article as it is to find correct points. The leader of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency tries to demonstrate that in his sphere only a hard line is justified, although one would have thought that everyone would realize that compromises are the best way. Mr Adelman claims that 'considerable progress has been achieved' now at talks, and then, as if startled by his own optimism, he corrects himself: 'We still have far to go.' It creates a rather odd picture: Passages 'saluting' the hard-line approach to disarmament quickly develop into a 'requiem' for the prospects of eliminating nuclear weapons.

"But let us look at the substance of K. Adelman's arguments. He begins by obviously trying to justify Washington: He seeks the reason why the Reagan administration is the only one in recent decades to have failed to sign a single agreement with the USSR on curbing the arms race even in one and a half terms in office. Why? Apparently, the 'obduracy of the Soviets' is to blame. And if this 'obduracy' is now a thing of the past, he says, then all credit to Reagan's policy -- tough and uncompromising!

"Let us say right away that the thesis of the need to pressure the USSR has become very fashionable in the West. But it is a mistake. To fail to understand the real reasons for a particular Soviet offer geared to promoting radical disarmament is to run the risk of making major policy errors.

"The Soviet Union made a concession when it accepted the U.S. 'zero option' on medium-range missiles in Europe. A considerable one, to be honest. But the point is that this was done not by any means because of U.S. pressure. One could even put it more strongly: It was in spite of it, in spite of the barriers the Americans have placed in the way of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. In fact there is all too much evidence that Reagan's 'zero option' was put forward in the expectation that the USSR would not accept it and it would then be easier to accuse Moscow of 'obduracy.' Just one example: Those who in the early eighties in Western Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic advocated eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe are now unhappy that this may happen. They are issuing appeals: Leave some U.S. missiles, let the missile formula of 100:100 for the Asian part of the USSR and U.S. territory operate in Europe as well; do not cut a single missile until the 'discrepancies' in other armaments are eliminated, and so forth.

"So the 'obduracy' is a two-edged weapon. The U.S. edge is there for all to see. Adelman's flirting with the criticism thesis is no accident. It is somewhat theatrical. Pity America, poor thing, forever being criticized, even for 'wanting to conclude an agreement' in the disarmament sphere.

"Now for the problem of SS-20 missiles. Adelman treats it as practically the only important aspect of European nuclear confrontation. But this problem is distorted in the West. The chief point is that SS-20 missiles have never threatened and are not threatening America because they cannot reach its territory. At the same time the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles (and there are now 380 in Europe) are a direct threat to Soviet strategic facilities. On the false pretext of 'neutralizing' the SS-20's (but in fact in order to create a first-strike capability) the United States has continued to this day to deploy 'Euromissiles.' The talk of the 'obduracy of the Soviets' is a

total distortion of reality. Had the United States gone along with the Soviet approach 6 years ago, the picture of nuclear confrontation in Europe would be completely different. And Adelman would not have to try to prove that all these years, you see, the United States has been dreaming about a Europe without medium-range missiles.

"One way or another, an agreement on medium-range missiles is now possible. Even in 6 months or so, according to the Soviet estimate, if Washington is willing. It is here that Adelman sounds totally at odds with his presentation of the 'SS-20 problem' as the key one. Apparently, hitherto 'both supporters and opponents have overemphasized the strategic and political significance of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces,' whereas this agreement 'will not completely solve the problems of East-West relations' and so forth.

"He obviously wants the reader to think that if an agreement cannot be reached it is not so terrible. Then comes what appears to be Washington's number one song -- 'we still have far to go.' Why far? Because there is ever-increasing resistance among rightists and ultra-rightists in the West. Not for nothing is Adelman constantly trying to justify himself in the face of 'Atlanticists' criticism.

"K. Adelman's article is altogether highly typical. It is not only a well known 'hawk' speaking. It is, to all appearances, Washington's official view as well. And this has to be worrying for all who want to rid Europe of the deadly nuclear burden as soon as possible."

'Number of Buts' Growing

LD291056 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 28 Mar 87

["Top Priority" program presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov]

[Text] [Kuznetsov] The Geneva talks on medium-range weapons in Europe have now gone into recess and are scheduled to resume in April after a meeting in Moscow between Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz, who are expected to give a boost to these talks by cutting through some controversial points, difficulties that have arisen there. I'd like one of you to give an assessment of the current situation on this issue.

[Bogdanov] You know, Pavel, I was always little bit pessimistic about the outcome of those talks.

[Kuznetsov] They're not through yet, they're not through yet.

[Bogdanov] Yes, they are not through yet, but you know that my pessimism was based rather on American domestic situation and, let me put it that way, correlation of forces within this administration. And I'm afraid that I have not more pessimism but not less pessimism, and I would like to call our listeners' attention to two very interesting facts. We have very important talks, very promising talks, and we have a number, you know, of signals from the administration that they are genuinely interested in getting some results about INF. But at the same time you have two things: Number one, Pentagon publishes a famous, you know, Soviet...

[Kuznetsov -- interrupting] Notorious, I would say.

[Bogdanov] Notorious, let me put it that way, sixth edition of the "Soviet Military Power" and it is said in that edition that the Soviets, they still build, they outspend, they have ominous design about United States and the most, you know, unpleasant thing which is in the sixth edition of "Military Power" is some, you know, very bad smelling hits in the address of our secretary general. It is said that in spite of benign words they still, this secretary general is for military, you know things like that. Now, my question is: If you are really aiming at reaching an agreement with the other side, how you could possibly create such, you know, hostile, you know, environment and you signal to the American public -- but look, they are aggressive, they are very dangerous people and you can read between lines that no deal is desirable with these ominous, you know, Russians, because they are cheaters and things like that, and what not? And number two: Very recently we had a statement by some very important people that the Soviet side is making the talks very difficult by declining to discuss, to include in the, some package -- which package I don't know -- the short-range, the short-range missiles, which makes the whole business, you know, of INF impossible. [indistinct interruption] That's a sheer lie, that's a sheer lie.

[Kuznetsov] Okay, I'd like to discuss this point in more detail. Let's go back to 1983 when the first Pershings appeared in Western Europe and not a single official soul in the West, or Western Europe, told us they were particularly happy about it. They just wanted to defend Western Europe from a conventional Soviet onslaught. At the same time we were told, and very emphatically at times, that once the Soviet medium-range missiles were removed there would be no problem in doing the same to the American medium-range arms. Now, what's the situation now?

I mean, are they as committed to their zero/zero option as they claim they are?

[Plekhanov] Well I think the more we learn about the proposal of the Reagan administration back in 1982 to go for a zero/zero option, namely no medium-range missiles, nuclear-tipped missiles, in Europe whatsoever, east or west, the more convinced one becomes that the proposal was made precisely because the American side knew that the Soviets would not support it. You know, you make a proposal and you are sure that the other side won't pick it up and so you can reap all the media benefits, public relations benefits, from it. Well now we are picking it up. We're saying okay, you've suggested zero option, let's remove all those missiles from Europe.

[Kuznetsov] What's happened?

[Plekhanov] What's happened? They say: Wait a minute we didn't really mean it because, you know, there are other problems and they can't reject it out of hand and they are formally committed to negotiating that particular agreement in separation from the long-range missiles and the space weapons. So they are talking about that. But you know, as time goes by the number of conditions, the number of buts, is growing. For instance, this business of short-range missiles. Now, there's a lot of maneuvering on the American side going on. Now, for instance they say: Well the Soviets made just the other day -- somebody in the administration said: The Soviets made a giant leap backward, which is they are not, they say, prepared to discuss the short-range missiles together with the medium-range missiles. In the past allegedly the Soviets were prepared to do that.

[Bogdanov] This is a lie!

[Plekhanov] Yes, this is a lie. We never spoke of putting all those missiles in one basket and discussing them. What we did commit ourselves to and remain committed to is that the moment we sign an agreement we start negotiations on tactical missiles. We

are for removing all tactical missiles from Europe. We are for negotiating speedily an agreement to that effect.

[Kuznetsov] And I think our position was made clear following a 2-day meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Moscow where they pursued the aim, endorsed and made absolutely clear.

[Plekhanov] Yes and also there is, our proposal also includes removal as we sign this agreement that the Soviet missiles which were put, sort of long-range short [as heard] long-range tactical missiles which were put in GDR and Czechoslovakia after NATO started deploying Pershings in 1983, those missiles would be removed as a unilateral gesture.

[Bogdanov] Pavel, just a very short comment. I am not interested, frankly, in the technical side of that story. I am rather interested in the political side and let me come back to my pessimism.

[Kuznetsov] I'll ask you, my final question in the program will be about your pessimism.

[Bogdanov] I am absolutely sure that (?some) people in the administration are very well aware of the real, genuine Soviet position. They know everything. They are distorting it.

Why? What for? And I come to the conclusion that you have another, you know, stage of in-fighting within the administration, that they cannot [word indistinct] to meet both ends, you know, and they bring into the field of Geneva talks some additional difficulties, trying to if not to kill the talks but to make them enough difficult and to drag on and to save time for their own (?purposes).

[Kuznetsov] If I understood you correctly, they met with disapproval a Soviet package on arms control so we broke it and decided to treat those medium-range arms separately. Now the west has come up with its own package. Is that right?

[Bogdanov] Yes. Yes. That's right, but I would rather look at that from the political angle, not from the technical, and I mean that they bring into the field additional difficulties.

[Kuznetsov, to Plekhanov] You want to say something?

[Plekhanov] Yes. You know, if you have an administration which for 6 years has not negotiated seriously -- and when I say seriously I mean under conditions which would be acceptable to the other side; if you simply make unilateral demands and expect the other side to unilaterally concede them then you are not negotiating seriously and this has been the negotiating posture of the Reagan administration -- but if you have been doing that for 6 years and at the very last moment or near the last moment you decide, oh well, wait a minute, we're going to be the first administration that hasn't signed an arms control agreement with the Russians, let's do something about it, it may be too late, because you know you've got to have the right people in the right place, you've got to have the machinery in the bureaucracy, you've got to have all that system of alliances within your bureaucracy which would allow you to make the decisions. And if for 6 years you've been moving in the opposite direction, using arms control to cover up [indistinct interruption] I hope that at the very last moment there will be, something will happen, that they will be able to push it through. But I'm afraid that there is too much anti-arms control inertia built in this administration which may preclude an agreement.

[Kuznetsov] Anyway, the crucial point of the talks, the crucial problem of the talks as I see it is that the American side, prodded by some of its allies, would like to preserve their missiles in Europe but under a different guise. And this is what I mean -- they are talking about removing their Tomahawk cruise missiles from Europe and putting them, placing them on ships and converting the Pershing-2 into a shorter-range weapon by removing one of its stages. This is an important technical detail because according to our chief arms negotiator, Viktor Karpov, if we adopted the same logic and sought to preserve our own arms in Europe we could convert the SS-20 medium-range weapon into an intercontinental-range weapon by adding another stage. So the situation would remain as it was only under a different guise. And this is what's happening, what's blocking progress, as far as I understand, at those talks.

[Bogdanov] That's another example.

[Kuznetsov] It's just a ploy, a technical ploy.

[Bogdanov] It's not a technical ploy, it's a political ploy, I'm sorry to say, resting on some technical base if you look inside you will see very, very clear political purpose.

To stay, whatever price you pay, to stay in Europe with nukes. That's the problem, that's the main problem. Now, my difficulty is how to -- you know, I have been in that business for so many years, I heard so many benign words about nuclear disarmament from the west -- my question now to them: Where is your disarmament policy?

[Kuznetsov] An event which has, I think, a direct bearing on the topic of our discussion on "Top Priority" is the visit by Prime Minister, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, to Moscow. What would you say about that, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Well, I think it's a very important visit. Britain is a nuclear power. It's a major European power, and the Soviet Union has always tried to improve relations with Britain. And of course, I think, it has a direct bearing on the situation between the East and West.

[Kuznetsov] What do you mean?

[Plekhanov] Well, I mean, I mean, you see the medium-range weapons are part of the European military balance and of course the position of Britain vis a vis Soviet-American arms talks is very important. It can be a positive, it can have a positive impact or it can have a negative impact. And this is a great responsibility as far as Britain is concerned.

[Kuznetsov] And I also think that Britain, France and perhaps China cannot remain on the sidelines for ever. At some point they should join in the talks.

[Plekhanov] But we are, we are committed and we are steadily on course toward complete nuclear disarmament and Europe is one place where we can start. And we have a whole range of specific proposals designed to do just that. And when you are dealing with a power, I mean Britain, which has enough nuclear weapons to obliterate everything on this planet -- it has, the arsenal of Britain is quite huge -- then of course, you know, you are interested in discussing with those people problems of nuclear disarmament or arms control, reduction of nuclear weapons.

[Kuznetsov] Like nuclear tests, because Britain was actually involved in that process some time ago.

[Plekhanov] Yeah, yeah. It has not exploded as many as the United States but Britain, of course, has not yet renounced nuclear tests.

[Kuznetsov] But Britain was involved in the trilateral talks on stopping nuclear tests in the late 1970's. Our positions, as far as I remember, were closer than those with the United States.

[Plekhanov] After the negotiations were broken off by the American side, after the Reagan administration came to power. Before that I think there was enough cooperation on all sides and we were very near the agreement by 1980 on complete termination of nuclear tests. And then when the Americans changed their posture the position of Britain for some reason or other was not important.

[Kuznetsov] As time is running out on us I'd like to shoot my final question at you, Prof Bogdanov. It seems to me that it's easier these days to be a pessimist rather than a cautious optimist and it's easier to keep saying that the glass is half empty rather than it's half full. Do you feel any pride, are you proud, or do you feel comfortable that your somber predictions are closer to reality than anyone else's on our panel?

[Bogdanov] I don't feel comfortable at all, but I am just stating the facts. You have very new faces at the White House level, you have some new faces at the ministerial level. But I would like to call you attention to one objective fact, which is that the anti-Soviet inertia, antidisarmament and arms control inertia in the administration is so strong that I am afraid that even powerful new people are not really much able, you know, to block that inertia, or at least to divert it. That's on what ground my pessimism is built.

[Kuznetov] Okay, time will show who is right and who is wrong and I'd like to be on the brighter side of the (?metal).

And on this note, I'm Pavel Kuznetsov signing off. We've come to an end of "Top Priority", a weekly panel discussion from the North American service of Radio Moscow. Goodbye till next time on the same wavelength. Goodbye.

Difficulties 'Clearly Artificial'

PM301053 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Boris Orekhov: "Europe and Missiles"]

[Text] The working group on medium-range missiles has gone into recess at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

This working group and its doings are now the focus of universal attention. This is not hard to explain: A vitally important problem affecting the interests of every European -- freeing the continent of missiles weapons -- is being discussed.

We will use this pause in the talks to look back and try to interpret what is happening in Geneva and around it.

A month has passed since the Soviet Union proposed separating the problem of medium-range missiles from the general complex of issues and concluding a separate

agreement on it without delay. Why is it so urgent? The fact is that there is every reason for posing the question in this way: not only the basis for such an accord exists, but even an actual accord itself.

Remember Reykjavik. It was established there that the USSR and the United States would remove all their medium-range missiles from Europe in the next 5 years.

Our country has expressed willingness to withdraw its increased-range operational and tactical missiles from the GDR and the CSSR -- with the consent of these countries' governments -- which were situated there as a countermeasure to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe in accordance with NATO's well known "two-track decision." This would only be possible after an agreement has been signed on removing medium-range missiles from Europe. With regard to other operational and tactical missiles, the USSR has expressed readiness to immediately begin talks aimed at reducing and ultimately totally eliminating them.

In short, what else is needed to reach an accord now, after the Soviet proposal of 28 February?

Today, however, it is becoming clear that the way to reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles is not so simple, although the difficulties encountered are clearly artificial. Moreover, statements by some high-ranking U.S. figures cast doubt on the sincerity of Washington, which once put forward the "zero option." We also cannot fail to be put on guard by the attempts of certain forces in Western Europe to prolong the search for a solution to the missile problem and surround it with all manner of conditions and provisions from the so-called "position of strength."

We will frankly say that any procrastination in freeing our European home from its nuclear burden is not only wasted time but also a dangerous game that is clearly not in the interests of the European People. One would think that in this situation the peoples and political figures in NATO countries could be expected to display political maturity and do everything in their power to promote the reaching of an accord in Geneva which is awaited by Europe and the rest of the world.

PRAVDA Weekly Review

PM310851 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

["International Review" column by Igor Melnikov]

[Excerpt] Against Scholasticism

The past week was a short but very active time in international life. During the week, statesmen, politicians, and public figures in East and West expanded the platforms from which they intend to embark on the resolution of the urgent problem of the day -- ensuring mankind's survival. The truly universal scale of the task dictates a high pace, and any loss of time -- large or small -- is dangerous. It is necessary to immediately bring international relations and the behavior of governments and states into line with the realities of the nuclear age.

Thus it is quite obvious that the aim is the same for everyone, it is common to all mankind. Unfortunately, the approaches of the sides -- and this is also quite obvious -- are different and hard to reduce to a common denominator. The West is demonstrating a clear adherence to scholasticism on questions of nuclear disarmament.

This week's Moscow session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states was proof of the mobile, forward-looking restructuring of political thinking and international relations. On what did the ministers' 2-day discussion focus? On the quest for new opportunities to step up joint efforts aimed at ending the arms race, ensuring military detente on the continent, and developing the all-European process. This quest was embodied in the documents adopted at the meeting.

The present Foreign Ministers' Committee session was distinguished by its participants' profound conviction of the need to boost everyone's initiative in implementing the jointly formulated line. During a detailed comradely conversation with the ministers, M.S. Gorbachev dwelt on the need to make the work of the Foreign Ministers' Committee even more dynamic and fruitful to ensure that this important tool for coordinating the fraternal socialist countries' foreign policy activity fully accords with the growing and increasingly complex tasks in the world arena and the broadening opportunities for socialism's peace-loving policy to influence the world's destiny.

One cannot deny the importance and urgency of any of the 12 paragraphs in the communique of the Foreign Ministers' Committee session. It is by no means accidental that it presents a detailed and well-argued approach to the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. The idea of the immediate signing of a separate agreement between the USSR and the United States whereby U.S. and Soviet "Euromissiles" would be completely eliminated is surging through government cabinets and the headquarters of the continent's leading political parties. Populations in all states without exception support the Soviet Union's initiative and welcome its readiness immediately after the signing of such an agreement to withdraw increased-range operational and tactical missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia by agreement with those countries' governments. As for other operational and tactical missiles, the USSR is prepared to embark immediately on talks aimed at reducing and totally eliminating them. The speedy conclusion of an agreement on medium-range missiles would open up the way to completely ridding Europe of nuclear weapons.

Missile Tightrope Walkers

Certain Washington officials would gladly consign our country's initiative to the trash can, but you can hardly do that under the piercing gaze of the world's public. Whether they like it or not, they will have to respond.

Let us see what kind of response there may be.

After the initial, quite favorable reaction to the Soviet proposal, there was a pause in Washington. It was needed -- such things have happened more than once in the past -- to regroup. Soon "counter-moves" followed. The tone of one clearly propagandist direction in them was set by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Addressing the Trilateral Commission, representatives of big business and retired statesmen, in San Francisco, he stated that the elimination of medium-range missiles could lead to "political and psychological inequality and give the Soviets a stronger position with regard to West Europe."

While all 300 of the confused representatives of the Old and New Worlds and Japan (and with them the many publications that featured this UPI report) tried to come to grips with Kissinger's "half-baked" ideas, another, no longer propagandist, counterattack followed. A statement by the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff was made public. If an agreement on Euromissiles is reached with the Soviet Union, he said, the U.S. Army intends to turn NATO's medium-range missiles sited in Europe into short-range missiles.

A few days later it became known that what he had said was not the fruit of the general's fevered imagination. It is actually Washington's official position at the Geneva talks. The proposals submitted by the U.S. side envisage the possible reequipping of Pershing-2 missiles as missiles of less than medium range.

Doing this at a Pentagon base somewhere in the FRG is no more complicated than removing a U.S. sergeant's appendix in an army hospital. A recent issue of THE WASHINGTON POST literally stated the following: "The Pershings can be modified by removing one of their stages and making slight changes to the electronic equipment in the delivery vehicle and warhead. Martin Marietta Corporation, which produces the missiles, has all the necessary documentation and has worked out the technological process for carrying out the modification."

If things take that turn, virtually all 108 Pershing-2's will remain in Europe along with their service installations. In the Pentagon's plan, the cruise missiles sited in Europe are to be fitted to surface ships and submarines, for instance, rather than destroyed.

To what do the nuclear tightrope walkers' exercises attest? Just one thing: The Pentagon essentially does not want to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, and the "zero option" has seemingly been seen by the Washington administration as a bluff from the very outset.

If Agreement Is To Be Reached, Then It Must Be in Earnest

Again and again life brings us back to the question of Europe's place in contemporary international life and the degree of trust among us Europeans. The experience built up on the continent during the detente years teaches us convincingly that trust has to be created through the experience of cooperation, through mutual acquaintance, and through the solution of common questions.

It is wrong to argue that trust must come first and everything else -- disarmament, cooperation, joint projects -- will follow. Trust has to be approached via common concerns.

Yesterday saw the start of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's visit to the Soviet Union. The forthcoming talks in Moscow are awaited with interest not just in London or in our country -- this trip by the British stateswoman has in fact been preceded by solid groundwork on a whole range of major problems.

It goes without saying that the aspect of bilateral relations between our countries is fundamental. Suffice it to recall the major contacts that British industrialists have concluded with Soviet partners, the mutually enriching collaboration among scientists from the two countries, and our ballet company's recent triumph in England. The session of the British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, which opened in Moscow on Wednesday, has assisted efforts to make new business contacts.

But who can ignore the problems of security nowadays? It was for good reason that our British guest went to Paris and Bonn to discuss this on the very eve of the Moscow visit. In both capitals she had "a very intensive exchange of opinions." Her interlocutors were President F. Mitterrand and Chancellor H. Kohl.

Europeans are essentially united in the realization that medium-range missiles must be removed from the continent's territory. That is what the peoples want. That is what the West European capitals state. But, if that is the case, then why, one wonders, are the NATO states in no hurry to start right away on rooting out [vykorchevyvaniye]

missiles which they themselves have called for rooting out? Instead they are looking for ways around doing it and for loopholes. An appeal has been launched for the strengthening of "European defense" and the creation of an additional pillar for NATO, almost as if in response to... the elimination of medium-range missiles. What is more, the construction lot designated for this "pillar" is not in fact NATO or even the Western European Union, but the entire sphere of the "Common Market," which, as we know, has up to now not been deemed a suitable forum for the discussion of military-political problems.

Without question, the Western capitals have managed to muddy the waters considerably since the Soviet Union put forward its crystal-clear proposal on eliminating medium-range missiles! As for our country, it is ready to eliminate all medium-range missiles in Europe -- all 243 SS-20's -- and to destroy them together with the launch installations [puskovyye ustanovki]. But the United States must do the same. This makes it necessary for the missiles to be dismantled and destroyed under strict monitoring [kontrol]. This applies both to the bases where the missiles are and to the factories where they are manufactured.

Zero Option 'Bluff'

LD290816 Moscow TASS in English 0626 GMT 29 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 29 TASS -- The national daily PRAVDA said today all indications were that the U.S. Administration's "Zero Option" proposal had been bluff all along.

It made the remark in a comment on the U.S. reaction to a Soviet initiative for signing an agreement without delay to destroy all American and Soviet "Euromissiles."

The paper said that the idea was being enthusiastically discussed by the governments and leading political parties in Europe.

People in all European countries without exception supported the Soviet Union's Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) proposal and its stated readiness to withdraw shorter-range theater missiles from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, in agreement with their governments, right after signing an INF accord.

"After the initial and fairly favorable response to the Soviet proposal, there has ensued a pause in Washington," PRAVDA wrote.

"It has often been this way also before -- to gain time for regrouping forces," it added.

The paper also pointed to reports of the U.S. Army's deputy chief of staff saying that if a "Euromissile" agreement was reached with the Soviet Union, the American Army was going to convert NATO's intermediate-range missiles into shorter-range ones.

It had become known a few days after that the idea "was not a product of the general's fever-driven imagination but was effectively Washington's official position at the talks in Geneva," PRAVDA added.

"If things go this way, practically all 108 Pershing-2's will be left in Europe -- along with their service facilities," it said.

"At the Pentagon, in point of fact, they do not want elimination of INF missiles in Europe, and the 'Zero Option' proposal appears to have been bluffing by the U.S. Administration from the very beginning," PRAVDA concluded.

Agreement, Summit Possible

LD302251 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2020 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Report with recorded portion on interview with Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute of Moscow, by correspondent Gabor Izbeki; Bogdanov speaks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Text] [Izbeki] Will there be a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting this year? Will Mikhail Gorbachev go to Washington in order to sign with Ronald Reagan the agreement on the disarmament of European medium-range missiles? This question occupies every politician today, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is having talks in Moscow about, among other things, the possibilities for this agreement and the chances of reaching an understanding. There is nothing surprising about this, since it would be the first agreement of the nuclear age in which the contracting parties would be agreeing on a real reduction in the number of nuclear weapons and on their annihilation. The Soviet Union announced a few weeks ago that it was taking European weapons out of that certain Reykjavik package; that is to say, it was not making an agreement dependent on the Americans renouncing their Star Wars plans. However, the moment it became apparent that the draft agreement was virtually ready, the opponents of an agreement raised their voices.

The next time the two countries' diplomats will deal substantively with the issue will be when U.S. Secretary of State Shultz visits Moscow. Recently, Radomir Bogdanov, deputy director of Moscow's America Research Institute, visited Hungary. I had the occasion to talk to him about these issues. First of all, however, I asked him how much Soviet foreign policy is dependent on individuals, as Soviet foreign policy essentially changed after Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the CPSU.

[Begin recording] [Bogdanov] Naturally, I do not deny that the new general secretary of the CPSU has made Soviet foreign policy dynamic, enriched it with new elements, new forms. As I see it, this is a legitimate phenomenon. But I also think it is much more important that Mikhail Gorbachev's new dynamism expresses the new realisms of the world situation, or to be more precise, also the (?understanding) of it. This means that the world's development has reached a decisive phase and it depends on our decisions today whether mankind survives or not, whether we go further along the path that leads to an eventual nuclear war or not. I would also draw attention to the fact that there is a close connection between the internal transformation of Soviet society and the change in foreign policy. Internal transformation requires detente, a world situation in which the danger of nuclear war is reduced. Internal transformation requires peaceful, calm conditions, in which the greatest possible material and intellectual forces can be placed in the service of internal, social development.

[Izbeki] Now both Soviet and U.S. diplomats are saying that the agreement on the disarmament of European medium-range missiles could be reached within a few months, perhaps half a year. What schedule do you consider to be realistic?

[Bogdanov] I would like to remind you that we wish to agree not only on the disarmament of medium-range missiles, but we are also ready to disarm our increased-range operational and tactical missiles as well, and our tactical nuclear weapons, too. We treat these weapons as a whole and we take into account the fact that these weapons make Western Europe uneasy.

As for when the plans will turn into an agreement, that depends to a large extent on the stance of the U.S. side; or, to be more precise, on how the power relations develop in the near future with the members of the U.S. Government. The agreement is, in essence, ready on paper; all that is missing are the signatures.

[Izbeki] So, does that mean Mikhail Gorbachev is willing to go to Washington to sign the agreement if the U.S. side also wants that.

[Bogdanov] Regarding the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, I say well in advance that one must not give rise to illusions and await the remaining months of the year with unfounded hopes. This much I can say: that if all that is now needed for an agreement is the meeting of politicians, then that will not be lacking. But I stress once again that this depends on what the final agreement is like, what it contains.

[Izbeki] The people of the Soviet Union and Europe, then, are hoping there will be an agreement. At the same time, as the hopes grow, in the United States the alliance of political interests that would like to obstruct the emergence of this agreement is also gathering strength. You know the United States well; what tools do they hold in their hands? Will they have the strength to reverse today's favorable processes?

[Bogdanov] I think you have put your finger on the main point. I also think the fate of the agreement depends on whether in the United States the supporters of an agreement or its opponents gain the upper hand. I would very much like to believe that this U.S. Government and the present U.S. President have enough political will, strength, and determination to sign this really fateful agreement. We, however, think that the political basis of today's U.S. administration is on the right wing of U.S. social and economic life. The government itself has been organized out of people who stand on that side. We are aware that for the U.S. President it is not at all easy to make himself independent of these circles, not even if he wants to do so. In addition, the preparations for the Presidential election, due in 18 months, have already begun; therefore, even if we formulate it carefully, I must say that the situation is complex. Still, it can be calculated that the opponents of the Soviet-U.S. agreements, and in concrete terms of the agreement on European weapons, will gather strength. Moreover, it will depend on Reagan personally, and on his immediate environment, whether there will be an agreement.

[Izbeki] Does one not have to fear perhaps that while the U.S. Government might sign the agreement on the reduction of European weapons, it might in exchange totally commit itself to the Star Wars plans?

[Bogdanov] The U.S. administration now wants Reagan, in his remaining 23 months, to get far enough in developing space weapons for the next President to have to continue this program as a matter of course. They want to reinterpret the former Soviet-U.S. agreements so that they might conduct space weapon experiments in space as well. There are many opponents of this action in the United States: for example, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn. But the government, despite this, is doing everything in the interest of developing space weapons.

[Izbeki] If that is going to be so, then is it worth concluding any agreement at all with the United States? What will be the Soviet Union's response in the event of Washington's extending its space weapon experiments to the cosmos?

[Bogdanov] The most important task, naturally, is for us not to permit this. That is, we should not permit the arms race to reach a new phase that would be completely unverifiable. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the Americans can not be dissuaded from their Star Wars plans for now. In this case, the Soviet Union will have to respond. This response does not mean necessarily that we shall also deploy space weapons; but we shall strive to develop much more cheaply a sufficient, effective defense against the U.S. cosmic weapons. I repeat, however, that we do not want a new wave in the arms race; moreover, we would like to return to a lower level of balance.

[Izbeki] This is understandable. At the same time, many people do not place trust in the success of the talks; neither do they trust that the arms race can be curbed at all.

[Bogdanov] Well, I must say that the limitation of the arms race is by no means a hopeless thing. After all, in your time there have been two SALT agreements in this regard. It has been possible to stop nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and under water; furthermore, we have also limited the strength of underground explosions. This always proves that if the situation is ripe, then there is a possibility for agreements. The agreement is now also ready on the disarmament of European medium-range missiles. The only thing that is difficult is to disarm the opponents of agreement. But if we have enough firmness, consistency, and willingness for discussions, then we can attain results in this field.

[Izbeki] Will flexibility now remain the key word in Soviet foreign policy?

[Bogdanov] The key word, or the key words, are realism, consistency, and flexibility, and readiness to compromise. [end recording]

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: COMMENTS ON U.S. RAISING OF SRINF ISSUE IN INF

Origin of Issue

WA241500 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 23 Mar 87 p 6

[Article by Sergey Karaganov, research associate of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies under the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric "A Continent Without Missiles": "What's Behind the References to Short-Range Missiles"]

[Text] An excursus into history will help us trace this issue to its origin.

The all-round modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons was decided upon by the NATO nuclear planning group in 1974-75, at the U.S. initiative. In addition to the headquarters concerned, the job was tackled by the so-called European-American Workshop -- a research group of conservative American and West European experts who included Richard Burt, now U.S. Ambassador to the F.R.G., the well-known American right-wing strategists Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Rowen, the F.R.G. conservative Uwe Nerlich and the British conservative Laurence Martin, and Johan Holst, now Norway's Defence Minister. [paragraph continues]

It was the workshop that came up with the "double-track decision" and wrote the October 1977 speech for the then F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt -- the prelude to the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The workshop's recommendations were not confined to the deployment of the new intermediate-range missiles. In 1977 it published a book entitled "Beyond Nuclear Deterrent" substantiating NATO's new tactical concept, which later came to be known as the "Rogers plan" or "Follow-on Forces Attack." The plan was to have been carried out by means of "a new weapons generation of dual-capable stand-off weapons and cruise missiles."

In May 1977, on President Carter's insistence, the NATO Council adopted a long-term rearmament programme. Working groups were formed to finalize it. Group No. 10, formed in October of the same year to look into a nuclear rearmament plan, was the one that recommended the deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. Plans for the modernization and buildup of other U.S. missiles in Europe were shelved for the time being -- but not abandoned.

The deployment of new-generation nuclear missiles was officially sanctioned by NATO's Montebello decision in October 1983. In Montebello, NATO leaders agreed on reducing the over-sized U.S. nuclear arsenal in Europe (about 7,000 warheads). The reduction was supposed to sweeten the bitter pill for the West Europeans to swallow: the commencement of Pershing 2 and cruise missile deployment in the continent.

The U.S. nuclear arms cut amounted to the scrapping of outdated and inefficient nuclear ammunition: atomic mines, warheads for AA-missiles, and nuclear artillery shells. These were to be replaced not only by intermediate-range missiles but also by longer-range systems. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence for nuclear affairs, Richard Wagner, said at a Senate hearing that the Montebello decision provided for "the proportion changing from a heavy reliance on short-range systems to a stronger reliance on longer-range systems which have more utility, both from a political point of view and, as our ability to consider striking deeper targets increases, in increased military capability as well." It was reported at the same hearing that the Montebello decision had set NATO the aim of "across-the-board modernization," specifically of developing longer-range missiles than the American Lances and Honest Johns now deployed in Western Europe (and capable of hitting targets over 115-120 km away).

Hard as the censors tried to black out the military officials' answers to senators' questions, the minutes of the hearings show beyond doubt that it had been decided in Montebello to deploy missiles of still greater range: 200 to 500 km. The plan was to have been implemented by the early nineties. The elaboration of political decisions was paralleled by the development of these missiles. Although they are highly classified, scraps of information about them occasionally filter into the press.

Before 1984, the U.S. Army and Air Force were busy developing, by joint effort, the JTACMS missile. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee was told at a hearing that the missile was intended for use "with options for conventional, chemical and nuclear munitions."

Later, however, the two arms of the service failed to agree on uniform missile specifications. So the army continued to develop JTACMS, and the Air Force its cruise missile.

Attempt To 'Palm Off' P-2's

LD250012 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1954 GMT 24 Mar 87

[From "The World Today" program presented by Boris Kalyagin]

[Excerpts] The foreign mass media continue to pay a great deal of attention to the Soviet proposals on medium-range missiles. [passage omitted]

The leaders of the main Western countries one way or another have expressed support in principle for the idea of an agreement on medium-range missiles. However, there is still no confidence that one will be implemented in the near future.

The U.S. Administration has again begun a political game regarding the negotiations on Euromissiles. It is difficult for Washington to reject our initiative if only for the reason that it includes President Reagan's so-called zero option. One cannot refuse one's own proposals. However, as even the U.S. press now admits, when the zero option was put forward no one in the U.S. Administration thought that the USSR would agree to it. Our readiness to meet the other side half way in beginning a real process of disarmament has taken Washington by surprise.

Nevertheless, the people there are once again trying to gain the maximum advantage for themselves at the expense of the other side. They are trying to palm us off with the

draft of an agreement that would in fact mean the preservation of U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe with only a few modifications carried out on them.

As was noted in an interview in IZVESTIYA by Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Directorate for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, the Americans in Geneva put forward proposals that envision the possibility of re-equipping medium-range missiles, in particular Pershing-2's, as missiles with a shorter range. In practice, to do this on Pershing-2's requires only lengthening the second stage. Obviously it will be just as easy to return them to their former state. As far as cruise missiles located in Europe are concerned, the United States proposes not to destroy them but to deploy them on ships. The variant proposed by the United States is just a means of deluding public opinion as the Americans do not at all intend to reduce their nuclear missile potential.

It is not surprising that the interview given by our responsible representative aroused a stormy response both in Western Europe and in the United States. Washington was in a rather awkward position. Charles Redman, U.S. Department spokesman, tried to refute Comrade Karpov's words. He asserted that the United States was optimistic and was striving actively to conclude an agreement with the USSR. It would be good if these statements did not just remain as promises but were backed up with deeds.

It has transpired that the American corporations Martin-Marietta and Vought are developing the T-16 and T-22 missiles with an effective radius of up to 200 km. The missiles are to go into operation by the end of this decade. The CAM-40 missile (a version of Pershing 2 modified to carry non-nuclear warheads) is on the drawing boards.

Bonn and Washington are unanimous in the belief that an intermediate-range missile agreement can be reached only if missiles with a range of 150 to 500 km are negotiated, the DPA news agency reported late in November 1986. Incidentally, NATO had never singled out missiles with such ranges into a separate category before. Under discussion were missiles with ranges of up to 100 km and of 100 to 1,000 km. The unexpected singling out of the missiles in the 150- to 500-km category is obviously intended to block the talks on intermediate-range missiles and justify the deployment of shorter-range U.S. missiles.

One cannot help getting the impression that all the talk about Soviet superiority in short-range missiles is intended to camouflage NATO's own plans for building up these weapons (as has repeatedly been the case in the past). Clearly, this can only impede the advance along the road towards a nuclear-free Europe. It is easy to imagine the haste with which certain NATO members are now seeking ways to block an agreement on intermediate-range missiles by references to short-range missiles and, of course, to an "imbalance" in conventional and chemical weapons.

All these issues can be resolved at the negotiating table. To begin with, the sides could get down to a serious discussion of the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals for the reduction of conventional arms, and the banning and elimination of chemical weapons.

As for short-range missiles, the Soviet Union suggests early negotiations on their reduction and eventual elimination. Whatever imbalance there is, it must be levelled out, not up. Besides, the U.S.S.R. suggests that the more dangerous offensive weapons be removed from Europe. In the interests of European and world security, the military blocs' concepts and doctrines must be based on defence principles. We are for a drastic reduction of the armed forces in general to reasonable limits, and for the non-development and non-production of super-destructive conventional weapons.

All these measures are to facilitate progress towards a stable and non-nuclear Europe, a world without nuclear arms.

INF Talks Impeded

LD242344 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; studio commentary by Spartak Beglov, political observer of NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, entitled: "NATO's Bonds on the Road to Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] Hello comrades! Redman, a representative of the United States Department of State confirmed on Monday that the agreement being elaborated for the Geneva talks on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe must guarantee the United States the right to reach the same level as the Soviet Union in close-range missiles in Europe.

Meanwhile the Soviet proposal of 28 February points out clearly that our country is ready -- immediately following the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles -- to remove from the GDR and the CSSR its enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles and simultaneously to begin talks aimed at reducing and completely eliminating other operational-tactical purpose missiles.

There are thus no foundations for the United States and NATO to demand some kind of compensation in this type of weapon. What's the matter? This is the matter: The English weekly THE OBSERVER reported on Sunday that disarmament specialists at Bradford University in England had uncovered unpublished materials from a session of NATO Defense Ministers in October 1983. From them, it turned out that 3 1/2 years ago NATO made a decision to modernize its operational-tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater and to deploy [razvernut] in Western Europe 2,000 new close-range missiles [rakety blizhnego radiusa deystviya] and also nuclear charges and bombs. Let us note that this decision was approved by the governments but concealed from the public.

Now the design of the strings being attached and discussed today in the NATO capitals can be seen clearly: They simply want to find a loophole to escalate [narashchivat] new types of nuclear weapons. There was a time when the West's ruling circles reproached the Soviet side for being nonlegitimate in tying the question of medium-range missiles to the rest of the problems in nuclear disarmament. Now that we have agreed to this and separated the medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, these selfsame figures have taken to impeding the talks with their strings.

Where then is the logic? The conclusion suggests itself: Either these figures were insincere when they put forward the so-called zero option or the truth is that it is hard for them to give up nuclear weapons. The question can stand only this way and no other.

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: BESSMERTNYKH CRITIQUES DOUBTS IN U.S., EUROPE ON ACCORD

WA241500 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 23 Mar 87 pp 3-4

[Article by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister, under the rubric "A Continent Without Missiles": "Solution for Europe"]

[Text] The reaction of government, political and public circles in most countries to the new Soviet proposal was that it offers real hope of long-awaited progress of the nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva. This progress would help solve other problems of global concern. Presidents, including those who had hitherto concentrated on evading agreements rather than reaching them, prime ministers, including those who had made hawkishness a cornerstone of their political careers, ministers, including those notorious for their lobbying against any "agreements with the Russians" -- all or almost all of them have been compelled to respond positively to the new Soviet initiative.

Wherein lies the force of attraction of the Soviet Union's new political action? Why has it aroused such a lively interest worldwide? The answer is as follows: Concrete, clear-cut, and imbued with the desire to remove a pressing problem from the international agenda, the Soviet government's proposal came at a time when the optimism engendered by Reykjavik had started giving way to feelings of alarm and concern. And this was small wonder: The American stand at the Geneva talks all but deadlocked them again. The U.S. representatives declined to register agreed positions even when Soviet and American formulas coincided fully, literally word for word.

Under the circumstances, the Soviet leaders decided to take a purposeful step, which would promise, to begin with, a solution to the complex European nuclear missile problem. The decision to eliminate intermediate-range missiles from Europe and dramatically reduce them (down to 100 warheads) in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. and on U.S. territory is intended to provide a powerful impetus to negotiations all along the line. This is a logical assumption, for it was on intermediate-range missiles that an agreement was in fact reached at the Reykjavik summit. "The main thing is that we have succeeded in reaching an understanding on delivering the European continent from nuclear missiles," Mikhail Gorbachev said. "An important breakthrough has been made in this aspect of nuclear disarmament as well. The American administration has failed to dodge our persistent effort to get positive results."

Nevertheless, a first positive response to the Soviet initiative across the world does not automatically guarantee a successful outcome. [paragraph continues]

There is still a certain amount of opposition to an agreement on the issue, although its opponents are obviously taking pains not to strike too discordant a note -- which would be to their political disadvantage -- in the atmosphere of unprecedentedly wide approval with which the Soviet proposal has been met. Right-wing forces and all those who have identified with an endless arms race dread the prospect of any progress being made at the Geneva talks, but they are resorting to more refined tactics than usual in their attempts to block it.

The essence of these tactics is to try to dissuade those U.S. and West European political leaders who are now prepared to reach an agreement from doing so (no matter what these leaders' motives might be). The means used towards this end are nothing new.

One method is to sow doubts with regard to Moscow's intentions (THE WASHINGTON POST informed its readers, for instance, that the Soviet proposal was actually a trap).

Another method is to "warn" Europe of the dangers with which the implementation of the Soviet proposal is allegedly fraught. There is persistent talk of the Soviet Union's and the Warsaw Treaty countries' "enormous superiority" in conventional arms, and the "incredible disproportions" in battlefield systems. The U.S. and NATO are advised to build their armaments up to the "appropriate level" first. In short, what we have here is another rerun of a line of reasoning whose tenacity is due not to its inherent logic, but to the persistence with which it is imposed on public opinion.

Prospects of reaching agreement are questioned even by certain figures outside the extreme-right category. More likely than not, they are simply set in their biased attitude towards anything that comes from the Soviet Union -- a reflex conditioned by years of political opposition to Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

Neither does the Soviet proposal suit those in Western Europe who do not wish to part with nuclear weapons, which they rely on for their ambitions and their countries' security.

On the face of it, the U.S. leaders have received Moscow's initiative without the scepticism which is characteristic of them in such cases. President Reagan said he regarded the Soviet proposal as "a major breakthrough on the path towards an agreement for mutual and verifiable reductions in arms between ourselves and the Soviet Union." Even Defence Secretary Weinberger grudgingly admitted that the proposal was "a welcomed development," but added in the same breath: "I think the Soviets want and need an arms reduction agreement, and I think they'll try to get one by insisting that we do things that will strengthen their own position."

The question now is whether U.S. political strategists really want an agreement on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. After all, our comparatively long record of dealing with Americans on problems of arms limitation and reduction has had its ups and downs. Unfortunately, it has been mostly "downs" of late. We know from experience that the U.S. administration's initial approval of this or that Soviet proposal is not necessarily translated into a concrete stand at subsequent negotiations. It often happens that, having paid lip service to public opinion, Washington changes over to obstructing an agreement. Such was the case at the Soviet-American talks in the early eighties, which were divided between strategic arms limitation and reduction, on the one hand, and nuclear arms limitation in Europe, on the other. We came up against a similar situation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons begun in 1985 with their subject and objectives agreed upon in advance.

After we had put forward the Soviet initiative in Geneva as a concrete proposal, the U.S. followed suit with its own draft agreement (which the Americans themselves admitted to be half-baked). If this practical response stands for an intention to coordinate the two sides' mutually acceptable commitments in a businesslike fashion, the talks promise to bring fruitful results.

We shall see soon just how serious Washington is about wanting an agreement. There are a number of more or less accurate indicators of U.S. intentions. The first alarming symptoms are already in sight. According to the British press, U.S. representatives told the ambassadors of NATO countries at a recent Brussels meeting that Washington would not be in too much of a hurry to reach an agreement. Is it going to delay the negotiations using the same old tricks again, such as making a likely agreement conditional on numerous -- and, as a rule, unacceptable -- reservations or reducing certain, even legitimate, demands to absurdity? Or take the issue of control, the ensuring and tightening of which the Soviet Union is particularly interested in, as we have made abundantly clear since Reykjavik. The U.S. may well distort it to the extent of making the other side stop trying.

Yet another trick is to throw in restrictive conditions that would empty the agreement of all sense and meaning.

The Soviet Union will follow the further steps of the U.S. administration closely.

Our policy is to search for bold, quick and feasible ways of strengthening the security of our country, the United States and the nations of Europe. The Soviet proposal for a radical solution of the intermediate-range missiles issue offers just such a way.

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CRITICIZES GENERAL ROGERS ARTICLE IN FRG PAPER

LD251634 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT 25 Mar 87

["INF Treaty Will Strengthen World Peace -- Analysis" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Way back in early 1982 a negotiator involved in Soviet-American talks on nuclear arms in Europe expressed the opinion that while making its "zero option" proposal, the U.S. delegation in Geneva was awfully afraid lest it should be accepted.

The Reagan administration, he said, was much more interested in a U.S. nuclear arms buildup in Western Europe than in mutual cuts in nuclear weapons.

American General Bernard Rogers, supreme allied commander, Europe, has now most definitely confirmed that conclusion of five years ago.

Writing in the West German newspaper WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE, he came out against a zero-zero solution to the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe on the grounds that it would allegedly make NATO weaker.

He also effectively conceded the untenability of NATO propaganda claims for many years that "The United States has had to deploy its missiles in Western Europe to offset the Soviet missile threat".

"Historically, it would be wrong to think that NATO's re-armament has been a response to Soviet missile deployments in Europe," General Rogers said.

His negative attitude to the Soviet proposals concerning medium-range missiles can hardly be explained by his concern about "weaknesses" in the NATO military structure: The missiles will have to be destroyed not only by the United States but also by the Soviet Union.

The much more likely explanation is that the destruction of Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe will sap the Pentagon's "limited nuclear war" concept underlying U.S. military strategy.

Two or three years ago President Reagan used to talk often about his desire to "eliminate the whole class of intermediate-range missiles", but the Pentagon has always believed that these are indispensable to its plans for nuclear war escalation at a substantial distance from American shores.

An INF agreement is being opposed in the United States not only by generals.

The State Department is seeking to complicate the issue by insisting that the agreement be linked to a simultaneous elimination of theater missiles.

Experts from different American departments are leaning over backwards to think up such "verification measures" as they hope would make the Soviet Union renounce the agreement.

It is also being proposed in the United States that Pershing-2's be modified so that formally they will no longer belong to the medium-range class and so will not be subject for destruction under the future agreement.

Having derailed a number of agreements and scuttled a series of talks aimed at reducing the risk of outbreak of global war, the Reagan administration over the past six years has come to be rightly seen by world opinion as an enemy of all arms control treaties.

By accepting the Soviet INF proposal, which is based on an understanding reached in Reykjavik, the present U.S. Administration would be able not only to mend its reputation but also to make a serious contribution to stronger world peace and stability.

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S OBUKHOV ACCUSES U.S. OF RAISING 'NEW PROBLEMS'

LD261634 Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Geneva March 26 TASS -- As the negotiating group on medium-range nuclear arms completed the present phase of its deliberations, Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey Obukhov, deputy head of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms, made the following statement:

"Following the completion of the seventh round of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the negotiating group on medium-range nuclear arms continued its work in Geneva from March 6 to March 26.

"The round in that negotiating group was extended by mutual agreement in view of the possibility that had emerged for a radical breakthrough in resolving the problem of medium-range missiles, based on the formula agreed upon at the Reykjavik meeting."

"The way to a treaty on medium-range missiles was opened as a result of a major new Soviet initiative set forth in the February 28 statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

"In that statement a proposal was made to single out the question of the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe from the block of issues discussed at the negotiations, to conclude a separate agreement on this subject, and do it without delay.

"This Soviet proposal has been put on the table in Geneva. An early conclusion of an accord on medium-range missiles, containing measures for strict verification of compliance with the obligations assumed by the sides, would open up the prospect of completely ridding Europe of nuclear weapons."

"The group has been doing useful work. The sides have started negotiating formulations for inclusion in a joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles.

"Regrettably, what stands in the way of rapid progress in this area is a number of elements in the position of the United States which it knows are unconstructive, efforts by the U.S. side to raise new problems, artificially expanding the scope of issues under discussion.

"It is our hope that adjustments will be made in the U.S. position to free it from everything that is not consistent with the objective of promptly reaching an effective

accord on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and on other measures for the limitation and reduction of such Soviet and U.S. missiles."

"The negotiating group has now adjourned for a short recess. It has been agreed that the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space arms will resume on April 23, 1987. Accordingly, the medium-range systems negotiating group will resume its work on that date.

"In this connection it is understood that this date could be adjusted at the upcoming Soviet-U.S. meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Moscow.

"The Soviet side is determined to build upon the Reykjavik accords by seeking to deeply reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, to prevent an arms race in outer space and to ensure strict compliance with the ABM Treaty Regime."

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: KARPOV BRIEFS JOURNALISTS 26 MARCH

USSR Favors 'Summit'

LD261352 Moscow TASS in English 1337 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS -- The Soviet Union favours in principle a summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan, Viktor Karpov, head of the Directorate for Arms Reduction and Disarmament at the Soviet Foreign Ministry [as received] told a briefing for journalists here today.

"We still believe that such a meeting should be well prepared. It should bring about tangible results on one, two or three major issues related to security, reduction and limitation of nuclear armaments."

In view of this possibility, he said, "we are trying hard at the Geneva talks to ensure positive results. If there is cooperation from the American side, from the side of the U.S. delegation and the United States as a whole, preparations for the summit can be successful.

But we cannot secure mutually acceptable agreements on our own. Two sides are required for that," the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Convert SS-20's to ICBM's

LD261415 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS -- "If the United States wants to reserve a right to convert Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1b ones which are easily transformed back into Pershing-2 missiles, why should not the Soviet Union think of having a right to keep its SS-20 missiles in some other capacity", Viktor Karpov, head of the Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on arms limitation and disarmament issues, stated at a briefing here today.

"Since the SALT II treaty has been announced by the United States as being out of operation, and since the USSR has a right to act with regard to strategic offensive arms as it thinks necessary", he went on to say, "we could visualize, theoretically speaking, such a situation in which the Soviet Union would not eliminate its SS-20 missiles but will, say, convert all the 243 missiles, which we have deployed in Europe, into intercontinental ballistic ones".

"Thereby we would not increase a threat to Europe in any way but, instead, we would increase the power of a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory".

"If the United States has in mind such a version, we could consider it. Although, this is not the way which we would like to follow".

"Our proposal envisages precisely the elimination of the Soviet Union's and the United States' medium-range missiles in Europe, and we would like both sides to take precisely these measures to eliminate their medium-range missiles in Europe, reducing the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war in Europe".

'Alarming' Elements at Talks

LD261324 Moscow TASS in English 1311 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Geneva talks" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS -- The group for medium-range missiles functioning within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons is winding up its work in Geneva today, said Viktor Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Directorate for the Limitation of Arms and for Disarmament. He was addressing a briefing for newsmen here today.

Agreement has been reached, he continued, that the talks will be resumed on April 23. Correspondingly, the group for medium-range missiles will resume its work also on that date. It is yet too early to sum up the final results of work on the draft treaty on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. Yet it can be said already now that Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal contained in his statement of February 28 has been a fresh incentive for the talks and set them to specific work.

Meanwhile, Viktor Karpov continued, it is alarming that some elements have appeared in the U.S. stand, which call in question the possibility to eliminate effectively U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. The point at issue is the demand of the U.S. delegation that the whole potential of medium-range ballistic missiles be left in Europe under a new signboard under the pretext of converting Pershing-2 missiles into shorter range ones.

As far as the land-based cruise missiles are concerned, the United States insists on its right not to scrap these missiles, which are now deployed in Europe, but to relocate them to naval ships. This it is proposed, as a matter of fact, that in signing the agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe the USA could preserve for itself the whole of that potential. Such a plan does not, naturally, accord with the task of reducing nuclear weapons in Europe and lessening the nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the USA in that field.

As far as the tactical missiles are concerned, the difference between the stands of the sides is not over the time of holding the talks, but over the character of the freeze. The USA was trying to get for itself the right to build up its tactical missiles in Europe, while the Soviet Union declared for proceeding from the frozen levels down to a cut in the missiles.

The task now is apparently to analyze carefully before the new session is resumed the results of the discussions held and objectively evaluate what has been achieved so that it would be possible to overcome the outstanding differences at the next stage of the

talks and ensure that a mutually acceptable agreement is drawn up that would conform to the agreement reached in Reykjavik on the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry said in conclusion.

'Reliable Control' Needed

LD261448 Moscow TASS in English 1442 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS -- At the given stage the Soviet Union has agreed that the question of elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe be resolved without Britain and France undertaking any obligations concerning their nuclear systems. This was stated at a briefing here today by Viktor Karpov, head of the Department for Arms Reduction and Disarmament of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Since American Pershing-2 and long-range cruise missiles are being deployed on the territory of a number of European countries, the USSR is interested in establishing reliable control also over the process of elimination of these systems at American military bases in Europe. We must be confident that there will be no circumvention of the accord reached, that American medium-range ballistic cruise missiles will not appear at American military bases in Europe. The USSR is interested in conditions to be ensured for reliable control from the Soviet side at American bases in Europe, also through on-site inspection, Viktor Karpov said.

Strategic Arms, SDI Linked

LD261445 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS -- The Soviet Union does not link an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe to the American Strategic Defense Initiative, Viktor Karpov, head of the Department for Arms Reduction and Disarmament at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, told a briefing here today.

As to issues of limiting strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States, they were closely linked with the ABM Treaty, with its strict and full compliance. At that point, Karpov said, there emerged a problem with the American SDI programme.

"Clearly, SDI is an antipode of the ABM Treaty. We believe it is necessary that the USSR and the United States reach a clear agreement that both sides shall fully abide by the ABM Treaty, by all its provisions, including the ban on the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems.

This is an earnest of the reduction of the strategic offensive arms. Without this, the issue of cutting the strategic offensive weapons is unfeasible," the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR, KARPOV HITS U.S. PROPOSAL TO CONVERT PERSHING'S

LD311327 Moscow TASS in English 1316 GMT 31 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 31 TASS -- Viktor Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's arms control and disarmament department, made a following statement at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents here today:

The White House several days ago issued a statement on behalf of the U.S. President on the results of the latest round of work by the group on medium-range nuclear arms at Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

An attempt to distort the Soviet negotiating position, the statement alleged, in particular, that it was a departure from the stand taken by the Soviet Union on the issue of missiles with a range of under 1,000 kilometers in Reykjavik. [sentence as received]

The Soviet Union has consistently stood for limiting and reducing such missiles and ultimately eliminating them altogether.

The Soviet side in Reykjavik expressed readiness to freeze missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers and hold talks on their later fate.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva has abided by the same position.

It has made a proposal for the sides to freeze such missiles in Europe at their current levels and conduct negotiations on this class of arms.

The Soviet Union's readiness to press for a solution to the problem of theater missiles, including their reduction and elimination, has received added confirmation in Mikhail Gorbachev's statement on February 28.

This goes to show, and this is the main thing, that the Soviet Union stands for resolving this issue by reducing and eliminating also this class of nuclear weapons.

What is the position of the American side? In Geneva it has been claiming the right, and this has been reflected also in the White House statement, to a U.S. buildup of short-range missiles on a global scale, in particular in Europe.

This is, as a matter of fact, what the differences in the side's positions basically come to.

The Soviet side has never given its consent to the buildup of such missiles because we must talk about ending the arms race rather than legalizing it.

The United States' approach to the theater missile issue assumes a special meaning also in the light of its strong insistence that its Pershing-2's, which would be liable to scrapping, be allowed to be converted into shorter-range missiles rather than destroyed.

It is clear that this would preserve also the possibility of their being reconverted back into medium-range missiles, that is effectively preserve the INF (intermediate nuclear force) potential in Europe.

Isn't this the fundamental reason why the American side has been making persistent attempts to bring the INF issue and the theater missile issue into the same knot?

Significantly, the White House devoted a substantial part of its statement to theater missiles rather than to how an agreement could be made easier to eliminate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

This makes one wonder if it isn't an attempt to complicate efforts to attain this agreement at a time when the latest Soviet initiative has opened a real prospect for reaching it and the signs have emerged of practical movement towards it.

The Soviet side stands for discussing and resolving also the theater missile issue but it is against an INF agreement being artificially linked to a solution to this issue, the more so being made conditional on it.

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CSO: 5200/1387

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: NATO SCG MARCH SESSION RESULTS ASSAILED

U.S. 'Remains Opposed' to Accord

LD272153 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1610 GMT 27 Mar 87

[Text] Brussels, 27 Mar (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Albert Balebanov reports: Yet again the United States has been able to foist onto its NATO allies its unconstructive position on disarmament matters. Such are the results of the meeting here today of the NATO special consultative group which examines questions connected with intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Speaking at the news conference that followed the meeting, Allen Holmes, the group's chairman and U.S. assistant secretary for political-military affairs, declared that the NATO partners "fully supported the U.S. position" on intermediate-range missiles in Europe and favored the continuing deployment in West Europe of U.S. cruise and Pershing-2 missiles.

The Soviet proposal to divorce the problem of intermediate-range missiles in Europe from the totality of the questions being discussed at the Soviet-U.S. talks and to conclude a separate agreement on it would seem to have opened up the way to an agreement. However, the United States has, apparently, taken fright at this turn of events and, to judge from A. Holme's statements, now demands close linkage of the problem of intermediate-range missiles with that of operational-tactical missiles.

In fact, the Soviet Union proposes that, immediately after the conclusion of an INF agreement, talks should begin to reduce and completely eliminate the operational-tactical missiles, and declares its readiness to remove the increased-range missiles of this class sited on the territory of the CSSR and the GDR as countermeasures to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. The U.S. side deliberately passes over this aspect in silence.

Moreover, the Washington emissary openly declared that the United States insists on its "right to the upgrading of arms." "There's no chance of a compromise on this question," A. Holmes rapped out harshly. "We'll never agree to the Soviet proposal."

It is noteworthy that, at today's session of the NATO special consultative group, according to A. Holmes, the question of "altering" [peredelka] the Pershing-2 missiles so that they would not formally belong to the intermediate-range category and so would not have to be destroyed was also discussed. The search for all kinds of hitches is under way in order to avoid an agreement.

The news conference by the representative of the U.S. Administration showed the renewed force that the White House, despite its much proclaimed statements on its devotion to arms control, was and remains to be opposed to any kind of agreement on the subject.

Adherence to 1979 Decision

PM301542 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent V. Antonov report: "The Same Old Standpoints"]

[Text] Brussels -- A session of the NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG) has been held at the North Atlantic Bloc's headquarters in Evere.

Supposedly, this group was originally set up to coordinate the positions of the Atlantic allies on the problems of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. But the United States long ago turned it into a NATO propaganda organ designed to mislead world public opinion about the West's true goals in the nuclear arms control sphere.

It is clear from a communique issued here that the session was devoted to a discussion of the results of the seventh round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, held in Geneva, and in particular to the work of the group on medium-range nuclear arms, which is engaged in drafting the text of a treaty on medium-range missiles.

At a news conference, numerous foreign journalists who had gathered in Evere expected a concrete explanation of the NATO allies' standpoint on this question. A. Holmes, director of the U.S. State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, who chaired the SCG session, tried to convince the representatives of the mass media that Washington and its NATO partners are supposedly interested in "constructive dialogue" at the talks and come out in favor of concluding a concrete agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe on the basis of Soviet and American proposals. This desire on the part of the Atlantic allies can only be welcomed, one would think. But at the same time he pointed out that the representatives of NATO countries on the SCG again confirmed the need to continue the planned siting of American Pershings and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

Answering journalists' questions, A. Holmes made it clear that, in the absence of a treaty with the USSR on medium-range missiles, the United States is interested in ensuring that all the bloc members adhere firmly to the NATO "missile decision" of 1979.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: ZAGLADIN, TOLKUNOV MEET EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS

LD221948 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 22 Mar 87

[Text] The group of the European People's Party of the Europarlament, in our country at the invitation of the parliamentary group of the USSR, has ended its stay in the Soviet Union. Here is what Egon Klopsch, chairman of the group and member of the board of the Christian Democratic Union of the FRG, told Irina Mishina, our correspondent, at the end of the talks.

[Begin Klepsch recording in German with superimposed Russian translation] During our group's stay in Moscow, we had two important meetings: with Comrade Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR parliamentary group, and with Comrade Zagladin, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. Both talks proceeded in a frank [ytkrovenniy] atmosphere. We received detailed information on the progress of restructuring in the Soviet Union, and touched on the issue of ensuring peace and security in Europe and implementing the Helsinki accords. I would not be mistaken if I were to say that at the center of our discussions was the Soviet peace initiative aimed at eliminating American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. We virtually had no disagreement on this issue. All of us, representatives of different European countries, were united in the opinion that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe would be the step that could, in time, ensure the elimination of other forms of weapons. I mean strategic offensive arms, short-range missiles, as well as the banning of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Throughout the course of many centuries, Europe has been the stage for bloody wars, the place where various military blocs and groupings were born. We have fought one another enough. Now the real opportunity has arisen to make our common European home a peaceful one. For this reason we welcome the statement made on 28 February by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. [end recording]

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW REPORT ON PORTUGUESE MP'S VISIT TO USSR

PM191041 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

["Joint Report on Visit to USSR by Portuguese Assembly of the Republic Delegation"]

[Excerpts]

A delegation from Portugal's Assembly of the Republic headed by Fernando do Amaral, speaker of the assembly, was on an official visit to the Soviet Union 10 through 16 March at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation included deputies from all parliamentary groups: the Social Democratic, Socialist, Democratic Renewal, Communist, and Social Democratic Center Parties, and the Portuguese Democratic Movement.

The Portuguese parliamentarians were received by P.N. Demichev, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and had meetings with the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Chambers and the chairmen and members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Chambers' Standing Commissions.

During exchanges of opinions on the main international problems the Soviet and Portuguese parliamentarians expressed their common concern at the continuing arms race and the current world situation. In this regard they noted the important role that can and should be played by parliamentarians in stepping up efforts to promote the humanization of international relations and the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding on the key problems of security and world development.

The Soviet side set out the concept of a nuclear-free world advanced by the USSR and substantiated the need for new political thinking based on an understanding of universal independence, with the idea of civilization's survival as its foundation. The USSR Supreme Soviet deputies resolutely opposed the spreading of the arms race to space and advocated the strengthening of existing mechanisms for restraining it -- first and foremost the ABM Treaty.

In this regard the importance of the proposals put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February 1987 statement on the immediate conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe was particularly stressed.

The Portuguese parliamentarians noted the features of their own constitutional system and the existing division of power between their organs of power, including in the

foreign policy sphere. They reaffirmed their adherence to the foreign policy principles enshrined in the Portuguese Constitution aimed at safeguarding peace, security, and international cooperation, and expressed support for all steps that provide a real opportunity for embarking on disarmament, the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, and their elimination from Europe in particular.

Both sides expressed an interest in developing relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation among the European states on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and in ensuring the success of the Vienna meeting.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS CITES JAPANESE PAPER ON U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS IN KOREA

LD261821 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Tokyo March 26 TASS -- TASS correspondent Vasiliy Golovnin reports: The Pentagon is planning to use war planes, artillery and other weapons of the South Korean Army for hitting a nuclear strike in the Far East in case of "extraordinary circumstances." This is overtly said in the manual on the organisation and functions of American troops in South Korea which had come at the disposal of the Japanese Weekly ASAHI JANARU. With reference to well-informed military sources the weekly writes that the command of the Seoul Armed Forces together with Pentagon representatives is already having regular meetings to work out plans of joint operations in the Korean Peninsula and the Far East with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

In the manual it is said that there have been 150 units of nuclear weapons at the U.S. air base Kunsan 180 kilometres south of Seoul by the beginning of 1985. According to the Japanese press, there are such depots at the American Ulsan and Osan bases, in the area of Pusan and a number of other settlements. The newspaper PEOPLE'S KOREA, issued in Tokyo, reported late last year that a new strategic depot for U.S. nuclear weapons was under construction in the Kenren Mountain in the area of Kojo, south of Seoul codenamed "Project 620." According to the data available, the construction of that depot is directly linked with the planned transfer of American operational-tactical lance missiles to South Korea.

Washington views the south of the Korean Peninsula as a bridgehead "to exert influence on the whole of Asia," ASAHAI JANARU has been told in an interview by a representative of the Seoul Defence Ministry. He stressed that American bases in that area are aimed above all at the Soviet Union.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW: SOVIET WORKERS QUESTION REASONS FOR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS

LD290900 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 27 Mar 87

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program, recorded on 24 March during a meeting between All-Union Radio international affairs journalists and the collective of the Uralmash Works in Sverdlovsk; presented by commentator Igor Pavlovkh Charikov; with political observer Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver; commentator Vladimir Ivanovich Fadeyev; and international affairs journalist Vladimir Semenovich Kulikov]

[Excerpts] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrade Uralmash workers. You are direct participants today in our flagship program "International Situation: Questions and Answers," which goes out every week on Fridays. Our writers, who vary, base this program upon letters received from listeners, letters asking questions about various aspects of the international situation. We, our team, have decided to push back, so to speak, the walls of the studio and record this program among a live audience, during direct communication with you and, naturally, so that the recording of this program should then go on the air next Friday, the 27th, on the first program of All-Union Radio. So we invite you to start our program off. Please.

[Shorina] Shorina, an engineer in the main power engineering department. At present the Western press is making a lot of noise about the USSR having occupied Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Poland and the GDR. We all know that. Well, we are not going to talk about Afghanistan, nor about Nicaragua, but how can one explain the presence of our troops in the GDR and Mongolia, and why does our government not proceed to withdraw our troops from there?

[Charikov] Aleksandr Vladimirovich Zholkver will answer your question.

[Zholkver] Well, comrades, I do not think there is any need to ask for an answer to this question among this audience as to why our troops went into Berlin. This is recalled clearly enough by the Treptow Park memorial, which expressed this idea visually: on the one side, a soldier who has cut through a swastika with his sword and, on the other, with a rescued child in his arms. It was this dual mission -- a mission of retribution for Hitlerite aggression and a mission of helping the peoples by liberating them -- that brought the Soviet soldier to Berlin. Now the basis for the presence of Soviet troops in the GDR is the existing agreement between the USSR and the GDR Governments and the membership of our two states in the Warsaw Pact Organization. It is on this basis that Soviet troops are present in certain other Warsaw Pact member countries, say, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In certain Warsaw Pact Organization countries there are no Soviet troops -- there are none in Bulgaria, none in Romania. These are the agreements that have been reached.

It is another matter how many of these troops there are, how long they are there for and with what weapons. I happened to be working in the GDR when 20,000 Soviet soldiers and 1,000 tanks were withdrawn, and in the presence of Western journalists, too. There is also the question of equipping these troops.

You know that the question has been posed that if agreement is reached on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, both Soviet and American, we also shall remove our enhanced range operational-tactical missiles, which are in response to the deployment of the Pershings, all the 108 American Pershings deployed in the FRG. We undertook retaliatory measures -- the installation of enhanced range operational-tactical missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In agreement with the GDR and Czechoslovakia Governments, and they already have issued the relevant statements, these missiles will be withdrawn just as soon as an agreement is reached on intermediate-range missiles. Moreover, our government -- and this was first announced in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement -- is prepared to embark upon solving the shorter-range missiles question immediately after that. We also are prepared not simply to withdraw, but to eliminate these missiles. This question is therefore acquiring truly great topicality now. We are ready to resolve this question.

Incidentally, the Soviet Union's initiative -- even prior to the latest statement on intermediate-range missiles -- also was aimed at reducing conventional weapons.

We also must speak about the other side and note that at present, according to official American data for the end of 1986, the United States had a total of 1,500 military bases and installations, where 500,000 American soldiers are stationed in 32 countries. Look how painfully the Americans immediately react when the question is raised not necessarily of eliminating them, but even of making some reduction in the number of these bases. The Spanish are asking this question, and they cannot get a decision. Similarly, this question has been under discussion now in Turkey; after Weinberger's visit to Spain he went on to Turkey and, on the contrary, the validity of the agreement on the presence of U.S. bases in Turkey and on the stationing there of the U.S. Air Force and Navy, too, was extended there. [passage omitted]

[Charikov] If you please, are there any more questions from the floor?

[Question] I'm from workshop No 50 at Uralmash. This is my question. We have been talking about intermediate-range missiles, and the great conflicts we have with the Americans, and so on. But if you recall the time when our missiles were being taken to Cuba, the Americans prohibited (?them from being taken there) and there was such a major conflict that Mikoyan even had to go there, and the conflict was settled all the same. Why did our people allow these intermediate-range missiles to be installed in Europe? That's my question.

[Zholkver] Comrades, first of all, it is not by accident that you have drawn an analogy here with the so-called Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, the situation at that time was so serious that certain historians now think that the world was balancing on the brink of nuclear war. Well, the situation is now even more complicated: Even more nuclear weapons have been accumulated, they have become even more complex and their delivery vehicles have become even more sophisticated.

[Unidentified interjection] Quite right.

[Zholkver] Most sophisticated, I would say. Thus, under present conditions, it is doubly dangerous to balance on the brink of war. At that time, you know, it took both

sides to display some kind of restraint in order to pull back from the threshold of death. So it would be doubly dangerous to move toward that under present conditions.

But you are correct in this respect: The thing is that this process did not take place over one brief period. I mentioned the 108 Pershings in the FRG. They were not brought in all at once and, incidentally, installation of cruise missiles is still continuing today, and now the Belgians, for example, are very glad that it seems that an agreement on the elimination of the missiles is being contemplated, and they will not need to install these American cruise missiles, which they agreed to in principle via NATO, on the designated sites near Florennes, near the town. So here it is a question of U.S. pressure on the NATO countries to get them to agree to this deployment indeed being very great, but there is another aspect to the problem.

In those years I was working, as it happens, in the FRG, when they were preparing for this, and I travelled there later, and to other countries in Western Europe....I have to say that somewhere -- take, for example, the Schmidt doctrine, the then chancellor of the FRG -- this so-called two-track decision was made, that is, on the one hand, they give the go-ahead for the deployment of these missiles, but, on the other, they demand that talks be continued with the Soviet Union on a whole range of aspects, first and foremost on the reduction of strategic weapons. If you like, the Americans bought the West Europeans' agreement to, as they said, allowing us to install these missiles and in exchange we nonetheless will pledge ourselves to continue the talks with the Soviet Union on reduction of strategic weapons. The Americans have not implemented the second half of this two-track decision; they have not fulfilled it.

This is why I'm saying all this: On the one hand to demonstrate that the Soviet Union has made every effort to prevent such a dangerous turn of events. The United States, the U.S. Administration, has acted in the opposite direction, first and foremost defending the interests of the American military-industrial complex. That is how the situation developed.

How must this problem be solved today? Of course, not by looking backward, neither to the events of 1979, nor to the events of 1960's regarding Cuba, but by looking ahead. How can this matter be resolved? The opportunity of solving the problem of eliminating the intermediate-range missiles has now arisen, but this in no way removes, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in his 28 February statement, the need to resolve the matter of limitation of strategic weapons, of eliminating the military potential that has been stockpiled altogether and, of course, of preventing the penetration of weapons into space. This is all the more topical now, as this week is the fourth anniversary of Reagan's speech in London, where he set out the Star Wars program. During those years the unrealistic nature, on the one hand, of this program has become perfectly clear, and, on the other, its danger. We hope that Washington will heed the warnings of the Soviet Union and of U.S. scientists themselves.

[Kulikov] I would like to illustrate the difference in the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States to the disarmament question overall and to the elimination of intermediate-range missiles specifically. I would like to quote to you the words of a fairly curious person, a former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His name is (Pat Holt). This is how he described Reagan's position at the present time, he says, literally, the following: the President -- meaning Reagan -- does not accept Gorbachev's proposal. This looks as if you are being paid so that you might not do something that should not be done. One more feature that we should not forget. This is that for a very long time the Pentagon, the military department of the United States, has fostered and nurtured the idea, and adopted as doctrine the

possibility of a limited nuclear war. They have not renounced it yet, and it would seem that they have no intention of renouncing the doctrine of the limited nuclear war. I would like to recall that the first, as it were, intermediate-range missile, if you like, strike vehicle was the B-29 bomber carrying nuclear weapons. These bombers appeared on British airfields immediately after the end of World War II. On the purely military level, the attainment of an agreement eliminating intermediate-range missiles has set a good example, but, on the other hand, it would get rid of the temptation to make a nuclear first-strike, a warning strike, or whatever; it would exclude the possibility of a limited nuclear war. That is one other meaning of our step directed toward attaining an agreement eliminating intermediate-range missiles.

[Charikov] Right. Comrades, are there any more questions from the floor? Well, in that case, allow me to thank you for your attention. [applause] Do write to us, please, with questions, to Moscow radio, International Situation: Questions and Answers. All the best.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK: SOVIET OFFICIAL SUGGESTS INSPECTORS AT U.S. MISSILE BASE

LD121622 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1551 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Soviet inspectors could be based at Greenham Common where U.S. cruise missiles are deployed if there is an agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union for the removal of medium range nuclear weapons from Europe, Mr Victor Karpov, a top Soviet official said in London today.

Mr Karpov, a former chief negotiator at Geneva and now head of the Arms Control Directorate at the Soviet Foreign Ministry told a press conference at the Soviet Embassy: "This would be the first agreement that provides for the elimination of nuclear missiles.

"We feel it is important that the first agreement should be verified as quickly as possible so there is not cheating.

"There could be provision for on-site inspection. We would like to have inspectors at Greenham Common. We would allow inspectors at our bases where the SS 20's would be dismantled and destroyed."

Mr Karpov insisted that verification should be adequate, whether this was by challenge inspection to check that the agreement was being observed, or by on-site inspection.

He estimated that an agreement with the U.S. could be reached at Geneva within six months.

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CSO: 5240/066

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

UK LABOR LEADER REVIEWS STAND ON REMOVAL OF CRUISE MISSILES

London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 20 Mar 87 p 2

[Article by Nicholas Comfort]

[Text]

MR KINNOCK emphasised last night that Labour remains committed to the removal of cruise missiles from Britain, despite his readiness to tell President Reagan next week that he would not press the issue pending arms talks between the superpowers.

The Labour leader made it clear he was as determined as ever to rid Britain of all nuclear weapons, and that if the Geneva talks failed, the cruise missiles would have to go.

But he refused to be drawn on how long he would give the talks to reach a successful conclusion, repeatedly stating that both Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev wanted them to succeed.

"I hope on the basis of what the Kremlin and the White House have said that we will be looking on the optimistic side of a year," Mr Kinnock told reporters at Westminster.

Commons derision

Earlier in the Commons, Mrs Thatcher had treated with derision Mr Kinnock's readiness to tell Mr Reagan that cruise could stay if agreement between the superpowers to remove it was in prospect.

"It would seem that the Leader of the Opposition simply cannot bear to go to the United States to defend his indefensible defence policy," she said.

"I understand he assumes there will be a successful negotiation satisfactory to this country and that, if not, he will still take out cruise missiles and

have a unilateral defence policy."

Mr Kinnock, in a TV-am interview, said Labour did not want to "jostle anybody's elbow" at Geneva. "We want to get rid of cruise and, if that can be done through Geneva, so much the better."

Formula offered

Senior Labour figures see the prospect of a US-Soviet agreement on intermediate nuclear weapons—cruise, Pershing II and SS20—as greatly reducing their difficulties over defence policy in the run-up to the election.

They appear to have convinced most, if not all, of the party's Left wing that the formula now offered to Mr Reagan on cruise will not betray the cause of nuclear disarmament.

Mr Kinnock was at pains last night to avoid categorical statements on the points at which, in the absence of an agreement, he would tell the Americans cruise must go.

But he was equally careful, when questioned, to underline that if Labour took office, other aspects of its unilateralist policy would be set in motion at once. He said Mr Reagan was "already familiar" with the message he was bringing.

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CSO: 5240/066

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FINNISH DAILIES COMMENT ON LATEST GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

Euromissiles Proposal Considered New

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 3 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Package Deal in Missile Negotiations Glimpsed"]

[Text] The Soviet proposal for an agreement on Euromissiles means a return to the situation before the Reykjavik summit conference. The gigantic package deal that was outlined there was apparently too big. The West's doubts about an agreement on Euromissiles have, however, grown to such an extent that NATO may impose more conditions.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's change of position on the Euromissile issue was expected. In Reykjavik they had attempted to make a great leap forward by combining Star Wars, intercontinental ballistic missiles and Euromissiles. The goal was an ambitious one, but arriving at a practical decision on the package was impractical.

When it became apparent that they probably would not obtain so comprehensive an agreement, the Soviet Union drew pragmatic conclusions. That may be easier for a superpower that can pursue its major political policies without having to constantly keep its eyes on domestic policy and public opinion. To be sure, citizens in the Soviet Union too are probably expecting concrete results from the openings that have revealed themselves so far.

Compromising on a position publicly stated to be unconditional is, of course, not unique for the Soviet Union. As early as during World War II negotiations, we noticed that the Soviet Union could be rigidly uncompromising, but would finally all at once yield and lay out a dazzling festive table. In the West they are used to making gradual compromises.

The Soviet Union has already returned once to the negotiating table it had marched away from during the Euromissile negotiations too. The fact that Euromissiles can be specifically discussed without expecting other problems to crop up is now, however, more important than negotiating tactics and propaganda advantages.

The Soviet Union is basing [its proposal] on what was outlined in Reykjavik. All Soviet and American mid-range missiles would be removed from Europe in 5 years time. France and England would, however, be allowed to keep their missiles.

The Soviet Union would retain the right to keep 100 mid-range missiles in Asia--which is also of interest to China. The United States could correspondingly keep 100 missiles on its own territory.

The Soviet Union has promised to also withdraw its operative tactical missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia in connection with an agreement on Euromissiles. They were located there as a counterbalance to the West's Euromissiles--which were, to be sure, in turn characterized as a balancing factor to compensate for the Soviet mid-range SS-20 missiles. The Soviet Union has announced its readiness to also discuss other operative tactical missiles. The West's initial reaction was generally positive, which may now be the wisest response in terms of propaganda to Gorbachev's conspicuous appeal. What follows may be more complicated, especially for many European NATO countries. In their time their governments fought a tough domestic policy battle to be able to accept American missiles. They, of course, want to have the next steps seem to be the logical consequences of the previous decisions, not complete about-faces.

The Soviet proposal for the elimination of short-range missiles is probably aimed at West Germany in particular. Now they can claim that not a single Warsaw Pact missile is specifically pointed at the no-man's land between the Rhine and the Elbe. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, of course, have a global radius of operation.

West Germany's conservatives have constantly stressed the superiority of Warsaw Pact ground forces, to counterbalance which they say that different kinds of American nuclear weapons are needed. Many West Germans are, however, afraid of a strategy through which their country would become the stage for a nuclear conflict, even a limited one. The Christian Democrats' real election defeat has emphasized the popularity of this attitude.

The leadership crisis in the United States is also reflected in the Euromissile negotiations. If President Reagan gets back on his feet, he may attempt to crown his career with an agreement on Euromissiles. If, on the other hand, Washington is left without strong leadership, the start of real talks may take some time.

Leading Paper Lauds Initiative

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Mar 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Gorbachev's Admirable Concession"]

[Text] An entirely new situation was produced on Saturday when the Soviet Union changed its position on the arms limitation talks and reversed itself on the Reykjavik disarmament package deal. The timing of party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's offer may be described as brilliant since he extended President

Ronald Reagan a helping hand at this most depressing moment of his political career.

The change, with its consequences, is not a simple one. Gorbachev made Reagan, as it were, a public concession when he went back to his proposal of a year ago for separate agreements on the different kinds of missiles. Last fall in Reykjavik, Gorbachev tied all progress [with the talks] to U.S. abandonment of development and testing of the SDI, or Star Wars. Now it is as if Reagan had gotten Gorbachev to return to a realistic course of action without himself having done anything, just stubbornly sticking to the SDI. Thus in this affair Reagan comes off as a truly adroit statesman whose hard line has produced results.

The essential reason for this is probably Gorbachev's need for obtaining proof of arms limitation. He needs a tension-relaxing foreign policy in order to be able to develop [his country's] national economy. An agreement on Euromissiles with its supplements is the most warranted move from the Soviet standpoint. In particular it will eliminate from Western Europe the Pershing-2 missiles which, only about 6 minutes away from the Soviet Union's nuclear bases in Europe, have been a serious cause for alarm. An agreement will lessen the direct physical threat.

Gorbachev probably decided that even a partial agreement with Reagan now is better than waiting for the next U.S. president. With his physicists, he probably also decided that the SDI is more suggestive of a paper tiger than a real threat for this decade.

The United States was already prepared for an agreement on mid-range missiles in the fall. Now Reagan's own serious confidence crisis because of the Iran-Nicaragua affair has probably increased that readiness. On the other hand, his allies in Western Europe did not dare to immediately speak of Reagan's willingness to [reach agreement on] disarmament at the time of the Reykjavik conference.

Last December NATO reached a mutual understanding on the need for achieving balance in conventional weapons in the wake of an agreement on nuclear missiles. Under the leadership of West Germany and England, its allies squeezed a promise out of the United States to initiate talks, once an agreement on missiles was produced, aimed at reducing the Soviet Union's many-times-over superiority in tanks and artillery in Europe. The military alliances sent out feelers on these talks in connection with the CSCE followup conference in Vienna. If they are successful, they would mean the first real agreement on disarmament.

The Soviet Union's superior weapons and troops in Central Europe are deployed in offensive position against the West. NATO wants the Soviet troops to be moved to defensive positions and is aiming for balance by either producing more tanks and artillery or getting the Soviet Union to scrap its own. The West is also demanding the right to, if need be, inspect weapons and personnel on the spot.

According to former top Soviet weapons advisor Viktor Karpov, a half a year would be needed under the best of circumstances to conclude an agreement on missiles. This places the repeated charges that have been raised as to the failure of the brief Reykjavik conference in a new light.

This past weekend the world, spellbound, has been able to observe how, creaking along locked in ice, superpower relations have suddenly begun to move and we take it for granted that talks are beginning to be organized at all levels. The foreign ministers are soon to meet and after that perhaps the leaders. The Geneva arms negotiations are bracing themselves for new rounds of talks in full swing. The atmosphere is like what it must have been when Sleeping Beauty ended her 100-year sleep in the castle.

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CSO: 5200/2506

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

TASS ON INF MEETINGS--Geneva, 20 Mar (TASS)--A number of meetings took place in Geneva this week in the framework of the group on medium-range nuclear arms. Under an understanding reached after the completion of the 7th round of Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, the group is continuing its work to hammer out a treaty on medium-range missiles. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0900 GMT 20 Mar 87 LD] /9274

TASS ON PERSHING II TEST--Washington, 25 Mar (TASS)--The Pentagon held a fresh test of first-strike Pershing-2 missiles in conditions close to combat ones. A series of six launchings of the medium-range missiles against targets at a distance of several hundreds of miles in the Atlantic Ocean was fired for two and a half hours from mobile launchers stationed in Cape Canaveral (Florida). As a spokesman for the test range said, one of the objectives of the testing was to check on the combat preparedness of the crews of American missile launching pads. [Text] [By Igor Ignatyev] [Moscow TASS in English 0812 GMT 25 Mar 87 LD] /9274

OBUKHOV BRIEFS PAPANDREOU--Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was officially briefed in Kasti yesterday by Aleksey Obukhov, the deputy chief of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva talks, on the developments in the Geneva negotiations following the Soviet Union's proposal to eliminate all IRBM's in Europe. A statement from the Prime Minister's Press Office mentions that "on instructions from the Soviet leadership, Aleksey Obukhov briefed the prime minister on recent developments in various areas of the Geneva negotiations, but especially on the issue of the IRBM's, an area in which the two superpowers appear determined to achieve a final agreement." The meeting was attended by Viktor Stukalin, Soviet ambassador in Athens, and Khristos Makhairitsas, director of the Prime Minister's Diplomatic Office. The Soviet envoy came to Athens from Brussels, where he had briefed the Belgian Government, and today will leave for Bonn. [Text] [Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 12 Mar 87 p 1 NC] /9274

CSO: 5200/1387

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET MILITARY PUBLICATION CLAIMS U.S. VIOLATES BW CONVENTION

LD301342 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1255 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 30 Mar (TASS) -- In its latest edition, the "Voyenny Vestnik" of the NOVOSTI Press Agency reports that our editorial office is in possession of a document testifying to the fact that there are 30 formulae for biological weapons in the arsenal of the U.S. Army.

After 30 July 1981, the bulletin says, a new instruction is the basic document regulating the operations by escort parties accompanying convoys of biological ammunition, and also vessels with such materials, agents, and formulae. The instruction stipulates the rules of transporting biological formulae, or ammunition charged with them, containing toxins or the instigators of 30 infections.

Matters of organizing the transport of biological ammunition are in the hands of the military transport command of the U.S. Army and of the committee on ensuring safety in handling explosive substances of the U.S. Defense Department.

The basic tenets of the instructions FM3-20 are in keeping with NATO standards and the quadrilateral agreement on standardization between the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia, the "Voyenny Vestnik" points out.

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CSO: 5200/1391

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: KASHLEV INTERVIEW ON CSCE PROGRESS IN VIENNA

WA201352 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 8, 2 Mar 87 pp 12-13

[NEW TIMES correspondent Anatoliy Kovrigin interview with Yuriy Kashlev, chief Soviet delegate to the CSCE meeting in Vienna: "The Inertia of the Bloc Mentality. How [To] Overcome It?"]

[Excerpt] [Kovrigin] And what is the situation in Vienna with regard to questions that affect the destiny not only of the Europeans but of the whole of humanity? I mean the strengthening of security and real disarmament.

[Kashlev] Debates on military and political issues show that most of the participants in the meeting are unanimous: Vienna could make a tangible contribution to the improvement of the political climate in Europe and pave the way for talks on major reductions in the armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. Today on the negotiating table of the Vienna meeting there is only one explicit proposal for strengthening European security. It is Poland's initiative to the effect that the mandate of the Stockholm conference be extended in such a way that it should consider at the next round both confidence-building measures in the military sphere and real reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. The Polish proposal, put on record as document No. 1 of the Vienna meeting, proceeds from the stand of the Warsaw Treaty states agreed upon at their Budapest meeting. It also takes account of the interest shown by the West European countries in reducing armed confrontation on our continent. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries view Poland's proposal as a major constructive initiative to facilitate an effective transition from the individual confidence-building measures approved in Stockholm to a comprehensive system of trust and real disarmament.

[Kovrigin] Could you clarify that is meant by real disarmament?

[Kashlev] The Warsaw Treaty countries put forward in their Budapest appeal a detailed stage-by-stage programme for reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. It provides, as a first step, for simultaneous mutual reductions in the troop strength of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization by 100,000-150,000 for each side within the space of one or two years. Then, in the early 1990s, the parties could further reduce their land forces and tactical air force by 25 per cent from the current level. The socialist countries suggest that these measures be accompanied by measures that would obviate fears of the balance being upset. Agreements could even be reached on thinning out the forces along the line of contact of the two military and political alliances in Europe and on restricting major military exercises.

[Kovrigin] And what about verification? The West has always made a point of it.

[Kashlev] The reduction could be carried out under effective control, with the use of both national technical means and international procedures including on-site inspections. I want to draw your attention to the fact that we suggest, along with the verification of agreed reductions, monitoring the military activity of the remaining forces.

[Kovrigin] So the proposal is, as you have said, to discuss all this simultaneously with the confidence-building measures already agreed on during the first round of the Stockholm conference?

[Kashlev] Precisely. A number of confidence-building measures were agreed on during the first round. It was an exceptionally important accord, which was appreciated by virtually all the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The question of confidence-building measures, however, has not been closed and, in our view, should be resumed in the second round. The Soviet Union, for instance, would like to suggest such items for discussion as notification of independent air force or naval exercises, restrictions on the scale of military exercises, and the extension of confidence-building measures to the territories of all the CSCE countries. Other countries may put forward for discussion some other new confidence-building measures in the military field. [paragraph continues]

It is essential, however, that discussion should not be an end in itself and push the problem of real reductions in the armed forces in Europe into the background and that both sets of proposals should be discussed simultaneously, which is the essence of the Polish proposal.

[Kovrigin] Even people not well versed in military problems will realize that the Polish proposal, supported by all the socialist countries, is giving the go-ahead to the second round of the Stockholm Conference. And what is the attitude of the other participants in the Vienna meeting to this initiative?

[Kashlev] Delegates from a number of neutral and non-aligned countries, such as Yugoslavia, Sweden and Finland, commend the flexibility of Poland's approach. As for the NATO countries, they still avoid giving a straightforward reply to the constructive proposal of the Polish People's Republic.

[Kovrigin] In what way is the Polish initiative related to press reports on possible consultations on disarmament between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization?

[Kashlev] We think the problem of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe should be considered in an all-European context with the participation of all 35 CSCE states. This is our basic position. However, it does not exclude that, in order to expedite the transition to the concrete examination of disarmament issues, we would take part in work in any form, including unofficial contacts, both bilateral and multilateral.

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CSO: 5200/1383

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

CSCE: SOVIET GEN TATARNIKOV BACKS POLAND CDE 'ADDITION'

LD241446 Moscow TASS in English 1406 GMT 24 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna March 24 TASS -- Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation, made a statement today at the Vienna meeting of representatives of countries, participants of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe. He called attention to the state of affairs that has arisen at the meeting over such an important problem of the time as military aspects of security in Europe. He stressed that the new Soviet proposal for an immediate solution of the problem of medium-range nuclear missiles and the readiness of the Soviet side to begin talks with the purpose of reducing and fully eliminating theatre nuclear weapons tend to facilitate progress on matters of disarmament.

The problem of disarmament today is more pressing than ever before. At a time when general philosophic statements are being made at the Vienna meeting, the Soviet representative said, more and more first-strike nuclear weapons arrive in Europe and new types of conventional weapons of increased destructive power are developed and adopted for service. One gets the impression that some people would like to bury the Helsinki ideas of disarmament in Europe under piles of deadly weapons and remove the problems of disarmament from the European process.

Real, mutual, staged and considerable reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe are a ripe problem which must be seriously examined without delay on a balanced and reciprocal basis and on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all participants of the European process.

The Soviet delegation believes that there is a good basis for the solution of this problem. This is the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for an addition to the mandate of the Stockholm Conference, an addition making it possible to discuss parallelly both confidence-building and security measures and force and arms reductions in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1383

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET WEEKLY: VIENNA CSCE MEETING SHOWS 'NO PROGRESS'

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 23 Mar 87 pp 10-11

[Article by Anatoly Kovrigin]

[Text] No progress is to be reported in Vienna on these central issues, although the socialist countries have done all they can to make the discussion of their military aspects constructive and concrete.

During the first phase of the meeting, at the close of 1986, the Polish delegation proposed an addendum to the Stockholm Conference mandate to enable the reduction of armed forces and armaments to be considered along with measures to strengthen confidence and security in the military sphere.

By the start of this month the Soviet, G.D.R., Bulgarian, Romanian and Yugoslav delegations have put forward 11 more proposals in the military-political field referring to measures of confidence in the military sphere, cuts in conventional armaments, the need for a new thinking with regard to security, military detente, the non-militarization of space, a nuclear-weapon test ban, and the establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones.

How has the West responded to all this? To this day, the moment problems of strengthening security and disarmament arise, delegates from NATO countries are silent. And at the opening of the Vienna meeting last autumn the ministers of some NATO countries distinctly announced the intention to present by mid-December proposals that would extend Stockholm-1.

The situation in the S group, which is discussing the military aspects of European security, is indeed strange, Major General Victor Tatarnikov of the Soviet delegation told me. It is impossible to play a waiting game in politics. The meeting has a definite time limit, the general said, and we must keep to it. Few expected that in the space of four months the West would not submit a single proposal on military issues, he noted. In the view of many participants in the Vienna meeting, including some NATO delegates, the new peace bid set out by Mikhail Gorbachev in his February 28 statement will further stimulate the constructive consideration of aspects of the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. For it is clear

to the uninitiated, not to mention military experts, that the Soviet leader's proposals accord with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the population of Europe. They represent, Major General Tatarnikov noted, a big step towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons, and the Vienna meeting must contribute to the attainment of that objective.

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CSO: 5200/1393

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: 20 CSCE STATES SEND OBSERVERS TO USSR-GDR EXERCISES

LD261819 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT 26 Mar 87

[Text] Berlin March 26 TASS -- The sides involved in a joint exercise staged by the group of Soviet troops in Germany and the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic today turned to active operations.

"Blue" units, after aircraft and artillery strikes at "Orange" troops; launched an offensive and broke through advanced defence lines.

The brunt of the attack was borne by a motorized rifle regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel V. Andrievskiy. The officer commanded his subordinates and units with utmost precision.

The second "Orange" echelon was preparing for a counter-attack. It comprised a motorized rifle regiment of the GDR's National People's Army under Lieutenant-Colonel M. Messerle. The regiment had to engage "Blue" paratroopers dropped from helicopters into the rear of the defending force. The paratroopers were routed after a fierce battle.

Aircraft provided great assistance to the land troops.

The main developments are being watched by observers invited by the GDR Government in keeping with a document of the Stockholm conference. Twenty countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe sent their representatives.

The exercise is continuing.

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CSO: 5200/1383

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

TASS: UNOFFICIAL MBFR CONSULTATIONS--Vienna March 23 TASS--Regular unofficial consultations between representatives of Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries on questions of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe were held here today. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 23 Mar 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1383

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS; PENTAGON ADMITS ERROR ON SOVIET WARHEAD TECHNOLOGY

PM300955 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Administrative Error?"]

[Text] Washington, 28 Mar -- The U.S. Defense Department has again been caught disseminating misinformation. It was a "large caliber" lie, as they say: It was contained in Defense Secretary C. Weinberger's annual report to Congress and in the annual military policy statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both these documents included a table comparing the positions of the United States and the USSR for 20 basic basic defense technologies. In particular the table's compilers claimed that the correlation between the technical standards of the nuclear warheads of the United States and USSR "is changing considerably" in the USSR's favor. Previous reports had indicated the existence of "approximate parity" in this field.

Congressman Edward Markey asked the Pentagon to explain how the "qualitative balance" had changed in the Soviet Union's favor if the USSR had carried out no nuclear tests for 18 months, observing the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, while the United States had carried out 26 underground nuclear tests.

It was a mistake, Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted in a reply letter. "No substantial reason has been discovered to justify this change," he stated. The admiral gave assurances that the cause of it all was "an administrative error," which will be rectified.

Is the question closed? Where is the guarantee that the numerous items with which the Pentagon crams Congress do not contain other similar "errors," which it would be more correct to call unforgivable misinformation?

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CSO; 5200/1388

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET MEMORANDUM TO U.S. ON 26 FEBRUARY TEST

PM301411 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Memorandum From the USSR Embassy in Washington"]

[Text] The Soviet Embassy in Washington has handed the U.S. State Department a memorandum in response to the latter's claim of release of radioactive waste during a nuclear explosion in the USSR on 26 February 1987, and their spread beyond Soviet territory.

The memorandum stressed that a careful check by competent Soviet organizations had confirmed that every essential safety measure had been taken to prevent radioactive disintegration products from escaping into the atmosphere during the test explosion.

The Soviet Union's national monitoring systems have confirmed the complete absence of any radioactive discharges.

The U.S. claims that the USSR is not living up to the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water are therefore without grounds and so these grievances have been flatly dismissed.

One is prompted to ask about the American side's motives in making such groundless claims.

It is noteworthy that the American allegations connected with the 26 February nuclear explosion were made at the same time as the President sent to Congress a report on "Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements" which falsely accused the Soviet Union of breaching treaties.

This serves to confirm the biased nature of the U.S. claims.

The memorandum stressed in conclusion that there could have been no Soviet nuclear explosion at all if the United States had joined a Soviet moratorium on nuclear blasts.

As is well known, the United States continued its nuclear test program, exploding 26 nuclear devices while the moratorium was in effect.

The irresponsible U.S. policy has compelled the Soviet Union to discontinue its unilateral moratorium.

However, the USSR reiterates that it is prepared to resume the moratorium any day and month when the United States declares a stop to its nuclear testing.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA ON U.S. MOTIVES FOR REFUSING TO JOIN MORATORIUM

PM161203 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Palladin article: "Moratorium Postscript"]

[Text] The moratorium on all nuclear tests introduced voluntarily and unilaterally by the Soviet Union in August 1985 lasted almost 19 months. Peace, silence, and calm reigned for 569 days at the Semipalatinsk test range, loudly proclaiming to the whole wide world our state's readiness to renounce nuclear power status if the other possessors of those weapons, above all the United States, demonstrate the same will.

Unsubstantiated assurances of love of peace, muffled every so often by the roar of nuclear explosions in Nevada, were the response from the American capital. During the 569 days there were 26 such explosions, an average of one every 3 weeks, or 5 for every decision of ours to prolong the moratorium,

I was in Washington and remember the approval with which sensible Americans received our decision to suspend nuclear tests, regarding it as a first practical step to ending the arms race. There and then a press conference was called in one of the halls of Congress where figures of such diverse views as Senator E. Kennedy and former CIA Chief W. Colby spoke. Everyone of them, without any reservation at all, welcomed our moratorium, describing it as an example worthy of universal imitation. The fact that it was introduced on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshim and Nagasaki was viewed by them as of particular significance.

The White House, on the other hand, gave the initiative a hostile reception. Without even having the decency to wait 24 hours, Washington functionaries declared it to be propaganda and pressed an invitation on Soviet specialists to come to Nevada, as if their presence would somehow sanctify the Pentagon officials' preparation for new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. The Reagan administration thus confirmed the suspicions prevalent in the United States itself concerning its allergy to any disarmament measures.

Initially they explained our moratorium across the Atlantic by saying that we had carried out a greater number of tests. Then, when even the Americans lost faith in this fabrication, a more subtle thesis was brought into play. The tests, it was said, are essential to keep the nuclear powder dry. But even

this card turned out to be marked. Informed specialists on both sides of the Atlantic reminded people that with the best will in the world you cannot check [proverka] the combat readiness of stockpiled nuclear arsenals by explosions like those carried out in Nevada and that it does not need such checks [proverka].

Washington then took out its battered "trump card" on the verification [proverka] of the moratorium itself. It was dangerous, they alleged, to believe Moscow's word without inspection [inspektsiya] of the nuclear test ranges.

The fact that this "argument" was dreamed up to justify the Nevada explosions is common knowledge. This was acknowledged recently by former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. According to him, verification [kontrol] from its own territory of observance of accords on nuclear explosions is no problem for the United States. The demands for on-site verification [proverka] that U.S. representatives have put to disarmament talks for almost a quarter of a century now are made with but a single aim--to conceal Washington's refusal to ban nuclear tests.

The far-fetched nature of the problem of verification [proverka] was finally revealed this summer, when the Soviet Union, once again unilaterally, permitted a group of American scientists to set up in the Semipalatinsk region equipment designed to detect underground tremors. The seismographs brought from America operated impeccably, picking up the echo of nuclear explosions at the other end of the world--in Nevada, that is. Day after day the American automatic recorders traced a perfect straight line, signifying the silence at Semipalatinsk.

After this it was pointless to go on pretending and the Reagan administration finally revealed the real nature of its opposition to the moratorium. So long as U.S. military strategy is based on nuclear force, the White House stated, there will be no peace for Nevada nor therefore the whole of our planet. By way of specific example: Soon after the Soviet Union again proposed to Washington last December a mutually-based moratorium of indefinite duration two new craters appeared in the Nevada desert, one after another, betokening the Reagan administration's obsession with the nuclear race.

Thus for 569 days mankind had the opportunity afforded by graphic example to compare two diametrically opposed approaches to the problem which determines the fate of our planet: The stance of the USSR, which not only advanced the idea of a nonnuclear world but also paved the way to its implementation, and the stance of the United States, striving to perpetuate the nuclear arms race and simultaneously spread it into outer space. On the one hand, new political thinking in action and concern for the supreme interests of the whole of mankind; on the other, the recurrence of imperial policy and an open challenge to the world public in favor of the Pentagon and the arms manufacturers. In ignoring the moratorium the Reagan administration did not simply reject this latest opportunity to radically improve Soviet-American relations but once again demonstrated its disdain for the will and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of people, since the moratorium gained the approval and

support of the UN General Assembly, the leadership of the nonaligned movement, the leaders of the "Delhi Six," many Western statesmen and politicians, and an impressive section of the Congress of the United States itself.

While carrying out at the end of February its first underground test for a long time the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to resume the moratorium as soon as the United States ended its explosions in Nevada. The continuation of tests is thus not our choice, and our conscience regarding the world is clear. With a mere handful of exceptions, this is acknowledged by all foreign commentators.

In the opinion of H. Ehmke (deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the Bundestag), "the latest opportunity to restrain the arms race has been lost" due to the stance adopted by the White House and also the FRG Government, which has been reluctant to exert appropriate influence on Washington. "Responsibility for the ending of the moratorium rests with the United States," writes Paris' LE MONDE, which also indicts Washington's allies, particularly France, which accompanied the Nevada explosions with its own explosions on Muroroa.

And what are people in the United States itself saying on this score? The Center for Defense Information has expressed complete understanding of our decision to resume testing. This prestigious organization, which is run by a number of retired admirals and generals, reminded people that up to the introduction of the moratorium the United States had a clear advantage in terms of the number of nuclear explosions held, having carried out one-third more such tests. Since then this gap had increased by 26 explosions in Nevada in the absence of any tests at Semipalatinsk. The other day the State Department confirmed the White House's intention to continue carrying out explosions in Nevada "while our security depends on nuclear weapons." Atomic power is also the basis of the notorious SDI program. It is no surprise that in its attempts to justify its refusal to join the Soviet moratorium the White House has explained the continual explosions at Nevada by the needs of the future "Star Wars" program.

Sensing, however, the shakiness and lack of cogency of its arguments, the Reagan administration decided to switch from outright defense to the offensive, with the aim of attacking our moratorium. In a report submitted to Congress the other day the White House boss made the "suggestion" that the USSR--in some way known to Reagan alone and secret to everyone else, including the American observers at Semipalatinsk--had continued nuclear tests even after it had committed itself to suspend underground explosions. In the absence of facts, the U.S. President, as is his wont, employed ill-intentioned conjecture--who knows, someone may believe it,...

It is difficult to say who advised the White House boss to put out such "arguments" in the hope of denigrating the USSR's major peace-loving action, or why. Possibly the president's advisers extracted the idea from the recently published report of the national laboratory at Los Alamos, where work to improve atomic weapons has been going on now for more than 40 years. That report also talks about nuclear explosions carried out on the sly during the

operation of a moratorium. As opposed to the Reagan administration, however, the Los Alamos scientists deal with facts rather than insinuations. There is another distinction too: It is the United States rather than the USSR which is charged with breaching its own commitments to halt nuclear tests.

What is at issue here is the moratorium of 1958-1961, to which both our country and the United States were party. The latter's commitment to it was, as is now clear, merely verbal. In actual fact, while the White House engaged in peace-making rhetoric the Pentagon carried out /SEVERAL DOZEN/ [capitalized words between slantlines printed in capitals] nuclear explosions: 35 at Los Alamos, slightly fewer at the Nevada test site. Since extremely low-yield charges were being tested, the then president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, found it possible to oblige the military, who suggested keeping this fact secret from the public on the pretext that the explosions carried out did not fall the nuclear category. Thus it was that with the knowledge and approval of the White House boss the Washington administration for a long time simultaneously deceived the world public and its own people.

The present American Republican president is essentially doing the same. And his motives are identical, that is, to justify the buildup in the arms race by any untruths.

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CSO: 5200/1388

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET EXPERT SAYS NUCLEAR PROGRAM BASED ON MINIMUM

LD301836 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1345 GMT 30 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 30 March (TASS) -- We do not intend to copy the U.S. nuclear program which is aimed in particular at creating space-based weapons. But the Soviet side cannot fail to be concerned about maintaining strategic parity with the United States, writes Major General Geliy Batenin, an expert at the USSR Ministry of Defense in the latest issue of the APN VOENNY VESTNIK.

The Soviet test program proceeds from the minimum necessary -- in the face of the U.S. position -- for fundamental research, national economic aims, verifying equipment and weapons for their resistance to the strike factors of a nuclear explosion, including resistance against those systems which are being developed as part of SDI plans, continues the author. Twenty-six explosions without response is a very large number. It is indeed a danger. The United States is developing six new types of strategic offensive systems. Experiments are continuing on nuclear triggered laser weapons within the framework of the SDI program. In terms of overall numbers of nuclear tests, the United States is at least one third ahead of the Soviet Union.

On 12 March the U.S. State Departments presented the Soviet ambassador in Washington with a memorandum asserting that during the underground nuclear test at the site near Semipalatinsk there was allegedly a leak of "radioactive particles which reached places outside the USSR" into the atmosphere. This assertion is a lie. In conducting underground nuclear explosions we took every precaution, completely hindering the release into the atmosphere of so-called "radioactive particles." First and foremost conditions for the depth at which the charge was buried were precisely observed, and other technical measures were taken aimed at excluding radioactive fallout.

The Soviet Union is an honest partner and attributes serious significance to strict and unswerving observance of all international agreements. We see the treaty signed in Moscow in 1963 as an important instrument in limiting the nuclear arms race and maintaining stability, stressed Geliy Batenin.

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CSO: 5200/1388

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET RADIO TO CHINA ON U.S., UK REFUSAL TO SIGN RAROTONGA

OW230507 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1600 GMT 22 Mar 87

["Short article" by station commentator (Shakhov) from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] About 100 years ago, British Prime Minister Disraeli declared that Britain is always right, even if it commits a crime. Around that time, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt also explicitly expounded a similar view toward foreign policy. He said: If a certain international agreement contradicts our imperialist strategic objective, then we should ignore or destroy it. The era when British and U.S. imperialist elements lorded it over others without restraint on this good earth, including the Asia-Pacific region, is over. However, imperialist and hegemonic ambition is still the foundation of their policies today. The decision of the British and the U.S. Governments not to commit themselves to observing the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in South Pacific is a case in point.

As we know, the Rarotonga Treaty was formulated in 1985 and was signed by Australia, New Zealand, and other South Pacific island states. The Soviet Union and the PRC are committed to observing this treaty, but the United States, Britain, and France refused to conform to the will of countries in that region. Why? Because Western countries, in principle, are opposed to all treaties concerning the establishment of nuclear-free zones. They have denounced ASEAN's proposal to declare Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone, and do not support the DPRK Government's proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula.

Washington is angry at the New Zealand Government and has applied pressure on the latter because nuclear-armed U.S. warships are denied access to New Zealand ports. The Soviet Union, China, the DPRK, and other socialist countries, as well as most developing countries in the Asian-Pacific region advocate the elimination of the nuclear threat, but the imperialist countries have demonstrated that they intend to use nuclear threat as the basis of their global strategy.

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CSO: 5200/1388

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NEW ZEALAND PM DISAPPOINTED IN U.S. ON TREATY REJECTION

Wellington THE EVENING POST in English 6 Feb 87 p 9

[Text]

Prime Minister David Lange yesterday expressed "deep disappointment" at the United States' decision not to sign the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty protocols.

"The United States response is the more disappointing in that intensive consultation took place with the United States authorities over the treaty and the protocol, and considerable efforts were made to heed United States concerns."

The US Administration had stated its decision was based on its global security interests and responsibilities, Mr Lange said.

"New Zealand deeply regrets that the interests of the South Pacific region do not appear to have been given more weight by the United States Government in reaching its present position."

The US had been made fully aware of the importance South Pacific nations, including New Zealand, attached to US support for the treaty through ratification of its protocols.

The Treaty of Rarotonga involved a major security commitment for nations of the South Pacific and represented a solemn step in contributing to both regional and global security, Mr Lange said.

The US announcement demonstrated that adherence to the respective protocols by all nuclear weapon states would be neither a speedy nor a simple process.

That had been clear from the length of time it took the nuclear weapon states to determine their positions on the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone.

"The obligations set out in the treaty and protocols demand a sincere and earnest assessment of the commitment undertaken by parties to the treaty and by the prospective parties to the protocols."

Mr Lange said he hoped the US and other nuclear-weapon states that had not

signed the protocols would not do anything inconsistent with the treaty's provisions.

"Indeed, it is clear that the United States proposes to observe the requirements of the treaty in a de facto liaison. I hope that in due course an appropriate formal commitment will be possible."

● Australia should "secede" from the United States in response to the US decision not to sign, Australian Democrats Senator Norm Sanders said yesterday.

Senator Sanders, the American-born peace and environment spokesman for the Democrats, said the Reagan Administration was acting like a bunch of schoolyard bullies who wanted everything exactly their way.

"For months they have been stealing our grain markets, and for years Australia has been their military playground," he said.

"For the last two years they have been trampling all over New Zealand for attempting to safeguard its harbours against nuclear accidents.

"And now, when faced with a Treaty which does nothing to inhibit their military operations in the South Pacific, they refuse to sign."

Senator Sanders said this was an act of spite against the small countries in the region, which did not like superpower interference in their affairs.

"It is also an attempt by the US to gain unrestricted rights to station nuclear weapons on Australian soil in the future," he said.

"Most of all, it demonstrated that the Reagan Administration just can't stand to lose.

"Instead of acting like the supine 51st American State, Australia should secede and stand on its own two feet as an independent nation." — NZPA-AAP

/9274

CSO: 5200/4307

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NEW ZEALAND'S PM DISCUSSES LAW BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BK121026 Hong Kong AFP in English 1001 GMT 12 Feb 87

[Text] Wellington, Feb 12 (AFP) -- New Zealand's proposed law banning nuclear weapons from its territory, port and waters was a restriction on the arms race, Prime Minister David Lange told Parliament Thursday.

The arms race "can only end when real and serious limits are placed on building, testing and deploying nuclear weapons", Mr Lange said.

The government bill was "a real measure of arms control" but still allowed the naval vessels of allies "to be welcomed to New Zealand", he said.

Washington has cut defence links with Wellington because of anti-nuclear policies and a ban on U.S. warship access to New Zealand ports.

Mr Lange said U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz made it clear that nuclear weapons "would come to New Zealand from time to time" on U.S. ships.

The Lange government has refused entry to all such vessels because of a U.S. refusal to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons.

"Only when there is a willingness to replace nuclear defence with conventional defence will there be any hope of an end to the arms race," the New Zealand prime minister said.

He rejected opposition claims that he had lost the battle over nuclear policy to the left wing of his Labour Party which was seeking non-aligned status for New Zealand.

Opposition leader Jim Bolger said the nuclear-free bill was "the formal opting-out legislation from the Western alliance".

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CSO: 5200/4307

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

WELLINGTON DAILY HITS RESUMED U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR TESTS

Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 25 Feb 87 p 6

[Editorial: "Missed: Nuclear Opportunity"]

[Text] At any moment now the world may hear that a nuclear device has been exploded at a testing ground in the Soviet Union. In August 1985, Moscow declared a moratorium on such experiments and extended it four times, until authorities scrapped it at the beginning of this year. During all those months, the Kremlin urged the United States to follow its example. Even now it says it is willing to stop the tests it is about to resume if the United States will desist.

Washington will have none of it. During the Soviet moratorium it exploded between 20 and 30 test nuclear devices. Why either country needs to carry on experimenting when each already possesses the nuclear strength to wipe out the other many times over is a question that continues to baffle the layman.

The Russians and Americans are not the only ones with nuclear-testing programmes. Britain, France, China and probably others are in the business, too. A test-ban agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would not necessarily inhibit any of them. Nevertheless, with Washington's rejection of the Soviet overtures, and the Soviet Union's intention to start blasting again, it does seem that somehow mankind has missed a great opportunity.

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CSO: 5200/4306

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

AUSTRALIAN EDITORIAL HITS U.S. ON TREATY REJECTION

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 9 Feb 87 p 8

[Editorial: "America's Pacific Mistake"]

[Text]

IT IS said that Mr Shultz and the US State Department were not entirely hostile to the Rarotonga Treaty. But sadly, the arguments against the treaty easily prevailed in Washington, and relations between the US and the Pacific's island states will be further frayed. Washington's reservations are obvious. The treaty is directly aimed at the nuclear testing program of France, one of America's most important allies. The US is concerned about doing anything that may encourage less sensitively worded nuclear-free zone treaties in strategically more important parts of the world. The Defence Department is said to have also objected that signing the protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty would restrict America's strategic options in the region.

Clearly, there were to be costs to signing the treaty. But they were greatly exaggerated, while the benefits — the most important being better US relations with the developing nations of the region — seem to have been given very little weight. Never particularly alive to the sensibilities of the region's absurdly small states, Washington has rejected the

Rarotonga treaty with inadequate thought.

The Soviet Union has signed the protocols, getting in just ahead of China. The Russians, of course, are outrageous opportunists, and signing the protocols would have got them nowhere had the US also signed. It is by rejecting the treaty — by rubbing the island states' noses in their unimportance to Washington — that the Americans have turned the Russian's transparent opportunism into a genuine propaganda and diplomatic victory.

The Soviet Union's relations with the region are warming while the US treats the region with frequently baffling contempt. First, it was the interests of the American Tunaboat Association that were paramount in Washington. And while the US was imposing economic sanctions against the Solomons (for arresting a US fishing boat), the Soviet Union was quietly offering the poorer Pacific states substantial royalties for the right to exploit their only significant resource — the fish migrating through their exclusive economic zones.

It took the Americans an unbelievably long time to reach a simple and sensible settle-

ment of the fishing-rights question; time which the Russians put to good use. Kiribati, one of the poorest countries in the region, took the offer up; Vanuatu followed suit. Now, to destroy any repairs to US-Pacific relations, comes the rejection of the Rarotonga treaty. Again the Russians can be expected to press their advantage. The island states are democratic to a fault, mostly conservative and pro-Western, but in many cases dreadfully poor. The need for foreign exchange, and the emergence of younger politicians, less tied to the West, will make the nations of the Pacific increasingly willing to listen to Soviet offers of trade and closer relations.

The US Government's careless diplomacy will help remove a crucial political barrier in the region to closer relationships with the Russians. While the Russians, of course, are on their best behaviour, capitalising on America's mistakes, but never pushing their luck. Surprising Russian subtlety, combined with infuriating American clumsiness, are rapidly transforming the South Pacific. No longer is it a tranquil ANZUS lake.

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET MILITARY PAPER ON U.S. NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL STRATEGY

Pentagon's Strategic Concepts

PM251031 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[First of a series of articles by Major General R. Simonyan, retired; doctor of military sciences, under the rubric "The Pentagon's Strategic Goals": "The Multi-Option Plans of Aggression" -- first two drafts are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction. Passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] The U.S. military-strategic concepts which reflect the administration's official views on the nature of wars in preparation have undergone many changes. What has not changed is their aggressive nature and U.S. imperialism's claim to the "right" to impose by force of arms its order on other countries and to thwart revolutionary and other progressive movements.

Today we publish the first in a series of articles which reveal the aggressive thrust and content of the Pentagon's military-strategic concepts.

Directive 59, signed by President Carter, is still in force. The main aim of U.S. military-political strategy is formulated in it as the destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system and the restoration of the capitalist system as the only system in the world. This idea was further developed by President Reagan who declared his ambitious intention "to write off communism as a sad and unnatural chapter in mankind's history."

In pursuit of these arrogant and, let's be frank, reckless aims, the strategy of "direct confrontation" and specific plans for the buildup and application [primeneniye] of armed forces were elaborated. Weinberger, the Pentagon chief, makes no secret of the fact that the new strategy is aimed at achieving "total and unquestionable U.S. military superiority" and "the restoration of America's leading role in the world," it is designed to "actively counter the USSR in all parts of the world" and "ensure readiness for waging war."

The strategy's specific aims are formulated in the "Guidelines for the Development of the U.S. Armed Forces" elaborated by the Pentagon. They contain the following statement about achieving victory in nuclear war: "The United States must win the upper hand and be able within a short time to force the USSR to cease military actions on U.S. terms." For this purpose it is deemed necessary above all to "decapitate the structure of military-political power in the USSR and the nuclear and conventional forces," and also to destroy "industrial sectors which determine military potential."

They also pursue the unrealizable and illusory aim of reducing to a minimum the damage inflicted on the United States as a result of a retaliatory strike.

The question arises: How is one to reconcile these U.S. military department guidelines with President Reagan's public pronouncements to the effect that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought?" The answer clearly ought to be sought in a revelation made by P. Nitze, special adviser to the U.S. President and to the secretary of state on questions of arms control and a true expert when it comes to the administration's "political intrigues." According to his definition the word "policy" is to be understood in two ways: As specific principles by which the administration is guided in its actions, and as "political statements" served up to the broad public in the hope of achieving a "political or a psychological effect" -- in other words, in order to deceive.

Both of these interpretations are incorporated in the strategy of "direct confrontation," which contemplates the unleashing and waging of various kinds of war: all-out or "limited," nuclear or conventional war, and correspondingly short or protracted war. Let us examine them.

/All-out nuclear war./ The main emphasis, as in the past, is placed on preparations for an all-out nuclear war based on a multitude of options for the use [ispolzovaniye] in such a war of the strategic offensive forces -- from so-called "selective" nuclear strikes to massed nuclear strikes against the whole complex of installations on the territory of the USSR and other socialist countries.

The plans for the "selective" use of the strategic offensive forces comprise a multitude of options for nuclear strikes in which nuclear munitions ranging from several units to several thousand units would be used. Such strikes are planned against various installations on the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and also in areas of so-called "vital U.S. interests," in particular in the Near and the Middle East.

The list of targets to be hit during a massed use [primeneniye] of strategic nuclear forces comprises installations of military potential, political, state, and military leadership organs, major installations in key sectors of industry, transport, and communications, and also major administrative centers in the USSR.

/Limited nuclear war./ In the strategy of "direct confrontation" special stress is laid on waging so-called regional nuclear wars, confined to a specific region, primarily Europe. The deployment in West Europe of a qualitatively new component of the NATO allied armed forces, namely means of a nuclear first strike -- the U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles -- is based on precisely these adventurist schemes.

The concept of theater nuclear war in the way that it is presented is highly contradictory and difficult to implement. The experience of war indicates quite clearly that it never proved possible to contain conflagrations within the limits drawn up beforehand. As soon as you start using nuclear weapons in the "battlefield" or a "limited" area, they may be used on a strategic scale.

/Conventional wars./ The U.S. strategy of "direct confrontation" (and under its impact also the NATO strategy of "flexible response") is geared also to preparing the armed forces for unleashing and waging wars using only conventional means of destruction. [paragraph continues]

For propaganda purposes this is served up as one the ways to overcome the "nuclear impasse." However, first, modern warfare, even if it is confined to "conventional" means can bring untold suffering to the people of the continent. Second, the likelihood that it will grow into a nuclear war is very great. Not even the American and NATO military experts rule this out.

Of late the U.S. military doctrine is paying considerable attention to so called /"low-intensity" conflicts/. This term is used to describe various forms of armed violence which, in the view of the U.S. strategists, need not grow into "limited" war, and it also describes other instances of a show of strength and subversive actions of various kinds launched by Washington in connection with domestic political events in countries with regimes which Washington finds unacceptable.

Not by accident did the West German journal BLAETTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK refer to the reasoning behind such conflicts elaborated by the Pentagon as a "concept of state terrorism." It is a question of carefully planned and sufficiently well-rehearsed actions (on a global scale) against national and liberation movements or progressive governments. The armed aggression against Grenada in 1983, for instance, and the actions of the counterrevolution against the legitimate governments in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and other developing states, the piratical actions against sovereign Libya, and so forth rank in this category of conflicts, according to U.S. view.

All the goals of the strategy of "direct confrontation," bearing in mind the armed conflicts possible in the present age, have been translated into extremely dangerous multi-option plans and large-scale material preparations for war. They are pushing mankind to the brink of a catastrophe.

The stance of the Soviet Union on the fundamental questions of war and peace is commonly known. "We," M.S. Gorbachev has said, "deny the right of the leadership of any country, be it the USSR, the United States, or any other country, to pass the death sentence on mankind. We are not a judge and the billions of people are not criminals who must be punished. For this reason it is necessary to dismantle the nuclear guillotine. The nuclear powers must cast off the nuclear shadow and stride out into the nuclear-free world."

U.S. Strategic Arsenal

PM261355 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 87 Second Edition p 3

[Second in series of articles by Major General (Retired) R. Simonyan, doctor of military sciences, under the rubric "Pentagon's Strategic Goals": "Courses of Nuclear Supremacy" -- passages between slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] In its plans preparing for a war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist states the Pentagon lays the main stress on building up its strategic offensive forces in every possible way. All postwar U.S. strategies have included as an important component a specially devised concept on the basis of which the demands for the development [razrabotka] and creation [sozdaniye] of nuclear arms are drawn up. Thus, in the fifties there was the strategy of "massive retaliation," which subsumed the concept of "nuclear supremacy." With the adoption of the "realistic deterrence" strategy (in the early seventies) the concept received the more sonorous title of "strategic sufficiency." And within the framework of the "direct

confrontation" strategy adopted by the Reagan administration, it has turned into the concept of "active opposition."

The U.S. magazine THE PROGRESSIVE called the name change a case of "playing with words," explaining that the difference between the terms was "virtually indistinguishable." And indeed, whatever these military-strategic goals may be called, they have the same aim of achieving nuclear supremacy and the same way of bringing it about -- building up the already jam-packed nuclear arsenals. Those are the facts.

By the time of the Reykjavik summit (October 1986) there were 2,208 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in service with the U.S. strategic offensive forces:

- 1,018 ICBM launchers;
- 672 SLBM launchers;
- 518 strategic heavy bombers.

The delivery vehicles in service with combat units are capable of delivering in one launch/sortie over 14,000 nuclear munitions with yields of from 50 kilotons to 10 megatons.

M.S. Gorbachev gave R. Reagan these figures during their Reykjavik summit and they provoked no objection. Since then the buildup in U.S. strategic offensive forces has continued. The SALT II treaty was violated and another five B-52 bombers have been adapted to carry cruise missiles. There have also been other changes. By 1 January 1987 there were already around 15,000 charges on U.S. strategic delivery vehicles.

The ground-launched strategic missile forces currently include MX, Minuteman-3, Minuteman-2, and Titan-2 ICBM launchers. More than 90 percent of the ICBM's are on constant standby.

The sea-launched strategic forces number 38 SSBN's with payloads of Trident-1, Poseidon C-3, and Polaris A-3 SLBM's. They represent around 50 percent of all strategic nuclear munitions. More than half of the SSBN's are constantly on combat patrol in various regions, ensuring that it is possible to inflict nuclear strikes against targets located on the territory of the USSR and the other socialist countries.

B-52 and B-1B heavy bombers are armed with modern nuclear munitions (bombs, SRAM guided missiles, and ALCM-B air-launched cruise missiles). Furthermore, there are 60 FB-111A nuclear-capable medium-range bombers specially intended for operations on the European continent.

In assessing U.S. strategic potential it is also necessary to take account of the Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles being deployed in a number of European NATO countries, which in terms of their tasks are essentially strategic weapons with regard to the USSR. These missiles, like the aforementioned strategic means, are designed for inflicting a nuclear first strike. It is planned that 108 Pershing 2 launchers (they have all already been deployed in the FRG) and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (256 missiles had been deployed as of 1 January this year) will be in service in Western Europe in 1988.

Enough U.S. nuclear weapons have been accumulated to wipe out all life on earth many times over. However, Washington claims that the United States does not have enough nuclear and other types of deadly weapons, since they do not provide military supremacy

over the USSR. Military programs encompassing all components of the strategic triad are aimed at achieving such supremacy.

/ICBM's./ A special role is played by the plans to deploy MX ICBM's. MX missiles are equipped with 10 warheads each yielding 600 kilotons. The Pentagon intends to deploy 100 such missiles. The first ten are in a state of combat readiness in launch silos at the Warren missile base, Vermont. President Reagan has approved the Pentagon recommendation about their new deployment mode -- on railroad platforms in order to ensure mobility and make their detection as difficult as possible.

Development [razrabotka] continues of yet another mobile based ICBM -- the Midgetman with a 500 kiloton warhead. It is planned to deploy 500-1,000 such missiles starting in 1992.

/Sea-launched missile systems./ Work is being expedited on the creation of the Trident-2 (D-5) -- a powerful SLBM. According to calculations, it will have virtually the same combat potential as the MX ICBM in attacking highly defended targets, will have a range of 11,000 km, and will exceed the current Trident-1 (C-4) missile payload by a factor of almost 2 and its accuracy by a factor of 4-5. It is planned to have 20 "Ohio"-class submarines equipped with Trident-2 missiles in service in the nineties.

/Strategic aviation./ Having torn up the SALT II treaty, the Reagan administration is continuing to re-equip its B-52 bombers with long-range (up to 2,500 km) cruise missiles. Each aircraft can carry up to 20 such missiles.

Series production and deployment of the new B-1B heavy bomber have begun. By 1989 it is planned to commission 100 such aircraft, each of which can carry up to 30 cruise missiles. Development [razrabotka] of the fundamentally new ATB [advanced technology bomber] (stealth) heavy bomber is proceeding at an accelerated rate. By the mid-nineties it is planned to have 132 such bombers in service. In the future the B-1B and ATB will be the basis of U.S. strategic aviation. In order to give these aircraft enhanced combat potential, the United States is completing development [razrabotka] of the new ACM nuclear cruise missile with a range of up to 4,500 km. It is expected to enter service in 1987-1988.

As a result of the implementation of all these sweeping militarist programs J.S. strategic nuclear potential will grow to 20,000 [as published] by the early nineties. The potential for delivering nuclear charges to targets in one launch/sortie will increase by no less than 50 percent.

All this, Washington believes, will make it possible to pursue the traditional U.S. imperialist "position of strength" political course and make possible a "wide range of flexible options" in the application of strategic forces. These forces, according to the present "active opposition" concept, should have the capability to ensure the "assured destruction" of states or coalitions of enemy states by inflicting above all a "preemptive" strike -- or to put it more plainly, a massive surprise nuclear first strike.

The plans to militarize space aimed at creating [sozdaniye] an entirely new weapons type -- space strike arms -- must be viewed in close conjunction with the strategic arms race. The task has been set, first, of deploying new space-based strategic forces which, in conjunction with existing offensive strategic means and those under development [razrabatyvayemy], would allow the United States to inflict a first strike with impunity. Second, of protecting U.S. territory with a multilayer antimissile defense, thereby depriving the USSR of the ability to inflict a retaliatory strike.

Pentagon chief Weinberge admitted with blatant cynicism that "if we could obtain a system which would be effective and make Soviet arms ineffective, we would be returning to the situation we were in when we were in when we were the only country with nuclear weapons."

This aim, of course, is illusory, but it is no less dangerous for that. Each time that reactionary U.S. circles embarked on another spiral in the arms race, counting on achieving overwhelming supremacy over the Soviet Union, it transpired that their calculations were built on sand. The USSR created [sozdal] the necessary types of weapons as a retaliatory measure. Military-strategic parity was maintained. But, through the fault of Washington, it was maintained at a higher and, consequently, more dangerous level.

U.S. Conventional Weapons

PM271201 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[Final article in three-part series by Major General (Retired) R. Simonyan, doctor of military sciences, under the rubric "Pentagon's Strategic Goals": "Militarists' Growing Appetites; Conventional Arms in U.S. and NATO Plans" -- passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] The U.S. and NATO military-political leadership believes that the increased effectiveness of weapons makes it possible under certain conditions to resolve set tasks and achieve the aims of a war by using conventional strike means only. That is why along with the expedited buildup of nuclear potential great stress is laid on developing conventional arms in every possible way.

This has its own theoretical basis -- the widely trumpeted concept in the West of "geographic escalation" and the concept of "follow-on forces (reserves) attack," which is known as the "Rogers plan" (named for its creator, the U.S. general who was NATO supreme allied commander, Europe).

The "Rogers Plan" -- essentially a version of the U.S. "airland operations (battle)" concept applied to European and NATO bloc conditions -- has been featured quite extensively in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. We recall that Rogers himself defined the key aims of his strategic plan as to step up the training of NATO armies for war using ultramodern ELINT means and new missiles with conventional nonnuclear warheads but with exceptionally high tactical and technical characteristics. As he put it, they should be capable of carrying out deep strikes against groupings of enemy forces throughout the depth of the area in which they are stationed (theater of military operations) even before they reach the front line.

As for U.S. "geographic escalation," it was advanced by the Reagan administration to replace previous concepts in line with the "direct confrontation" strategy. In this regard Defense Secretary Weinberger stated: "Strategic concepts based on artificial restrictions being placed on the possibility of escalation are unrealistic." The Pentagon chief, as we can see, is entirely opposed to any restrictions on U.S. imperialism's global military adventurism.

The "geographic escalation" concept is fundamental in determining the combat strength of U.S. general-purpose forces (ground forces, tactical aviation, and naval forces) and the directions in which they are developed. Under the concept, the Pentagon plans to

create (in terms of personnel and technical equipment) general-purpose forces which would be capable together with allied forces of waging against the USSR and its allies a protracted general war using conventional strike means simultaneously in several theaters of military operations. It is these aims that form the basis of the creation and improvement of various types of highly accurate weapons in the United States and NATO. We will dwell on a few of them.

/Cluster weapons/ are very widespread. They take the form of artillery shells and rockets, tactical missile warheads, air-launched missiles, bombs, and bomblet dispensers containing large quantities of smaller munitions (submunitions) of different designs and for different purposes: for attacking people, unarmored and lightly armored equipment, and tanks. Thus a salvo from one division of U.S. 240-mm MLRS multiple-launch rocket system combat vehicles contains several tens of thousands (!) of submunitions.

During its punitive operations the United States has also used so-called /"vacuum bombs,"/ which operate on the principle of dispersing an air-fuel mixture and detonating the resulting cloud. People caught in the cloud area are hit by the blast and also die as a result of the lack of oxygen, which is consumed during the explosion. "Vacuum" munitions are today 4-6 times (and in the future will be 10-20 times) more powerful than an equivalent weight of high-explosive munitions loaded with TNT.

The increase in the combat might of tactical strike aircraft is taking place mainly through aircraft renewal and the arming of aircraft with /multirole guided missiles and bombs./ The airborne guided bombs currently in service with the USAF have a glide range of 5-65 km. They are equipped with TV or laser seekers ensuring a circular error probable (CEP) of between 3-5 and 10 meters.

Short-range (20-40 km), medium-range (100-180 km), and long-range (up to 600 km) guided missiles in tactical aviation have been greatly developed. Long-range guided missiles, according to foreign press figures, will have a CEP of 5-30 meters. That means that tactical aircraft can strike "pinpoint" enemy targets (missile positions, concealed aircraft, air defense means, and other targets) throughout the entire depth of their area of operational deployment.

U.S. tactical aircraft renewal is proceeding with the entry into service of F-15 all-weather fighters and F-16 fighter-bombers. Aircraft with considerably enhanced operating range -- the Tornado and Mirage 2000 -- are entering service with the British, FRG, and Italian Air Forces and the French Air Force respectively.

The creation [sozdaniye] of /electromagnetic guns/ is being expedited. According to Western press figures, these can be used to "fire" shells with an initial velocity of the order of 100 km per second and not only to effectively resolve traditional artillery tasks but also to destroy enemy ICBM warheads during any flight phase. The Pentagon believes that at a range of 2,000 km (given a flight velocity of 10-20 km per second for inert munitions) electromagnetic guns are capable of creating a higher energy density per unit area than other promising weapon types, including power lasers and nuclear munitions (yielding up to 25 kilotons). It is not hard to see that the creation [sozdanie] of such a gun erodes the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons.

In the future the United States plans to develop [razrabotat] low- and medium-power tactical /laser weapons./ These may be based either on the ground or in the air and are designed to hit airborne targets and neutralize enemy electronic optics.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of enemy strikes a /radar early-warning and control system/ is being deployed. It includes 18 U.S. AWACS-system E-3A aircraft designed to provide surveillance extending 500-600 km into the Warsaw Pact countries' territories.

The U.S. and NATO command are gambling particularly on the creation of conventional weapons -- /reconnaissance strike complexes/ -- which combine reconnaissance means and automated control and strike means in a single system. Two types of complexes are being developed [razrabatyvatsya] in the United States: PLSS and Assault Breaker. The former is intended mainly to combat enemy air defense ground radar installations; Assault Breaker is designed to combat second echelon tank groupings. With the entry into service of reconnaissance strike complexes the U.S. and NATO strategists are aiming to make their conventional strike capability as effective as tactical nuclear weapons.

The escalation of the race in state-of-the-art conventional weaponry is very dangerous. With the improvements in conventional arms, those who are fond of military adventures may be tempted to carry out a so-called "preventive strike." And in the future new types of deadly weapons -- may appear. If we do not put obstacles in the way of more and more new types of weapon today, it will be much harder tomorrow.

The Warsaw Pact states have put forward proposals for reducing conventional arms and armed forces. Their implementation will not create any unilateral advantages and accords with the interests of the countries making up the opposing military-political groupings and the interests of all the peoples. A great deal depends on how seriously the West approaches this constructive appeal. However, there has not yet been a concrete response to it.

Thus, irrespective of the changes to the military strategic concepts linked with Washington's attempts to adapt to the changing situation in the world, these concepts have the same essence -- U.S. imperialism's desire for global hegemony and its obvious militarist adventurism. Each new concept differs from its predecessors mainly in the ferocity of its anti-Soviet and antisocialist thrust and in the appearance of more high-handed claims by U.S. ruling circles to the "right" to control international affairs "from a position of strength" and dictate their will to peoples who have chosen an independent path of development. However, nobody can turn the clock back.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW: PACT MEETING, THATCHER VISIT, 'SOVIET MILITARY POWER'

LD291919 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 29 Mar 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, deputy director of the United States of America and Canada Institute and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, and All-Union radio commentator Viktor Nikolayevich Levin]

[Text] Good morning, esteemed comrades. A sitting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states was held in Moscow this week, and we would like to begin by drawing your attention to the work of that committee and to the decisions made there. First of all, however, I would like to note that the work of the Foreign Ministers' Committee has recently become more and more creative, and that each one plans an increased initiative in implementing the course worked out jointly by the countries of the socialist community. Each state in the community has shown no small degree of initiative and previously has come out with important proposals for cooperation among the socialist countries. Recently, however -- and particular attention is being drawn to this -- this high level of initiative also has been producing definite results.

[Shishlin] One can go still further. After all, the restructuring process in the Soviet Union is accompanied by a restructuring process in our mutual relations with the socialist countries. It's not a question of any new kinds of principles being introduced into these relations, but rather, in my view, a question of these principles being filled with real content. This applies to the sphere of economic relations where, as we know, joint enterprises now are being created and direct contacts developed, and where it is a question of genuine socialist division of labor. It is also a question of multiplying contacts in the ideological and cultural spheres, and, of course, in political relations.

In my view this is expressed, on the one hand, quantitative terms which are, of course, easier to understand. I have in mind the regular sittings of the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee, the regular meetings of the Foreign Ministers' Committee, and meetings among the socialist countries at other levels.

Some things are also changing qualitatively. Going back to what you said, Viktor Nikolayevich, about the socialist countries' initiatives. I think that we are witnessing the transformation of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee into a collective, creative think tank for seeking the most effective methods and means of resolving the foreign policy objectives that unite the socialist countries. Though we all know that each socialist country has its own national interests, nevertheless,

there are some common objectives -- cardinal objectives -- such as those relating to overcoming the current confrontation and alienation in international relations, and the humanization of international relations. These objectives are, naturally, common to all the socialist countries. I would like to focus attention on the fact that the search is going ahead in such a nerve center of world politics as Europe. This is very important.

[Zhurkin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, it is indeed the case that this process of restructuring the relations among the socialist countries -- that most important component of all international relations -- cannot but have an effect on the situation in Europe as well. We have been witnesses to the 20-year continuation of the pan-European process since the beginning of the first preparatory steps for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe...

[Levin, interrupting] In Budapest in 1957...

[Zhurkin] Correct...

[Levin, interrupting] ...that idea was put forward.

[Zhurkin] It seems to me personally that for the first 10 years that process did not proceed badly, ending in the Helsinki Final Act. In the 2d decade it has been limping a great deal. We know very well whose fault this is. We know well that both the actions of the United States and a whole range of their NATO allies led to this. Anyway, the process has become lame. We will not digress by pointing to the culprits at this moment. The main thing is for us to make note of one objective fact: With the start of new activity on the part of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist community, serious hope again is apparent that this process will take off. It has now begun to. Remember the results of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference? There is, it seems to me, still serious hope that also at the Vienna meeting, to which this session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee was primarily devoted, the proceedings will get moving.

[Shishlin] What is of note in the work of the Foreign Ministers' Committee is the fact that the session participants are looking not only at yesterday or today, but at tomorrow in regard to European international politics. I think the positions taken by the socialist countries have very good prospects. On the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe, you are aware that here the determination of the socialist countries of Europe to see that an agreement is drawn up this year on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and on a sharp reduction in this type of weapons in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and on the U.S. territory has been clearly expressed. In my opinion, the decision of the Foreign Ministers' Committee on chemical arms is most vital. Essentially, here we are literally a step, if not half a step from working out an agreement. Therefore, the kind of additional efforts and ideas that have been expressed in the statement of the Warsaw Pact member states on the issue of banning chemical weapons are just what is needed.

On the other hand, I see as a fairly typical feature of the work of the recent session of Foreign Ministers' Committee the extremely attentive attitude of all participants in this conference toward the individual initiatives of each socialist country. This really is creative work. It really is a joint search for a solution when the individual voice of each participant helps to find an optimum solution.

[Levin] I also see as noteworthy in the work of the Moscow session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee the fact that it was not just a question of those initiatives that

are well-known -- our proposal, for instance, to separate the medium-range missile problem from the overall complex of talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, which has binned the support of the other socialist countries earlier on -- but here, new solutions also were worked out. There are also new initiatives, in particular on what you, Nikolay Vladimirovich, were saying, on the issue of banning chemical weapons. Incidentally, in this statement from the Warsaw Pact member-states on the question of a ban on chemical weapons, it is stressed that the socialist states are in favor of establishing the most rigorous monitoring [kontrol] of the member states' observance of their convention obligations.

[Zhurkin] Viktor Nikolayevich, on the question of monitoring [kontrol], the situation is now, I think, perfectly clear. Our country and the socialist community are the main fighters today for detailed, rigorous, well-developed, comprehensive, and multiphased international monitoring.

However, the United States, and I would say less so about the other Western countries, but above all about the United States -- which has for 40 years been dressing up in the mantle of the main proponents of monitoring -- that it is today, first here and now there, beginning to retreat from its position on the question of medium-range missiles and some other questions.

However, returning to the session of the Foreign Ministers' Committee, we somehow keep skirting the question of reducing conventional armed forces and weapons in Europe. On this issue, in my view, the socialist countries have demonstrated that now when there is some hope of deciding the issue of medium-range missiles -- and hope is building that after this question has been resolved matters will proceed more vigorously on the question of reducing to zero the strategic and tactical missiles of the two sides in Europe -- it is natural that the question arises of the colossal levels of conventional armed forces on both sides. Two million troops on each side face each other in Europe and, looking ahead, the socialist countries already are proposing a specific way to approach a resolution of this issue and are recalling the fact that, essentially, they have already contributed their main proposal of a 25 percent reduction as a first step.

[Shishlin] On the topic of the problem of curtailing conventional weapons and armed forces, there are many provisos in the West. One of these Western provisos is, in particular, the search for the most precise framework for the talks and for the participants in the talks. At the same time, the Western countries as is well-known, have in general, a fairly reserved attitude toward participation in these talks by neutral and nonaligned states, that is, those countries in Europe that belong neither to the Warsaw Pact nor to the North Atlantic bloc...

[Zhurkin, interrupting] but who live in Europe and are vitally interested in both the political and military situation in Europe becoming more favorable.

[Shishlin] Yes, this is so. The foreign affairs ministers of the socialist community countries do indeed believe that those European states belonging to neither of the blocs should take an active part in resolving this problem affecting all Europeans. Indeed, where is the logic? If we want to continue the Helsinki process, the more active a part played in it by the participants of the memorable European conference in the Finnish capital, the more successfully this process will develop and the further it will progress. What is of course vital is that the Foreign Ministers' Committee meeting actually coincides with a phase where the all-European dialogue seems to be livening up perceptibly, not only on a multilateral basis, but at the bilateral level. What I have in mind in the case in point is a certain clear interest on the part of influential political circles in the FRG to resume more profound, more serious, and

more extensive political relations with the Soviet Union. I have in mind the planned visits to the Soviet Union, and the visits by Soviet statesmen to West European countries. Of course, there is the visit to our country, which has in fact already begun, by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

[Levin] Yes, the talks begin tomorrow, Monday, but Thatcher is already in the Soviet Union, and her visit is, of course, arousing great interest. In the first place, it is the first visit, the first official visit, by a British head of government to the Soviet Union for the last 12 years. Secondly, there are no few problems in Soviet-British relations that need to be resolved and the general process of improving our relations could then be advanced.

Finally, we understand perfectly that these talks also could boost some all-European processes. We do not regard the British prime minister in the role of a mediator.

It emerges from her own words that she does not lay any claim to such a role herself, either. The British press, it is true, has repeatedly said that -- I quote -- Thatcher aspires to speak, if not on behalf of the West of a whole, at least on behalf of Western Europe. However, she dissociates herself from this, and this dissociation is probably completely well-founded, insofar as she represents Britain, a big, weighty, major country and a nuclear power. We indeed have things to discuss, in particular the nuclear problem. Yes, at this stage we have put forward proposals to take no account of the British and French forces when working out a treaty on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In the long-term, however, this issue must indisputably take account of the British and French nuclear potential. One would like to know how Britain regards the process of progressing toward a nuclear-free world. It is hard to say today what the talks will lead to, and it would be premature, to say the least. The results of the talks will speak for themselves, and after they have been completed, it will be necessary to summarize. For the time being, that is premature.

However, there are indeed questions. We know, for example, that the British Government is advocating arming itself with new Trident nuclear missiles. The conservative government does not want to renounce this, while the Labor Party leader Kinnock briefed President Reagan on his concept this week. True, it is said that the talks were not conducted in the warmest of atmospheres. However, the fact remains: When the Labor Party announced that it was in favor of a nuclear-free Britain, this evoked shock not only among many of Britain's NATO partners, but did not receive wide support in Britain itself -- not particularly wide support. A public opinion poll conducted in 1983 showed that 23 percent of the population favors unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain, while 67 percent are against it. A distinctive feature is that last fall, the correlation already looked different: 33 percent for the renunciation of nuclear weapons and 57 percent against such renunciation; things are moving. And if -- if, but we believe that this is not only possible, it is simply imperative -- agreement is reached on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, if an agreement is reached, then probably the correlation of forces in favor of Britain renouncing nuclear weapons will increase, just as the tendency in the world toward eliminating nuclear weapons also will increase.

[Shishlin] Viktor Nikolayevich, I think, nevertheless, that the question of Britain's nuclear weapons is one of tomorrow, if not the day after tomorrow, and most likely the day after tomorrow. In connection with the British prime minister's visit, I think one should not fail to consider the following: As far back as 1984, if my memory does not fail me, a parliamentary delegation visited Britain.

[Levin] Yes, December 1984.

[Shishlin] This delegation in fact was led by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev himself. Quite fruitful talks were held with the British at that time, including with Margaret Thatcher, and some prospects were outlined -- quite optimistic ones, on the whole -- for wide development of Anglo-Soviet cooperation in various areas. It seems to me now that if one looks at this period of time, 1984-1987, to a considerable degree these prospects have not on the whole been realized.

Furthermore, the second aspect I wanted to draw attention to: On the eve of her visit, Margaret Thatcher had the opportunity to talk to her European colleagues: She had meetings with French President Mitterrand and with FRG Chancellor Kohl.

However, even this is not the main point. The main point is the tone of Margaret Thatcher's statements that she considered necessary to adopt when speaking either in France, in West Germany, or in Britain itself.

I would say that this tone is distinguished by a toughness [zhestkost], by a conscious cementing of British positions. Outwardly it does not exactly look very promising in terms of whether one can expect any major results or major breakthroughs from the talks to be held in the Soviet Union. But all talks hold a secret. Perhaps this very cementing of positions is linked with the fact that there is an important secret. In the present case, I am quite simply guessing, because I do not think that the British prime minister has come just to have a cozy chat with Soviet leaders...

[Levin, interrupting]...to go to Zagorsk....

[Shishlin] Not just to Zagorsk, but I think a trip to Georgia has been planned for her, too...

[Levin, interrupting] Yes, then to Georgia.

[Shishlin] Well, and then to come back, and come back with everything remaining just the same.

[Zhurkin] But there is a sort of area of purely bilateral relations, primarily economic ones, where, I think, one must, nevertheless, expect some sort of changes for the better, taking into account both the latest decisions by the Soviet Union in this area, and our country's active aspiration to develop economic relations with all West European countries, including Britain, with which a well-established trading relation has existed for many years. So probably where bilateral relations are concerned, I do not think there is any great secret there. To return to the central issues however, that of Soviet-British relations and of world policy, then of course [words indistinct].

[Levin, interrupting] There is a lot that remains completely unknown.

[Shishlin] But, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, if we recall how things were after Reykjavik, [word indistinct] you remember, don't you, that soon after Reykjavik, and later too, in January of this year, Margaret Thatcher was in the United States. Then, you recall, the press had it that henceforth Margaret Thatcher would be some kind of mouthpiece for the NATO countries' general position on arms control issues. Well, it should be said that the 28 February statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and our new position on medium-range missiles in Europe and in the Asian sector of our country, is one of first priority, as formulated by Margaret Thatcher after her return from the United States after talks with President Reagan. After the Soviet proposal had been put forward on 28 February, it was Britain and France that both supported and

did not support this idea, and here, of course, elaboration and precise definition of positions are extremely important, extremely so.

[Levin] Well, since we have touched upon the problem of medium-range missiles, it seems appropriate at this point to speak about the U.S. attitude to this problem. It was this very week after all, if my memory serves me correctly, that the sixth edition of the booklet "Soviet Military Power" was published in the United States.

This work was presented by Defense Secretary Weinberger on the Worldnet Television Network, and the thought that was doggedly, consistently, and tenaciously advanced by Weinberger was that the Soviet Union had both been feverishly arming -- I'm citing his words -- and would continue to do so. In particular, it is impossible not to draw attention to the fact that Weinberger, generally repeating the theses of the booklet prepared by the Pentagon, was, to put it mildly, a trifle loose with the facts.

I will cite only a few examples. At a news conference, for instance, Weinberger was asked the question: On page 112, the report says that either Soviet assistants -- I'm citing this verbatim -- or the Soviets themselves, aim laser beams at aircraft of the Free World and at their pilots, and thus are possibly inducing temporary blindness among these pilots. Would you be able to clarify this? What incidents are involved?

This is followed by a very diffuse reply on the kinds of technological conditions that are possible for the application of these laser beams, and there was no direct answer. After this came the second question: In this case, you want to say that, in fact, a laser has not been used against pilots? Weinberger's reply was no, as far as I know, that has not happened. Well, then, excuse me, but what is being said in the report on page 112 then?

Or, let us take another matter relating to the correlation of nuclear forces. This is a favorite topic of U.S. propaganda, which loves to tote up the correlation of armaments between the USSR and the United States and which presents this in such a form that the United States is supposedly almost without weapons compared to the USSR. Here is what Weinberger said: In ICBM's and ballistic missiles, and submarine-based ballistic missiles, they -- that is the USSR -- outstrip us by a ratio of 4 to 1.

Let us take a look at the figures and let us take a look at the figures that the United States also admits. Here is the data on the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the United States for 1 January 1987. ICBM launchers: The USSR -- 1,398; the United States -- 1,016. Yes, in this category we do have a certain advantage, although, as you can see, the ratio is not 4 to 1. Submarine-based ballistic missile launchers, the overall number: the USSR -- 922; the United States -- 672. But, including launchers for missiles with MIRV's: the USSR -- 352; and the United States -- almost twice as many at 640. The overall number of warheads on strategic carriers: the USSR has about 10,000; the United States about 15,000.

Due to the difference here in approaches in terms, we believe that there is an approximate parity. But, then what kind of 4 to 1 ratio is Weinberger speaking about? He knows these figures full well. You see, this manipulation of facts and figures is very dangerous insofar as it generally continues to operate on developing the myth of the Soviet military threat and in no way bears witness to the good intentions of the United States.

[Zhurkin] Viktor Nikolayevich, but here is the remarkable thing. This is, after all, the sixth edition of this rather trashy little tome, founded on falsifications -- although it has been colorfully published with lots of crude pictures and photographs. Just look at what efforts were undertaken by Weinberger and the propaganda apparatus to

draw attention to this booklet now. These efforts are unprecedented; nothing similar has ever been done before. This means that it is getting harder and harder for Weinberger. The heat is on: in a changing international situation, they are now making far greater efforts than were earlier required in their attempts to somehow obstruct the progress of international processes, progress which is nevertheless positive and moving forward.

[Shishlin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I want to take up your thought that today, somehow, we really have been speaking more about Europe, or actually shifts in people's ways of thinking -- noticeable not only among Europeans, but quite noticeable within the United States. Very interesting things are taking place in Congress. When the House of Representatives opens session -- or at least a committee of the House of Representatives -- it will start to work out all kinds of bills to limit the financing of SDI and of strategic offensive weapons in the United States so that the United States will not overstep the limits of the SALT II treaty. The movement is growing in Congress to only finance nuclear tests with a yield no greater than one kiloton. Well, in my view, that is all very serious. It says that in general, the demands for a leveling out in international relations and for a radical improvement in the world political climate are far from being a monopoly of the Soviet Union or of our friends in the Warsaw Pact. These demands arise from the objective reality of that same West European political life, and similar demands are arising in U.S. politics.

[Levin] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I would like to illustrate your thought by way of an example. Our listeners already know that the United States already is saying out loud that in the event of an accord being reached on the removal of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, it will not eliminate the existing missiles, as put forward in our proposals; on the contrary, the United States says that it will transform Pershing-2 missiles into short-range missiles. We will remove one stage; even the technical problems in the process are explained in detail, describing it as very simple to do all this, but we will retain the physical missiles. As they would have it, this is necessary in order to compensate for the lag behind the USSR in the area of shorter-range missiles. Incidentally, on this account, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Committee gave an extremely accurate response: We propose to carry out the phased reduction of military confrontation in Europe, with the constant retention of military parity at an increasingly lower level. In doing so, wherever there is disparity in factors of any kind, it is necessary to level out the situation by way of appropriate reductions.

However, Weinberger is proposing a buildup. Here is how Bahr, the SPD arms control expert, reacted to this: He said that Weinberger is apparently unable to conceive anything other than achieving stability through new weapons. But that is, after all, idiocy. These are very sharp words, but in my view they accurately describe the situation.

[Shishlin] Having talked about current international affairs, we are forced to state that a great number of difficult problems still remain on the agenda, and, practically speaking, not a single one has been removed. However, shifts, both in people's minds and in practical matters, are taking place. For this reason, I feel that spring 1987, while it is a complicated, difficult spring in international relations, all the same should be called just that -- spring, insofar as some kind of general thawing process is underway in international relations. Along with the thaw, there is a stepping up of dialogue, and the stepping up of dialogue is the first step toward mutual understanding. From mutual understanding it is necessary to move on toward a reasonable compromise.

In essence, we may state that the course of active foreign policy taken by the USSR and which was determined by the 27th CPSU Congress and expressed in the Soviet position at the Geneva summit and in Reykjavik, this position -- and this has been borne out in practice -- has proved to be one with prospects.

[Levin] On this, esteemed comrades, our broadcast comes to an end. Thank you for your attention. All the best.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS REPORTS VIENNA PUBLIC PEACE FORUM

LD161619 Moscow TASS in English 1520 GMT 16 Mar 87

[Text] Vienna, 16 Mar (TASS)--By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev:

The peace forces of Europe and other continents must avert nuclear war. This is the main conclusions drawn at the international dialogue conference on problems of disarmament and detente, which closed here today. The elimination of medium-range missiles can facilitate in a decisive measure the attainment of other agreements on putting an end to nuclear tests, on the limitation of strategic weapons, a ban on chemical weapons, a cut in conventional weapons, says the statement adopted by the participants in the forum.

Representatives of political and public organizations and movements from Belgium, Britain, the GDR, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA, the Soviet Union, the FRG and Czechoslovakia have addressed an appeal to the political, government and nongovernmental organizations of Europe and the whole world that they do everything in their power to turn Europe into a nuclear-free continent.

It is on the initiative of representatives of the countries, which signed the Helsinki Accords, that the participants in the dialogue addressed an open letter to the meeting of representatives of the states participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, which is currently in session in the Austrian Capital. The peoples of Europe and the whole world should build their relations along the principles of renunciation of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons, mutual trust and equal security for all, the letter says.

Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal on the elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons has given an impetus to broadening the process started in Helsinki for the benefit of the peoples of Europe and the whole world, the letter says.

A press conference devoted to the results of the fourth dialogue conference on problems of disarmament and detente was held today.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR REPORTS ON UN BEIJING CONFERENCE

Conference Ends

LD272232 Moscow TASS in English 2150 GMT 27 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing March 27 TASS -- TASS correspondent Grigoriy Arslanov reports:

The U.N. regional five-day conference held here has been a positive contribution to solution of complicated problems of disarmament, building up measures of confidence and mutual understanding between states and peoples in the vast region of the world.

The conference held within the framework of the world campaign for disarmament for Asian and Pacific countries, brought out the community of destinies and interests of the peoples of Asia, the continent where American atomic bombs were exploded for the first time in mankind's history and where there is a whole network of foreign military bases, where conflicts are taking place. Participants in the conference meanwhile pointed to positive phenomena. One of them is that the two great nuclear powers of the region, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, declared they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

In the course of discussions the delegates expressed concern over the fact that the process of building up armaments is also spreading to developing countries, including the Asian-Pacific region, with one soldier per 44 people and only one doctor per 1,030 people.

The conference favourably responded to the Soviet proposals for establishing a universal system of international security, and also the idea of establishing nuclear-free zones. The conference declared for continuation of the dialogue on questions of Asian security.

The U.S. representative, who advocated nuclear intimidation, failed to summon up support of the participants in the forum.

Talking to the TASS correspondent, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR V.F. Petrovskiy underlined the great significance of the fact that the forum had been held in the capital of the People's Republic of China, a great socialist country with a population of 1,000 million. And it is difficult to overestimate the role of that country in the struggle for peace and disarmament, in building up measures of confidence, establishing mutually advantageous constructive cooperation between countries of the Asian-Pacific region.

He said that the USSR and the People's Republic of China had a high stake in consolidation of peace and stability not only in that region but also in the whole world, the early solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament without which there can be no durable peace and wholesome economic development of all countries.

At the concluding meeting the participants in the conference were unanimous in saying that the conference on the whole attained its goal -- establishment and development between countries of the region of a dialogue based on mutual understanding of the importance and complexity of the problems raised, promotion of the quest for new constructive ways of solving the problem of disarmament and settling conflict situations, establishing a reliable system of security.

U.S., Japan Lack 'Support'

OW300321 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China 0300 GMT
29 Mar 87

[Ivanov commentary]

[Text] Listeners: As everyone knows, a UN conference for the Asia-Pacific region within the framework of the world disarmament campaign has concluded in Beijing. The conference revealed the radical differences in the stands between the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and the peace-loving people in the region on the one hand and the United States and those who act as daring vanguards for the U.S. aggressive policy on the other. On this subject, our observer Ivanov comments as follows:

The theory on safeguarding the lasting peace of the Asia-Pacific region advanced by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Vladivostok last summer was the focus of attention of the representatives attending this regional conference. It is the consistent position of our country that new, rational relations be established among countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The proposal made by the Mongolian People's Republic for the establishment of an Asian disarmament and peace issue center as an organization for implementing the peace and security plan for the Asia-Pacific region evoked the interest of the participants. They pointed out with satisfaction that the two big socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China, have committed themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. They signed a protocol of the Rarotonga Treaty declaring the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone.

The U.S. representatives failed to win support from the participants in the Beijing conference for its nuclear intimidation policy, its position of refusing to support the Soviet proposal for stopping nuclear tests, and its attempt to defend its unwillingness to sign the Rarotonga Treaty. Also not welcomed by the participants was the speech made by the Japanese official representative in defense of the policy of expanding nuclear armaments in the Asia-Pacific region on the pretext of enhancing security against a concocted danger from the Soviet Union.

The Beijing conference once again indicated that the people of the Asia-Pacific region are longing for peace and cooperation.

Petrovskiy Meets PRC Foreign Minister

LD241126 Moscow TASS in English 1107 GNT 24 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing, March 24 TASS -- Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy, in Beijing to attend a regional United Nations conference within the framework of a worldwide campaign for disarmament for Asian and Pacific countries, today met with China's Acting Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

They discussed questions of establishing a system of lasting and secure peace in Asia and limiting and ending the arms race in the most dangerous nuclear-space direction.

The Soviet side described the process of restructuring currently under way in the Soviet Union. The Chinese side showed much interest in the information.

The conversation was attended by the USSR's ambassador to China, Oleg Troyanovskiy.

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